

NOTE.

In the Fasli year 1318 (A. C. 1908) His Highness the Nizam's Government appointed a Committee, consisting of Mr. A. Hydari, B. A., Secretary to Government in the Financial Department, Mr. Muhammad Aziz Mirza, B. A., Secretary in the Judicial, Police and General Departments, and Shams-ul-Ulama Sayyad Ali Bilgrami, B. A., ex-Secretary in the Public Works Department, to select and supervise the translation, into English, of rare and valuable works published in the German and French languages, with a view to their translation ultimately into Urdu, if considered advisable.

The first book selected was Renan's "*Averroes et l'Averroisme*" and its translation into English was entrusted to the late Nishikanta Chatophadhyaya, Doctor of Philosophy and Literature, Leipzig and Zürich. It is this translation which is now herewith published.

It is a melancholy fact that the Translator died not long after completing his task and that two out of the three members of the Committee of selection have also passed away.

The work of seeing the book through the Press and correcting its proofs has devolved upon Messrs G. S. Rao and Meherji Khurshedji of the Home Secretariat.

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SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

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17th April 1913.



12-25
AVERROES.

CHAPTER I.

Richard Johnson
by Alwahad on
December 1918

Life and Writings of Averroes.

The life of Averroes fills up almost the whole duration of the 12th century, and is connected with all the chief events of this epoch, which in the history of Mahomedan civilisation. The 12th century saw definitely fall to the ground the efforts of the Abbasids of Bagdad and of the Ommeyyads of Spain to create a rational and scientific development in the heart of Islam. When Averroes died in 1198, Arabian philosophy lost in him its last representative, and the triumph of the Koran over free speculation became assured for at least 6 centuries.

By the misfortunes of his life and by the reputation which he enjoyed after his death, Averroes shared in the inconveniences as well as in the benefits of such a situation. Coming after an epoch of great intellectual culture, at the moment when this culture was in a state of decline, if the misfortunes of his old age were the misfortune to which the cause he defended had fallen, Averroes, by a kind of compensation, gathered almost alone all the fragments of the works which he hardly did anything but offer to the world in their ensemble. Averroes is in certain respects the last of Arabian philosophy—one of those late arrivals who, by the encyclopædic character of their works what they were in a way, discussing and commenting, because it is the last of a great and other works, the last props of a civilisation which was falling, by an unexpected accident, attached to the debris of a civilisation which was gathered, and their writings were the last of a civilisation which enters on

The Arab-Spanish philosophy hardly counted two centuries of existence when it was suddenly arrested in its further evolution by religious fanaticism, by political revolutions, and by foreign invasions. Kaliph Hakem II, in the 10th century, had the glory of opening that brilliant series of studies which, by the influence it has exercised on Christian Europe, holds such an important place in the history of civilisation. Andalusia, Mahomedan historians tell us, became during his reign an extensive market where the literary productions of different climates were immediately brought for sale.⁽¹⁾ Books written in Spain and in Syria were often known in Spain before they were known in the East. Hakem sent 1,000 dinars of pure gold to Abul-faradj-el-Isfahani to procure the first copy of his famous Anthology, and, as a matter of fact, this beautiful book was read in Andalusia before it was known in the Irâk. He maintained at Cairo, at Bagdad, at Damas, and at Alexandria, special agents who were entrusted with the task of procuring, no matter at what price, works on ancient and modern sciences. His palace became a sort of workshop where you would hardly meet anybody else but copyists, book-binders and illuminators. The catalogue of his library formed in itself alone 44 volumes⁽²⁾ and even in this catalogue nothing but the name of each book was mentioned. Some writers state that the number of volumes in his library was no less than 400,000 and that at least six months would be required to transfer them from one place to another. Hakem was, besides, deeply learned in the sciences of genealogy and of biography. There was hardly a book which he did not read; he would then write on flying leaves the name, the surname, the patronymic of the author, his tribe, his family, the year of his birth and of his death and the anecdotes that were current about him. He spent his time in talking these subjects over with literary men who resorted to his court from all parts of the Mahomedan world.

(1). Pascual de Gayangos, — *The History of the Mahomedan Dynasties in Spain from the text of Al-Makkari* (London, 1840), t. I, app. p. xi. et suiv. t. II, 168 et suiv. Casiri, *Biblio. Arab. hisp.* t. II, p. 37—38 & 201—202. Middeldorff, &c., *Ibn-Abi-Oceibia, in the life of Ibn Badja*. (Bibl. imp. supp. ar. 673, folio 195).

(2). V. *Ibn-el-Ahbar*, dans Dozy, "*Notices sur quelques manuscrits arabes*," p. 103. 1 & 16—17. *Makkari* (edit, Dozy & Wright, &c.), Part I, p. 256.

The Arabs of Andalusia, even before Hakem, were impelled towards liberal studies, partly by the influence of their beautiful climate and partly by their constant intercourse with Jews and Christians. The efforts of Hakem, seconded by such favourable dispositions, developed one of the most brilliant literary movements of the Middle Ages. A taste for science and for all beautiful things in art and literature had given rise, in the 10th century, in this favoured corner of the world to a spirit of toleration of which it would be difficult to cite another example even in modern times. Christians, Jews and Mahomedans spoke the same language, chanted the same poems, and shared in the same literary and scientific studies. All the barriers which separate men were fallen : all laboured with one accord at the work of a common civilisation. The mosques of Cordova where scholars were counted by thousands became the active centres of scientific and philosophical studies. But the fatal cause which has always choked amongst Mahomedans the most beautiful germs of intellectual culture, that is to say, *religious fanaticism*, was already preparing the destruction of the work of Hakem. The theologians of Bagdad had already raised serious doubts about the final salvation of Khalif Mamoun, because he had had the temerity to disturb Mahomedan piety by the introduction of Grecian philosophy. The orthodox of Spain did not show themselves less severe. Hajib Almansour, having usurped power from the feeble Hisham, son of Hakem, understood that he would be pardoned everything, if he could only gratify the instinctive antipathy of the priests and of the people against rationalistic studies. He therefore had the library collected by Hakem with so much elaborate curiosity, ransacked for books treating of philosophy, astronomy and of other sciences cultivated by the ancients. All such books were burnt at the public places of Cordova, or thrown into the streams and water-cisterns of the palace. Only books on theology, grammar and medicine were preserved. "This act of Almansour," says the historian Saïd of Toledo⁽²⁾, "has been attributed by the chroniclers of the times to a desire to win popularity with the masses and to meet with less

(2). *Gayangos*, Part I, append, p. xl et suiv.

opposition in carrying out his political schemes, and a sort of stigma on the memory of Kaliph Hakem, who he was then trying to usurp." We shall presently see how the popular philosophers were in Andalusia. The people never looked for the sages; they bore with still more impatience the aristocracy of reason than they did that of birth and fortune. Dating from the above-mentioned Almansour, philosophy never enjoyed but short intervals of liberty, and became, on diverse occasions, the object of an open persecution. Those who devoted themselves to it were declared to be irreligious by the chiefs of ecclesiastical laws; and the *savants* were more than once forced to hide their sciences, even to their most intimate friends, for fear of being denounced and condemned as heretics.

The sudden changes of which Mahomedan Spain became the theatre in the 11th century finished by destroying the civilising work of the Ommeyyads. Cordova, the centre of liberal studies, was sacked, the palace of the Kaliphs was turned upside down, and the collections of books, &c., were destroyed. The relics of Hakem's library were sold at low prices and scattered all over the country.⁽¹⁾ Saïd acknowledges to have seen several volumes in Toledo and admits that they deserve to be burnt for what they contained, if the inquiries carried on under Almansour had been conducted with as much intelligence as they undoubtedly were with religious zeal.

Philosophy had, however, taken such deep root in this beautiful country, that all the efforts made to destroy it served only to revive it. Saïd bears testimony to the fact, that during his time (1068), the studies relating to ancient sciences were as flourishing as they had ever been, although some rulers still cherished an aversion towards them; and that the obligation of going away every year for the *Holy War* was extremely prejudicial to the meditations of philosophers. Certain princes even showed themselves favourable, or at least tolerant towards free thought. Experience has proved, that true philosophy has no need either of

(1). *Gayangos*. op. cit. p. xli et suiv.

protection, or of favour: it demands nobody's permission and takes nobody's orders. It is the most spontaneous product of human consciousness.

The golden age of the reign of Hakem has not added one illustrious name to Arabian history. Harassed by fanaticism, Avencebrol, Abubacer, Avenzoar, and Averroes saw, on the contrary, their names and works enter into the currents of European life, that is to say, into the real life of humanity.

PART II.

The sources for the biography of Ibn-Rushd⁽¹⁾ are as follows:— (1). The rather short notice which Ibn-el-Abbar has devoted to him in his *Supplement* to the biographic dictionary of Ibn-Bashkoual. (2). A lengthy article, but mutilated at the beginning, in the *Supplement* to the Dictionaries of Ibn-Bashkoual and of Ibn-el-Abbar, whose author is Abu-Abdallah Mahomed, son of Abdal Malek-el-Ansari of Morocco⁽²⁾. (3). The notice of Ibn-Abi-Oceiba in his "History of medical men"⁽³⁾. (4). The article which Dhéhébi has devoted to our philosopher, and to his persecutor, Yacoub Almansour, in his *Annales* ⁽⁴⁾, dating from the year 595 Hijri. (5). The article by Léon⁽⁵⁾ Africain in his book, called "The illustrious men of the Arabs"⁽⁶⁾. (6). Certain passages of the historians of Mahomedan Spain, and especially of Abd-el-Wahid-Maraékoshi ⁽⁷⁾. (7). References drawn from his own writings.

(1). The Latin name of Averroes has been formed out of Ibn-Rushd by the influence of Spanish pronunciation in which *Ibn* becomes *Aben* or *Aven*. Few names have undergone such varied transcriptions: *Ibn-Rosdin*, *Filius-Rosadis*, *Ibn-Rasil*, *Ben-Ruxid*, *Ibn-Ruschod*, *Ben-Rushed*, *Aben-Rassud*, *Aben-Rois*, *Aben-Rasd*, *Aben-Rust*, *Aben-Rosd*, *Avenryz Adveroyz*, *Benroist*, *Avenroyth*, *Acerroysta*, &c. The first names of Averroes have furnished other variations: *Abulquail*, *Aboolit*, *Abulidus*, *Ablutt*, *Aboloyz*. On the top of the *Colligat* (*Kulliyat*), we read: *Menbucius* (*Mahuntius* or *Mauvitiuz*), who in Latin is called *Averroys*, probably by the alteration of the name Mahomed, &c.

Manuscript de la Societe Asiatique, p. 51 et suiv.

(2). Manuscript de la Bibl. imp. fol. 74.

(3). Manuscript de la Bibl. imp. fol. 201, V, &c.

(4). Manuscript arab de la Bibl. imp. fol. 8024.

(5). Published for the first time by Hottinger, in his *Bibliothecarium quadripartitum*, p. 245 et suiv. etc.

(6). Arabic text, published by M. R. Dozy (Leyden, 1847). I may mention here for all that the quotations from the works of Averroes, when the particular edition is not mentioned, belong to that of 1560, apud Cominum de, Trivino, except for the *Physics* and on the *Soul*, for which, edit of Juntæ, 1553.

Of all the biographers of Ibn-Rushd, Ibn-el-Ahbar, and Ibn-Ansari appear by far to be the best informed. They derived their information from people who had intimately known the philosopher of Cordova. Although coming one generation after Ibn-Rushd, Abd-el-Wahid deserves also every confidence. The exact details which he gives about Ibn-Zohr, about Ibn-Badja, about Ibn-Tofail, whose autographic writings he saw, and whose son he knew, prove that he must have lived in the philosophic society of his times. Ibn-Abi-Oceiba wrote about forty years after the death of Averroes, and he had collected all his information from the Kazi Abu-Merwan al-Badji, who seems to have personally known the Commentator, i. e., Ibn-Rushd. Dhéhébi has hardly done anything but copied those that had preceded him. As regards Léon l'Africain his authority is of very little value. Although he quotes at every page from Arab authors and particularly the biographer Ibn-el-Ahbar, Léon frequently wrote in a very slipshod manner. Besides, the Latin translation, which is the only one left to us of his book, is so barbarous,² that we must often give up all hopes of making out any true sense at all.

The anecdotes related in the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance about Averroes have a still less historical character; they do not prove anything else but the opinions which people had formed about the Commentator, and have interest only for the history of Averroism. Nevertheless, it was these anecdotes which formed all the biography of Averroes until the middle of the 17th century. Since the publication of the little book by Léon in 1664, the article he has consecrated to Averroes has been reproduced with confidence and without any criticism by Moréri, Bartolucci, Bayle, Antonio, Brucker, Sprengel, Amoreux, Middeldorpf, Amable Jourdain. The notice by Ibn-Abi-Oceiba, although it had been known to Pococke, Reiske, de Rossi, was not really utilised until a few years ago by Messrs. Wüstenfeld,⁽¹⁾ Lebrecht,⁽²⁾ Wenrich,⁽³⁾ and at last by M. Munk in the excellent article which

(1). *Geschichte der Arabischen Aertze, u Naturforscher* (Gothtingen, 1840), p. 104—108.

(2). *Magazin für die Literatur des Auslandes*, Berlin, 1842, Nos. 79, 83, 95.

(3). *De auctorum graecorum versionibus et commentibus Syriacis, Arabicis, etc.* (Lipsiae, 1812), p. 166, sqq.

he has contributed on Ibn-Rushd in the *Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques*, and which he has since reproduced with considerable additions in his *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (1859).

Kazi Abdulwalid Muhammad Ibn-Ahmed Ibn-Mohamed Ibn-Rushd was born at Cordova in 1126 (520 Hijri). Ibn-el-Abbar and El-Ansari are of one accord about this date. Abd-el-Wahid states that Ibn-Rushd was nearly eighty years old when he died in 595 (1198). In his commentary on the second chapter of "Du Ciel" or of "The Heavens", Ibn-Rushd himself cites an event of the year 1138 of which he was an eye-witness. The *souvenirs* of Cordova are found in several places of his writings. In his "Commentary on the Republic", when Plato says that the Greeks are a privileged people for intellectual culture, the Commentator, i. e., Ibn-Rushd, roundly asserts the superiority of his own Andalusia. In the Colliget (livre ii, chapter xxii), he maintains against Galen, that the best climate of the world is *the fifth* in which Cordova is situated. An anecdote of the court of Alman-sour, which has been preserved for us enables us to be present at a discussion which had taken place in the presence of this prince between Ibn-Rushd and Abu-Bekr Ibn-Zohr of Seville on the scientific pre-eminence of their respective birth-places.⁽³⁾ "If a scholar dies at Seville" said Ibn-Rushd, "and people want to sell his books, they bring them to Cordova where there is an assured market for them, whereas, if, on the contrary, a musician dies at Cordova, they have to go to Seville to sell his instruments."

The family of Ibn-Rushd was one of the most considerable in Andalusia and enjoyed special regard with the provincial magistrates. His grandfather, called like himself Abulwalid Mohammed and like himself the Kazi of Cordova is remembered as a celebrated jurist of the malékite school. Our Imperial Library of Paris (suppl. ar. 398) possesses a voluminous collection of his decisions, placed in order by Ibn-al-Warrân, the Imâm or leader of prayers in the great mosque of Cordova. All the towns of Spain and of the west, even the Almoravide princes appear in the list of

(3). Makkarî, I, 98, (edit, Dozy and Wright, &c.). Gayangos, I, p. 422, Quatre-mère Mémoire sur le goût des livres parmi les Orientaux, p. 40.

those who hasten to avail themselves of the enlightenment of the learned Kazi. Philosophy in its relation to theology has been treated there, and we seem to touch in several pages of this strange book the origins, so to say, of the thoughts of the Commentator. In several respects, the grandfather of Ibn-Rushd played an important political part. In consequence of a revolt, he was entrusted with the task of carrying the message of submission of the Spanish provinces to the rulers of Morocco⁽⁴⁾. The Christians of Andalusia, having regarded with favour the invasion of Alphonse, *the Quarrelsome*, into Mussulman territories, he passed once more to Morocco (31st March, 1126), explained to the Sultan the dangerous situation which was created in the country by these internal enemies, and it was according to his advice that thousands of Christians were transported to Salé and to the Berbery coasts⁽¹⁾. His son (born in 1094 and died in 1168), who was the father of our philosopher, fulfilled also the functions of the Kazi of Cordova⁽²⁾. By one of those caprices of fame, of which there is more than one example, this Averroes whose name has attained, with the Latin races, almost the celebrity of Aristotle, is distinguished amongst the Arabs from his illustrious foregoers by the epithet of *el-hafid*, i. e., the grandson. Like his father and his grandfather, Abul-walid Ibn-Rushd studied at first theology of the Asharites and the canonical law of the malékite school. His biographers boast almost as much of his knowledge of jurisprudence as that of medicine and of philosophy. Ibn-el-Abbar, in particular, attaches much more importance to this portion of his labours than to his Aristotelian writings which have made him so famous, and Ibn-Said places him into the first rank of the canonists of Andalusia.⁽³⁾ He had for his tutors in jurisprudence the most erudite *faquih*s of the times, and in medicine, Abu-Djafar Haroun de Truxillo whose biography has been written by Ibn-Abi-Oceiba.⁽²⁾ It is impossible, in spite of what the same biographer says, to believe, that he had

(4). Leon Afr. *apud* Fabr, t. XIII, p. 282.

(1). Dozy, *Recherches sur l'histoire de la littérature de l'Espagne, pendant le Moyen Age*, Part I, p. 357. Gayangos, Part II, p. 306, 307. Conde, III, cap. xxix.

(2). Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 419.

(3). Makkari, II, 122 (edit, Dozy, etc.)

(2). Ibn-Abi-Oceiba, in Gayangos, Part I, append. p. xvii, xviii. *Chari*, Part II, p. 84.

took lessons from Ibn-Bâdja (Avempace), dead the latest in 1138, although the similarity of their views and the profound respect with which he always speaks of this great man might authorise us in a general sense to regard him as a pupil. In this manner, Ibn-Rushd lived in the society of the most illustrious men of his century. In his philosophy, he is directly under obligations to Ibn-Bâdja; Ibn-Tofail (*Abubacer* of the scholastics) was the artisan of his fortune, as we shall presently explain. During his whole life, he stood in the most intimate relations to the great family of Ibn-Zohr which alone resumes in itself all the scientific development of Mahomedan Spain in the 12th century. He had for his colleague Abu-Bekr Ibn-Zohr *the junior*, in the capacity of a physician to the king; and the friendship which bound him to Abu-Merwan Ibn-Zohr (*Anenzoar*), the author of *Teisir*, was so close, that when Ibn-Rushd wrote his *Kulliyât* (generalities on a treatise on the ensemble of the human body), he desired that his friend should write also a treatise on the different parts, in order that their united works might form a complete course of medicine. Besides, he was also in relation with the theosophist Ibn-Arabi who, however, did not recognise in him a fairly reliable *chela*. Ibn-Rushd, when he was the Kazi of Cordova, once requested Ibn-Arabi to communicate to him the secrets of his mystic science, but Ibn-Arabi was turned aside by a divine vision from revealing them to him.⁽¹⁾

The public career of Ibn-Rushd was not without some *éclat*. Fanaticism, which was the soul of the Almohade revolution, was for a moment arrested by the liberal tastes of Abd-el-Moumen and of Jousouf. People attributed the fall of the Almoravides to the destruction of books which they had ordered. Abd-el-Moumen rigorously prohibited these acts of barbarity.⁽²⁾ The philosophers of the century, Ibn-Zohr, Ibn-Bâdja, Ibn-Tofail and Ibn-Rushd were in high favour in his court. In the year 543 Hijri (1153), we find Ibn-Rushd in Morocco, occupied probably in supporting Abd-el-Moumen's views about the erection of colleges which he was

(1) Fleischer, *Catal. Codd. Arab. Lips.* p. 492.

(2) *Journal Asiat.*, February, 1848, p. 195

founding about this period and yet not neglecting for all this his own astronomical observations.⁽³⁾ Yousouf, the successor of Abd-el-Moumen, was the most literary prince of his day. Ibn-Tofail obtained very great influence in his court, and made use of it by attracting scholars from all countries. It was to Ibn-Tofail that Ibn-Rushd was indebted for his introduction into the favours of the prince. The historian Abd-el-Wahid had collected even from the lips of one of the disciples of Ibn-Rushd, the story of his first presentation at Court, such as the Commentator himself was in the habit of relating to his friends.⁽¹⁾

“When I went to visit the Emir of the Faithful, I found him alone with Ibn-Tofail. The latter began an eulogium on me, to boast of my nobility, and of my ancient lineage. He added, out of his kindness for me, all sorts of praises which I hardly deserved. After having asked my name, that of my father, and that of my family, the Emir opened conversation in the following manner:—

‘What is the opinion of philosophers about the Heavens? Is it an eternal substance, or had it a beginning?’ I was seized with fear and quite paralysed. I was on the look out for a pretext to be excused from giving a reply, and I actually denied having ever occupied myself with philosophy; since I did not know that Ibn-Tofail and the Emir had agreed to put me on a trial. The Emir of the Faithful understood my difficulty, turned towards Ibn-Tofail and began to discourse on the question which he had put to me. He repeated all that Aristotle, Plato and other philosophers had said on the subject, and explained, besides, the arguments of Mahomedan theologians against the philosophers. I noticed in him a power of memory such as I should not have suspected even in *savants* who specially occupy themselves with such subjects and who devote their whole time to these alone. The Emir, however, knew so well to put me at my ease, that he led me on also to speak in my turn, and that he might find out what knowledge I posses-

(3). *Comment. de Cælo*, fol. 176. Munk, op. cit. p. 420—21. Conde III, Part Leon l' Africain, “History of Africa,” 1, II, p. 60.

(1). Edit, Dozy., 174—175. Cf. Leon l' Africain, art. d' Ibn-Tofail, p. 280. Munk op. cit, p. 411, 421—422.

sed in philosophy. After I had retired, he gratified me with the present of a sum of money, of a *Pelisse* of honour of great value, and of a watch." If we are to believe the same historian,⁽¹⁾ it was according to the expressed desire of Yousouf, and at the instance of Ibn-Tofail, that Ibn-Rushd undertook the commentaries of Aristotle. "One day" said Ibn-Rushd, "Ibn-Tofail sent for me and said: 'To-day I have heard the Emir of the Faithful complain of the obscurity of Aristotle and of his translations: 'May it please God' said he 'that he might meet some one who would write commentaries on those books and clearly explain their meaning, in order to make them accessible to people'! You have in abundance all that is necessary for such a work; therefore, take it up. 'Knowing your high intelligence, your penetrating lucidity, and your great devotion to study, I expect that you would succeed. The only reason that prevents me from taking up the responsibility of it myself, is the age which you see I have reached, added to my numerous occupations in the service of the Emir.' Since then, added Ibn-Rushd, I turned all my efforts towards the work which Ibn-Tofail had recommended to me, and these are the reasons that have induced me to write the analytical treatises which I have composed on Aristotle." It is undoubtedly to Ibn-Rushd that Ibn-Tofail alludes in the following passage of his philosophical romance: 'All the philosophers who have followed Ibn-Bâdja occupy a place very much lower than he. As regards those of our contemporaries who have succeeded him, they are in a process of formation and have not yet reached perfection of any kind, so much so, that it is still impossible to judge of their real merits.'⁽²⁾ Ibn-Rushd didn't cease to enjoy, during the reign of Yousouf, his constant favour and to occupy the highest places. In 565 (1169), he fulfilled in Seville the functions of Kazi. In a passage of his commentary, on the fourth book of Aristotle's treatise on the *Parts of Animals*, finished this year, he excuses himself for the errors he may have committed, inasmuch as he is very much occupied with the affairs of the times and is, besides, removed at a

(1). *Ibid*, p. 175.

(2). *Philos autodid*, Proem, p. 16 (edition, Pococke, 1617).

considerable distance from his house at Cordova, where all his books happened to be.⁽³⁾ His return to Cordova must be dated about 567 (1171).⁽⁴⁾ Undoubtedly it was since this epoch that he composed his great commentaries. He there frequently complains of the pre-occupations of public affairs which take away his time and the freedom of mind necessary for such works. At the end of the first book of his *Abstract of the Almageste*, he says, that he has been forced to limit himself to the most important theorems and he compares himself to a man who, hard pressed by fire on all sides saves himself only by carrying away the most necessary things.⁽⁵⁾ His duties oblige him to undertake frequent journeys in the different parts of the Almohade empire. We find him sometimes on this side and sometimes on the other side of the Straits, at Morocco, at Sèville and at Cordova, writing his commentaries from these different towns.

In 1178, he wrote in Morocco a portion of the "*De Substantia Orbis*"; in 1179, he finishes at Sèville one of his treatises on theology; in 1182, Yousouf calls him again to Morocco and appoints him as his first physician in the place of Ibn-Tofail⁽¹⁾; then he confers on him the dignity of the grand Kazi of Cordova, which his father and grandfather had already possessed. During the reign of Yakub Almansour-billah, we find him more in favour than ever. Almansour liked to talk to him on scientific subjects; he made him sit on the cushion reserved for his most intimate favourites; and in the familiarity of these conversations, Ibn-Rushd even went so far as to address his sovereign, "*Listen, my brother.*" In the year of the Hijri 591 (1195), when Almansour was preparing to organise against Alphonse IX of Castille the expedition which terminated in the victory of Alarcos, we find old Ibn-Rushd beside him. Ibn-Abi-Oceiba relates, with many details, all the favours with which he was overwhelmed on this occasion, favours which, exciting the jealousy of his enemies, were undoubtedly the principal cause of the miseries which poisoned the last four years of his life.

(3). Munk, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

(4). For a discussion of these dates, see, Munk, *op. cit.*, p. 422—23.

(5). Munk, *Ibid.*

(1). Tornberg, *Annales regum Mauritaniae*, p. 182. Conde, Part III, chap. III.

By one of those sudden turns of fortune which form the daily history of Mahomedan Courts, Ibn-Rushd lost, indeed, the good graces of Almansour who banished him to the town of Elisana or Lucena, near Cordova. Lucena was formerly inhabited by Jews, and this was, indeed, the origin of the story derived from León l'Africain and very easily accepted since, which makes the persecuted philosopher find a refuge with his supposed disciple, Moses Maimonides. It appears, that his enemies even endeavoured to make people believe that he was of the Jewish race.⁽¹⁾

The motives of the disgrace of Ibn-Rushd gave occasion to many conjectures. Some attributed it to the intimate friendship which existed between the philosopher and Abour-Yahya, Governor of Cordova, and brother of Almansour. Others traced the cause to a lack of courtesy towards the Emir of the Faithful. Abd-el-Wahid and Ibn-Abi-Oceiba relate that Ibn-Rushd, having composed a commentary on the history of animals, once said, in speaking of giraffes, "I have seen a quadruped of this species with the King of Berbery, designating in this manner, Yakoub Almansour. He behaved in this matter, says Abdul-Wahid, in the manner of scholars who, when they have to name a King, dispense with eulogistic phrases such as courtiers and secretaries usually employ. But this liberty of speech displeased Almansour, who considered the expression *Malik-el-Berber* (The King of Berbery) as an outrage. Ibn-Rushd said in excuse, that this expression was an error of the reader of the manuscript, and that he had really written: *Malik-el-Barreyn* (The King of both the Continents), meaning by it, Africa and Andalusia. These two phrases, as a matter of fact, hardly differ except by their diacritical points.

NOTE (1). M. Dozy—(*Journal Asiat.*, juill. 1853, p. 90) is of opinion, that in this matter, the enemies of Ibn-Rushd might probably be not very far from the real truth, and he bases his opinions on the following two facts:—I. That in Spain almost all the physicians and philosophers were of Jewish or of Christian origin.—II. That not one of the biographers of Ibn-Rushd mentions the name of the Arab tribe to which he belonged, which is never forgotten in the case of the true Arabs. I must however, observe, that the functions of a Kazi, which the father and grand-father of Ibn-Rushd discharged, are such as usually appertain to very old Mahomedan families, and the profession of a physician in the Ibn-Rushd family dates only from our philosopher.

Another anecdote has been preserved for us by El-Ansari on the faith of a theologian who played a principal rôle in this affair. A prediction had been made all over the East and in Andalusia, according to which, on a certain day, there would arise a hurricane which would destroy the human species. People were, indeed, very much frightened, and were already thinking of seeking a refuge in caverns, or hiding themselves under the earth. Ibn-Rushd was then the Kazi of Cordova. The Governor, having assembled all the *savants* or other grave people for advice, Ibn-Rushd took the liberty to examine the matter from a physical point of view, and according to the prognostications of stars. A theologian, called Abd-el-Kebir, happening to mix in the conversation, asked Ibn-Rushd, if he didn't believe what was reported about the Ad-tribe, who were exterminated in the same manner—i.e., by a hurricane. Ibn-Rushd replied in a fashion little respectful towards this fable, rendered sacred by the Koran. Historical criticism is the sin which theologians are the least able to forgive. The enemies of Ibn-Rushd took advantage of the scandal which this conference gave rise to, to represent the too enlightened Kazi as a heretic and an unbeliever.

Abd-el-Wahid, in fact, relates that the enemies of Ibn-Rushd procured an autograph manuscript of his commentaries, and that they found in it a quotation from an ancient author, given in the following words: "The planet Venus is a divinity." They showed this phrase to Almansour, isolating it from what had preceded it; and attributing it to Ibn-Rushd, they found an opportunity to make him pass for a polytheist !

Whatever we might think of such anecdotes, it is impossible to doubt, that philosophy was the real cause of the disgrace of Ibn-Rushd. It had made him powerful enemies who made his orthodoxy suspicious to Almansour. All educated people whose good luck excited envy were subject to similar accusations. Almansour, having assembled the chief personages of Cordova, ordered Ibn-Rushd also to appear, and after having anathematised his doctrines, condemned him to exile. The Emir at the same time despatched edicts into the provinces, prohibiting such dangerous

studies, and ordering to burn all the books which had similar tendencies. The only exceptions made were with books on medicine, arithmetic and elementary astronomy, as much as it was necessary to calculate the duration of day and night and to find out the direction of the *Kibla*⁽²⁾ El-Ansari has preserved for us the text of an entire declamation written in an emphatic style by Aboue-Abdallah-Ibn-Ayyash, Secretary to the Emir, which was despatched on this occasion to the inhabitants of Morocco and of the other towns of the kingdom. The fanatical hate, excited by the school of free-thinkers is betrayed in every line. It is difficult, besides, to imagine anything more insignificant and more insipid than this repeated complaint for the thousandth time in the name of grievances for which nobody is to blame, and which often have their source in those who complain most about them. The revolution which ruined Ibn-Rushd was, as we see, a court-intrigue, the orthodox party succeeded in driving the philosophical party. Ibn-Rushd was, in fact, not the only persecuted man; several eminent personages: *savants*, physicians, *faquih*s, Kazis and poets are mentioned who shared his disgrace. "The cause of the displeasure of Almansour" says Ibn-Abi-Oceibia "was, that these persons had all been accused of devoting their leisure hours to philosophical culture, and to the study of the ancients." This, disgrace of philosophers found even some poets to celebrate it. A certain Aboul-Hosein Ibn-Djobeir in particular, exhaled his contempt for Ibn-Rushd in some ill-turned epigrams whose *conceits* appeared undoubtedly very pleasant to the triumphant cabals:—

"Now is Ibn-Rushd only too certain, that his writings are pernicious things. O, thou, who hast abused thy own self, consider if thou now find a single individual who would care to be thy friend!"

"Thou hast not remained in *the good path*, O son of *the good path*⁽¹⁾ when thy efforts were directed so high in this century. Thou hast been a traitor to religion; it was not thus, that

(2). Abd-el-Wahid-edit. Dozy, p. 224—225. De Hammer, *Journal Asiât*, Serier, 1848, p. 196 et *Lithraturgeschichte der Araber*, 1 Abth. 1 Band-p. c. i. v. &c.

(1). A pun on the name:—*Ibn-Rushd*.

thy grandfather acted. "Fate has struck all those falsifiers who mix philosophy with religion and who preach heresy. They have studied logic; but it has been reasonably said: *Ill-luck has followed their speech.*"

The disgrace of Ibn-Rushd was, however, not of long duration: A fresh revolution made the philosophers re-enter into royal favour. Almansour returning from Morocco, abolished all the edicts which he had issued against philosophy, applied himself to it again with great zeal, and at the instance of learned and important personages, called back Ibn-Rushd near himself as well as all his companions in misfortune.⁽³⁾ One of them, Abou-Djafar-el-Dhèhèbi, received the charge of watching over the writings of physicians and philosophers of the Court.

The story of Ibn-Rushd's disgrace is accompanied in Léon l'Africain's book⁽⁴⁾ with puerile details about the artifices which his enemies employed to demask his heresy, and about the humiliating circumstances of his recantation and of his exile. Those details do not seem to be authentic enough to be reported here. I cannot, however, believe, that Léon has only imagined them; he must have read them in some Arabic author and it is impossible to deny, that several things he relates do remind us of similar things mentioned by El-Ansari. Ibn-Rushd, the latter assures us, was in the habit of saying that the most painful trial which he had had to undergo during his disgrace was, that entering one day with his son Abdallah into the grand mosque of Cordova he saw himself outrageously driven out by the people of the lower orders. Almost all his disciples became faithless to him; people ceased to invoke his authority; the most daring of his followers, however, endeavoured to prove, that his opinions were, after all, not so contrary to the creeds of good Mahomedans as it has been imagined. Tadj-eddin-Ibn-Hama-weih who at this epoch visited the West, tried to see him, but did not succeed, so

(3). Ibn-Rhaldoun, l. c. Ibn-el-Abbar.

(4). Cf. Bayle, Dict. art. Averroes, note M;—Brucker, *Historia crit. phil.* III, p. 100-101.

was the seclusion in which the exiled philosopher was then living. Ibn-Rushd survived only for a short while after his return to favour. He died at Morocco, at a very advanced age, on Thursday, the 9th of Safar of the year 595 Hijree *i. e.*, the 10th December, 1198. This is the precise date given by El-Ansâri. Ibn-Abi-Oceiba in the same way places Ibn-Rushd's death at the beginning of the year 595. But he contradicts himself when he says, that Ibn-Rushd was in favour with Mohamed-Annassir who succeeded Yakoub-Almansour on the 22nd of Rabi-ul-Awal of the year 595 (2nd January, 1199), and especially when he places Ibn-Rushd's recall under Almansour in this very year 595 Hijree. Ibn-Arabi who was a witness of his funerals, Jafeï, Mohammed bin-Ali de Xativa and in general Mahomedan chroniclers are also for the year 595. Abd-el-Wahid and Dhéhébi do not deviate much from this chronology. They place the death of the Commentator at the end of the year 594, that is to say, in August or September, 1198. Only Léon l'Africain brings it down to the year 1206. El-Ansari tells us, that Ibn-Rushd was buried at Morocco in the cemetery situated beyond the gate of Tagazout, but that at the end of three months, his body was transported to Cordova where it was deposited in the family mausoleum, in the cemetery of Ibn-Abbas. Ibn-Arabi, in fact, states, that he saw at Morocco Ibn-Rushd's dead body being placed on a beast of burden for transport to Cordova. Léon l'Africain affirms, on the other hand, of having seen his tomb and his epitaph at Morocco, near the *gate of the Carroyeurs*. Ibn-Rushd left several sons behind of whom some devoted themselves to the study of theology and of jurisprudence, and became Kazis of towns and districts. One of them, Abu-Mohammad Abdallah was a tolerably famous practising physician. Ibn-Abi-Oceiba has given his biography at the conclusion of that of his father. He was physician to Annassir, and wrote a book on *the therapeutic method*. All these circumstances would, however, hardly permit us to give credence to the story of Gilles de Rome, about the journey and of Ibn-Rushd's sons to the Court of the Hohenstaufens of Germany.

Ibn-Battar and Abd-el-Melik Ibn-Zohr died about the same

year. Abou-Merwan Ibn-Zohr and Ibn-Tofail were already dead for sometime. All the scientific philosophical pleiades of Andalusia and of the West disappeared in this manner almost simultaneously during the last years of the 12th century. The historian of the Almohades Abd-el Wahid,⁽¹⁾ visiting the West in the year 595 (1198-99) finds Abou-Bekribn-Zohr, the nephew still living but very advanced in age who recited to him fragments of his poetry. In 603 (1206-7), he meets at Morocco, the son of Ibn-Tofail who repeated to him poems composed by his father. People were now living only on the *souvenirs* and traditions, getting more and more feeble every day of the glorious but the irrevocable past.

III.

The disgrace of Ibn-Rushd and the doubts of heterodoxy raised against him were the salient points by which he struck the imagination of his contemporaries. All the historians and Mahomedan biographers are unanimous in this respect and the variety of details with which they report this fact is the best proof of the sensation which it must have produced. These persecutions were, besides, by no means, isolated. Towards the end of the 12th century, a war against philosophy was organised over the whole surface of the Mahomedan world. A theological reaction analogous to that which in the Latin church followed the Council of Trent began to make efforts to regain the lost ground by argument as well as by force. Islam, like all other great religious movements, have always attempted to strengthen itself by obtaining from its followers a more and more unconditional faith in its doctrines. The companions of Mahomet hardly believed in his supernatural mission; infidelity during the first six centuries of the Hejereh had been pushed to its utmost limits. In modern centuries, on the contrary, it was enjoined, that there should be no doubt and no protest whatever. Escaping more and more on its dependance on the Arab race, sceptical by nature and becoming by the accidents of history the property of races naturally

(1). *The History of the Almohades*, edited by Reinhart Dozy. Preface, p. VI.

inclined to fanaticism, such as the Spaniards, the Berbers the Persians and the Turks, Islam in the hands of its new adherents began to adopt the traits of our austere and exclusive dogmatism. It occurred to Islam that which has happened to Catholicism in Spain, and which would have happened to all Europe, if the religious revival at the end of the 16th century and at the beginning of the 17th had crushed all rationalistic development. Asharism, a sort of compromise between faith and reason, very similar to our modern theology, dominated Egypt under Saladin, Spain under the Almohades, and has remained till our own days the orthodox creed of the Mahomedan sects. On all sides, people began to thunder against the academic chairs of Aristotle and of the philosophers. In 1150 by an order of the Khalif Mostonjid, all the philosophical works of the library of a Kazi notably those of Ibn-Sina and the encyclopædia of *the Brothers of purity*, were burnt at Bagdad. In 1192, the physician Al-Rokn Abd-el-Salam was accused of atheism and people proceeded with great show to the destruction of his books. The Maulavi, presiding at the ceremony, mounted the chair and preached a sermon against philosophy; then taking up one volume after another, he said a few words to prove their disgraceful tendencies, and passed them on to people who burnt them.⁽¹⁾ Raboi Yuda the cherished disciple of maimonides was an eye-witness of this outrageous scene. "I saw" says he "in the hands of a Maulavi a book on astronomy by Ibn-al-Haitem. Showing the circle by which Ibn-al-Haitem had represented the celestial globe, the Maulavi shouted: 'Here it is, what immense misfortune! what inexpressible disaster! and what sad calamity!' Saying these words he tore the book off, and threw it into the fire."

All the philosophers of the century of Ibn-Rushd were, like himself victims of persecution. The Almohades were directly descended from the school of Alghazzali; their founder in Africa had been one of the disciples of this enemy of philosophy. Ibn-Badja, the master of Ibn-Rushd, had already expiated in prison the suspicions of heterodoxy which attached to his person; and if

(1). Abulfaradj. Hist. Dyn, p. 451, text. Munk, Melange, p 334.

we are to believe Lèon l' Africain, he owed his release chiefly to the influence of Ibn-Rushd's father who was then the grand vizier. Ibn-Tofail passed for the founder of *philosophical heresy*, and for the master of Ibn-Rushd and of Maimonides in impiety. The philosopher Abdul Melik Ibn-Wahib of Séville. Contemporary of Ibn-Bâdja, was forced to limit his instructions to the most primary elements. Later on, he even renounced entirely all philosophical studies and prohibited all conversation on this subject, as he saw that he ran the risk of his life. He brought himself down to orthodox philosophy "so well that you do not find in his writings and in those of other philosophers those secret things which are explained only after their death." Sometimes even greater severity than this was used. Ibn-Habib of Séville was put to death because he cultivated philosophy: "It is a science hated in Spain," says the historian who mentions this fact, "It is cultivated only in secret, and people hide the books that treat of it. Metariff of Séville, says he, is just now occupied with these studies, although his fellow-citizens treat him as an unbeliever; he shows to nobody the books he composes." (1)

The life of Abn-Bekr-ibn-zohr by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia is full of similar incidents. "People know" says he "how Almansour conceived the idea of destroying in his territories the books which treat of logic and of philosophy, ordering that all the books of that kind which could be found should be publicly burnt; and how he tried to abolish all rationalistic sciences by persecuting those people who applied themselves to the same and by inflicting severe punishment on those who were convicted of having read such works, or of keeping them in their Libraries. When he first conceived such an idea, he charged Abu-Bekr-Ibn-Zohr, the nephew, with the execution of his orders; since although he knew well, that Ibn-Zohr himself was greatly devoted to the studies of logic and philosophy, he pretended not to have known anything about them. Abu-Bekr faithfully carried out the task that had been entrusted to him. He made a diligent search in all the book-stalls of Séville, taking care that there might not

(1). Makkari, t. II, p. 125-126; Gayangos, t. I, p. 198-199.

remain a single work, dealing with the above-mentioned subjects to the great grief of the friends of those subjects." The docility with which Ibn-Zohr carried out this commission which must have been painful to him as a philosopher, did not however, prevent his being denounced to the Khalif as a man who was addicted to the study of forbidden books. The persecution produced its usual results: *hypocrisy* and *the degradation of conscience*. I have collected, continues Ibn-Abi Oceiba the following anecdote from Abdul-Abbas Ahmed Ibn-Muhammed Ibn-Ahmed of Sèville: Ibn-Zohr had two pupils whom he was teaching medicine. One day as they arrived at the fixed hour to read medical books with him he noticed in the hands of one of them a small book on logic. Ibn-Zohr threw the book away into a corner of the apartment, and ran towards the delinquents with a view to strike them. The students fled and stayed away a few days without coming to him. At last they took courage, and came to see their teacher making excuses for having brought to his house a forbidden book without knowing what its contents were. Ibn Zohr pretended to accept their apology, and continued to deliver to them his lecture on medicine, with this difference, however, that, after having devoted a certain amount of time to it, Ibn-Zohr made them repeat some portions of the Koran, enjoining them, after their return to their respective houses to read commentaries on that Divine Book, as well as the histories and traditions of the Prophet and other books on theological subjects, but above all, to be very scrupulous in the performance of their religious duties. The young people followed the instructions of their teacher and when a little time after, Ibn-Zohr found, that their minds were well disposed, he fetched, a copy of a book on logic which he had once seen in their hands and said: "*Now, that you are prepared for the reading of this book, there is nothing that prevents me from reading it with you* ; and he began immediately to explain it to them, I have mentioned this fact, adds the biographer, in order to show the straight-forward spirit and the piety of Ibn-Zohr.

What is important to notice, and what might appear strange at first sight is, that these persecutions were exceedingly agreeable

to the people, and that the most literary learned princes were forced to sanction them, in spite of their personal tastes, as a means of obtaining popularity. This antipathy of the masses against natural philosophy was one of the most characteristic traits of Mahomedan Spain, and it is difficult not to see in it one of the effects of the influence, of the conquered race. "The Andalusians" says Makkari "cultivated all branches of science with zeal and success with the exception, however, of natural philosophy and of astronomy. These two studies, although pursued with zeal by the highest classes, were never publicly acknowledged out of fear inspired by the common people. Since, if any one had the misfortune to say about somebody else that "such and such a man takes lessons in philosophy or works at astronomy" the masses would at once apply to him the title *zendik*, that is to say, an unbeliever, and this qualification could stick to him for the remainder of his life. And then if his position became somewhat precarious, the masses would set upon him in the public streets, and would burn his house even before the Sultan had any knowledge about it. Probably the Sultan himself, in order to conciliate the affections of the people would order, that the poor race might be put to death, or would issue an edict for burning philosophical books everywhere. This was one of the means which Almansour employed to win popularity amongst the lower orders, during the first year of his usurpation, although he himself did not neglect to work in secret in these forbidden sciences. The afflictions which filled the life of the free-thinker, Ibn-Sabin (first part of the 13th century,) the shocking hypocrisy to which we see him continually forced to have recourse to, prove that these reflexions of the Spanish historian were by no means exaggerated.

IV.

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It is necessary to understand why a man like Ibn-Rushd who for four centuries has had amongst Jews and Christians such a long list of disciples and whose name has figured so often in the great battle of the human mind has never formed a school amongst his own countrymen, and why the most illustrious of the

Arabs with the Latin races has been entirely ignored by his co-religionists. In general, the things which Europe in the Middle Ages borrowed from the Mahomedans give no idea whatever of the relative importance of the different portions of the Arabian literature. The *philosophers* who were almost the only authors known to the Latin races form only an imperceptible family in the *ensemble* of this literature. Avenpace, Abubacer, Averroes have no reputation in Islam. Out of all this great intellectual ferment, there has emerged only one popular name, that of Ibn-Sina (Avicienna the collections of Arab bibliography,) called *the Kitab-el-Firist*, the dictionary of Hadji Khalfa, mention very few works on philosophy in the proper sense of the word. Even the very name of Ibn-Rushd is only incidentally mentioned by Hadji-Khalifa in connection with the work of Gazzali which he refuted and the poem of Ibn-Sina which he commented. Neither Ibn-Khallekan nor Safadi say a word about Ibn-Rushd in their *Lives of the Great Men of Islam*; Jamal-ud-din-al-Kifti who followed him after a generation (1172-1248) does not mention his name in his *History of Philosophers*. Jafai and the chroniclers in mentioning the date of his death in 595 Hijreh content themselves by vaguely saying that he wrote many books but it is easy to perceive that even the name of the great Commentator had hardly reached them. His countrymen and his contemporaries hardly know the existence of his books; all the writings of Ibn-Rushd mentioned by Ibn-el-Abbar are juridical, medical or grammatical. In an *Index* of prohibited books, contained in our manuscript 525 (suppl. ar.) only certain passages of one of his writings on Canon law are cited as dangerous; Mohammad-bin-Ali de Xativa attributes to him only one single work, and that work a book on law.

It does not necessarily follow, that Ibn-Rushd did not enjoy a great reputation amongst his contemporaries. Ibn-el-Abbar writes the most pompous panegyrics about him, and after having related some of the legends his profound learning gave rise to, he adds, that the reality even far surpassed the anecdotes. Ibn-

Saïd calls him *the Imâm of the philosophy of his times*.⁽⁴⁾ Oceibia, in his life of Ibn Bâdja places him in the first rank of that great master. The Kazi Ibn-Merwan-el-Bâdji, cited by this biographer, attributes to him the rarest of qualifications. Many witnesses, cited by El-Ansari represent him as one of those men whose name had reached all the boundaries of Islam. The historian Jafai boasts of his constant application to study, and the universality of his knowledge in jurisprudence, theology, medicine, philosophy, logic, metaphysics and mathematics. In fact, in an interesting discussion on the relative pre-eminence between Africa and Andalusia, quoted by Makkari, Ibn-Rushd figures in an honourable rank amongst the great men whom the defender of Andalusia mentions as upholding the superiority of that country. His fame had penetrated into the East; Maimonides read his works in Egypt in 1190. We have seen that Ibn-Hamaweh on his arrival in the West had nothing more urgent in view than to inquire about the whereabouts of Ibn-Rushd. But during periods of decadence, reputation and influence are things quite distinct. Of all the disciples of Ibn-Rushd whose names are known to us, Abu-Mohammed-ben-Haut-Allah Abulhasan Sahlben-Mâlak Abaurrabi ben-Sâlem, Abu-Bekr-ben-Djahwar, Abulcasem-ben-Attaïbs, and Bondoud or Ibn-Bondoud, there is not one who arrived at any amount of celebrity his theories found no commentators and even his works found few readers after his death. People do not perceive that the incredulous and pantheistic Ibn-Sabin (born in 1217) had directly borrowed nothing from Ibn-Rushd. Although, dealing exactly with the same problems, yet he never quotes him.

We have very few details about Ibn-Rushd's method of teaching. The external form of many of his writings would be sufficient to prove that they must have served the purpose of oral exposition. Ibn-el-Abbar, besides, expressly tells us, that he delivered lectures or gave free discourses according to Mahomedan usages. These discourses were, no doubt, held in some mosque of his own choice and selection. His grandfather had been up to his very last years a teacher of great authority. Léon l' Africain

(4). Makkari, t. II, p. 125. Gayangos, t. I p. 198.

says, that the celebrated Fakhruddin Ibn-al-Khatib Razi, having heard at Cairo of the fame of Ibn-Rushd hired a sailing vessel at Alexandria with the intention of going to Spain to see him, but having heard of the disgrace which his heterodoxy had brought on him he gave up the voyage. He himself had undergone similar misfortunes at Bagdad for his philosophical views. But the biography of Ibn-al-Khatib in Leon's book is full of such gross contradictions that this statement deserves no credence whatever. A few lines lower down, Leon makes him die 74 years after Ibn-Rushd! Whatever that may be, Fakhruddin seems to have been a disciple of that free-thinking philosophy which was subsequently characterised by the Latin races under the name of Averroisme. He wrote commentaries on Aristotle and Avicienna; after his death, people found at his place verses which sang of the eternity of the world and of the annihilation of the individual soul. The common people having found this out, unearthed his ashes and desecrated them.

We must not, therefore, search for *averroism* properly so called amongst Mahomedans. On the one hand, because Ibn-Rushd did not possess in their eyes the same originality as in the eyes of the scholastics who regarded him apart from his antecedents; and on the other because philosophical studies had fallen after his decease into perfect discredit. The real posterity of Ibn-Rushd and the immediate continuation of Arabian philosophy shall be found amongst the Jews of the school of Moses Maimonides. But the tenets of Maimonides are judged very severely by Mahomedans. The orthodox Makrizi says, that Moses Maimonides made his co-religionists *real atheists moattils*, and that there is no other sect which is further removed from the Divine creeds founded by the ministry of the prophets of God. ⁽¹⁾ *Moattil* is the participle of the verb *attala* which signifies to deprive a woman of her necklace to make empty. The *moattil* is he who takes away from God all his attributes, who makes a void in God, so to say, declares him to be inaccessible to understanding, and indifferent to the government of the universe. This is the nuance by

(1) De Sacy, Chrestomathie Arabe, t. I, p 299-300.

which *peripatetism*, i. e., the philosophy of Aristotle together with *atheism*, and such is indeed, the doctrine which has later on been attached to the name of Averroes.

V.

The number of fables accumulated about historical personages is always in proportion to their celebrity. Every man whose name becomes, rightly or wrongly, the index of a certain system ceases to belong to himself, and his biography indicates much more the different fortunes of the system with which he has been identified than his own individuality. Averroes has paid the debt of his fame; few biographies have grown big with so many fables as his. These fables can be arranged in three classes one class comes from the Arab biographers; another class is of Christian origin and was invented to keep up the rôle of infidelity which the Middle Ages gave to Averroes; certain stories besides, were evidently attributed to the great celebrity which Averroes enjoyed in the north of Italy at the Renaissance, and to the inventive genius which has always made the schools so fruitful in anecdotes about their famous masters. The majority of the trials related by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia, El-Ansari, and Léon-l'Africain have for their object to set off the virtues of Ibn-Rushed: his patience, the facility with which he forgave injuries, his generosity, particularly towards literary men. There is nothing in these harmless stories which resemble the legends of the Christian middle ages, and one would hardly suspect that the respectable Kazi delineated in these stories as a model of perfection is destined to become the precursor of Anti-Christ, and of systematic impiety, beating down the three known religions with equal contempt, blaspheming the Lord's supper, while shouting out: "May my soul die the death of all philosophers"! We shall have to criticise these last stories when we come to examine the rôle of Averroes as representing religious infidelity in the 13th century.

Of all the stories produced by the medical and philosophical reputation of Averroes, the most absurd beyond doubt, is the one

which had its origin in his affectation to contradict Avicienna. This tendency had already been noticed by Roger Bacon. Benvenuto of Imola has handed down the same tradition; he says, that it was by opposition to Avicienna who maintained that a man ought to respect the religion in which he is born that Averroes formulated his doctrine of the contempt of all established religions. Symphorien Champier assures us, and people have often repeated it after him that Averroes deliberately abstained from quoting his rival. Nothing is certainly more untrue. Ibn-Sina Avicienna is frequently opposed in the great commentary, and especially in the "Destruction of the destruction." But in medicine Averroes is so far from being systematically hostile to him that one of his chief medical works is a commentary on the didactic poem of Ibn-Sina to whom he accords the most pompous eulogies. Imagination, however, did not halt when going along such a beautiful road, people related, that Avicienna had come to Cordova at the time of Averroes (an anachronism of a century and a half) who, in order to gratify his spite had made him suffer the most frightful torments, and had made him expire on the wheel. Evidently we have here the reflexion of the ferocious hatreds of the *savants* of the renaissance. This epoch could not conceive two chiefs of a school without imagining them to be enemies. People related thousand stories of spite between Plato and Aristotle, between Barthole and Baldus; people gladly believed that Averroes had treated his rival as they themselves would have treated their own.

It was generally admitted amongst the physicians of the Renaissance, that Averroes had never occupied himself with the practice of medicine, although it was known that he had been physician to the King Memorolin. People attributed to him also an important discovery, namely, that blood-letting could be practiced without danger on children. Friend has shewn that this opinion had its origin in misunderstanding a passage where Averroes attributes this experiment to Avanzoar. It was equally from the perversion of a passage in the *Colliget*, whence the strange and oft-repeated opinion arose

that Averroes had the habit of prescribing no remedies at all for his patients. But the most ridiculous certainly of all the misunderstandings of which, Averroes was a victim, is that which is found in the *Patiniana*: "Averroes was killed by the wheel of a cart which unfortunately crushed him on the road;" and in Duverdier quoted by Bayle: "Averroes was killed by a wheel, which was placed on his stomach." This fable arose either from a confusion with another fable, that of torments which he is said to have made Avicienna suffer, or to an allusion to the obligation under which the Jews were (it is well known that Averroes sometimes passed for a Jew) *to carry a wheel of yellow stuff on their robes.*

VI.

We must, therefore, give up the idea of even knowing something, however little, of the personal character of Ibn-Rushd. Almost all that people say about him belong to legend and testify much less what he really was than the opinion which people had formed about him. The multitude of his books would prove that his capacity for work must have been immense even if we didn't know from Ibn-el-Abbar that he employed no less than ten thousand sheets of paper for the editing of his books, and even if we didn't find anything but exaggeration in the following statement of the same author, that since his first youth, he had passed only two nights without study: the night of his marriage, and that of his father's death! It is impossible to say, that Ibn-Rushd, in his studies differed much from the ordinary type of Mahomedan *savant*. He knew what others knew also: in medicine Galen; in philosophy, Aristotle! and in astronomy, Almageste. But he added to those studies a degree of critical power rare in Islam, and there are in his observations some which greatly transcend the horizon of his epoch. Like all good Mahomedans, he added jurisprudence to his profane studies (he knew *le Moufta* by heart) and also poetry, like all distinguished Arabs. Poetry was, at this epoch, amongst the Arabs only an ingenious combination of syllables. We should not, therefore, be

surprised to find it cultivated by spirits so little lyrical in their tendency, as Ibn-Sina and Ibn-Rushd Léon-l'-Africain tells us, that Ibn-Rushd had composed several pieces of poetry, moral and amorous, which he, however, had burnt in his old age. Léon has preserved for us a fragment of his poetry which might lead us to believe that wisdom in Ibn-Rushd was in certain respects only the fruit of years. Ibn-el-Abbar states that he knew the *dîvans* of Motenabbi and of Habib by heart, and that he frequently quoted them in his lectures. His paraphrase of the *Poétique* of Aristotle really testifies in its writer a great knowledge of Arabic literature, particularly of Ante-Islamic poetry. Quotations from Antara from Imroulkais, from Asha from Abou-Temam, from Nabega from Motenabbi from the *Kitabel-Agani* (collection of old Arab ballads) are found in every page. This paraphrase, on the other hand, proves the most perfect ignorance of Grecian literature as was to be expected. The Arabs knew from Greece only philosophers and scientific authors. Not a single author truly characteristic of Greek genius ever reached them. There is, besides, no doubt, that they would have been incapable of appreciating beauties so widely different from those they were in search of Logic, astronomy, mathematics, and to a certain extent also medicine, belong to all countries. The *Organon* of Aristotle has been accepted as a guide to understanding by the most diverse races of the world. On the contrary, Homer Pindar, Sophocles and even Platon would have seemed very insipid to the people of the Semetic races, very nearly as the Bible appears to the Chinese as a book of supreme immorality. Whatever that may be the blunders of Ibn-Rushd on the subject of Greek literature, are really of a nature to make us smile. Imagining, for instance that a tragedy is nothing but the art of praising, and a comedy that of blaming, he pretends to find tragedies and comedies in the panegyrics and the satires of the Arabs and even in the Koran. The extreme levity with which critics and historians have spoken of Arabian philosophy can alone explain the stupid mistake which, since Herbelot has been frequently repeated. "Averroes" says Herbelot "was the first who translated Aristotle from Greek into Arabic even before the Jews had

made their translation ; and we had for a long time no other version of Aristotle except the Latin version which was made from the Arabic translation of this great philosopher, i. e., Averroes who subsequently added large commentaries of his own which St. Thomas and other scholastics made use of before the original Greek texts of Aristotle and of his commentators were known to us." D' Herbelot could not but know the history of the Latin versions of Aristotle, which have been carefully studied only during the last few years, but in his capacity of an orientalist he ought not to have ignored the following : (1) That Aristotle had been translated into Arabic three centuries before Averroes ; (2) That Arabic translations of Greek authors had almost all been made by Syrians and (3) That probably no Mahomedan scholar, and certainly no Arab of Spain had ever known Greek. Whatever that might be, this erroneous view seems generally enough to have been held during the first period of the *Renaissance*. Augustin Niphus Patrizzi Marckoddo in the preface to the edition of the Juntas in 1552 Jean Baptiste Bruyerin, Sigonio, Tomasini, Gassendi, Longuerue Móréré and in general, the whole of the 16th and 17th centuries have regarded Averroes as having introduced Aristotle to the Latin races. D' Herbelot, repeating this mistake, and adding to it a new degree of precision, has been copied by Casiri, Buhle Harles, de Rossi Middeldorp'f, Tennemann de'Gerando, Amable Jourdain Alexander de Humboldt, &c. The same mistake was made in the catalogue of Hebrew manuscripts of the Imperial Library in Paris ; it has been stereotyped for a long time in all the *Conversation Lexicons* or encyclopædias. Such, in literary history, is the tenacity of errors.

Ibn-Rushd therefore had not read Aristotle except in the old versions made from Syriac by Honein-Ibn-Ishak, Ishak-ben Honein, Jahya-ben-Adi, Abu-Baschár Mata, etc. He knew how to profit by all the exegetic means at his disposal ; he compared the different Arabic versions ; he discusses the value of lectures ; sometimes he makes even critical observations which would seem to indicate a knowledge of the Greek language. But his blunders would be sufficient to prove, that the original texts were

ways closed to him. One of his bitterest enemies, Louis Vives has strangely exposed them. Ibn-Rushd, says he, confounds Protagoras with Pythagoras, Cratyle with Democritus. Herachite becomes a philosophical sect, that of the Herculeans. The first philosopher of the sect of the Herculeans was Socrates, just as Ananagotas was the chief of the Italian school. These errors would, indeed, betray the grossest ignorance, unless we recollect, that they are chiefly due to the translations which Ibn-Rushd had in his hands and that, besides, the Arabs lacked even the most elementary notions about the history and the ensemble of Greek literature.

With regard to the barbarism of the language of Averroes can we be surprised, when we remember, that the printed edition of his *writings is nothing but a Latin translation of a Hebrew version of a commentary made on an Arabic translation from Syriac translation of a Greek text?* And further remembering entirely the different genius of the Semitic and Greek languages, and the extreme subtlety of the text which had to be explained, how was it possible, that the original thoughts should not have evaporated in these repeated transfusions? If all the help of modern philosophy, if all the sagacity of the best intellects are not sufficient to lift the veil that still hides from us the thoughts of Aristotle, how was it possible, that Ibn-Rushd who had in his hands nothing but frequently unintelligible versions of the original texts should have been more fortunate than ourselves? We are almost inclined to be grateful to him for not having made greater mistakes, and to exclaim with Isaac Vossims : *Si græce nescius feliciter adeo mentem Aristoteles per pexit quid non-facturus, silinquam scissit græcam?*

“If he, not knowing Greek, could so well appreciate the spirit of Aristotle, what would he not have done, if he had known Greek?”

After Aristotle, Greek commentators such as Alexander d'Aphrodisias, Themistius, Nicolas de Damas, are those whose names come most frequently under the pen of Ibn-Rushd. Amongst the Arabs, Ibn-Sina and Ibn-Bâdja are most frequently

quoted. The opinions of Ibn-Sina and of Alexander, are ordinarily quoted only to be combated, and sometimes with an evident bias. Ibn-Bâdja, on the contrary, is always treated with profound respect, and if Ibn-Rushd permits himself at times to differ from him, he always does so protesting his admiration for the father of Arab-Spanish philosophy. In general, polemics occupy a very large place in the writings of Ibn-Rushd, and thereby introduce an element of liveliness in them which makes them more interesting. Sometimes, enthusiasm for science and love of philosophy elevate him to a pitch of very eloquent morality. His commentaries are rather prolix but not dry; the personality of the author is seen in the digressions and in the reflexions which he knows how to make on appropriate occasions. Let us add, at the same time, that these commentaries have for us only a historical interest, and that we should only lose our time and energy in vain, if we attempted to draw from them some light for the interpretation of Aristotle. It would be just the same, if in trying to understand Racine we should read him in a Turkish or Chinese translation, or for appreciating the beauties of Hebrew literature we should address ourselves to Nicolas de Lyre, or to Cornelius a Lapide.

VII.

The superstitious admiration of Averroes for Aristotle has been frequently noticed. Petrarca amused himself about it; Gassendi compared it to the cult of Lucretius for Epicurus; Malebranche has made use of it as a weapon in his fight against Aristotelism. "The author of this book" says Ibn-Rushd in his Preface to Aristotle's Physics "is Aristotle son of Nicomache, the wisest of the Greeks, who has started and finished logic, physics and metaphysics. I said, that he had started them because all the works that were written before him on these sciences are not worth one's while even to speak of and have been entirely eclipsed by his writings. I said, that he had finished them, because not one of those who have since pursued those studies up to our own days, that is to say, during the last 15

has been able to add anything to his writings, nor been able to find in them one single error of any consequence. But the fact, that all this is found combined in one single man is very strange and even marvellous. A being so highly privileged deserves rather to be called divine rather than human." "We address praises without limit" he says elsewhere, "to Him who predestined this man (Aristotle) for perfection, and who placed him on the highest degree of human excellence which no other man in any other century has been able to attain; it is to him that God alludes when He says in the Koran: 'God gives this superiority to whomsoever He wills' (Koran, Sura,)

"The doctrine of Aristotle" says he elsewhere, "is supreme truth, inasmuch as his mind represents the limit of human intelligence, we might say with good reason, that he was given to us by Providence to teach, how much it is possible for us to know." Again, "Aristotle is the principle of all philosophy; one can differ from him only in the interpretation of his words and in the inferences to be drawn from them." Again, "this man (Aristotle) was the standard of Nature, and a model in which Nature tried to express her type of perfection." All this very nearly amounts to what Balzac has said about him: "That before Aristotle was born, Nature had not been entirely finished; that in him had Nature reached her last touch and limit of perfection of being; that she could not go further beyond; that it was, no doubt, the limit of her forces and the boundary of human intelligence." Properly speaking, each phrases have nothing more emphatic or exaggerated than those that we find at every page of Christian writers since the great advent of Aristotle in the 12th century. A very widely spread belief attributes his philosophy to supernatural origin; a demon (good or bad?) had revealed it to him; only the Anti-Christ would know its secret! Probably even these exaggerated eulogies ought not to be taken too seriously. That which is perfectly certain is that Ibn-Rushd sometimes makes a distinction between his own opinion and that of the original text which he comments. No doubt, he never permits himself in his commentaries any thoughts different from those of his master, but, on the other hand, he takes care to in-

form us, that he does not accept the responsibility of the doctrines he explains. At the end of his medium commentary on the Physics of Aristotle he says, that he had no other intention but to announce the ideas of peripatetics without giving his own views and that like Gazzali, he desired only to know the systems of different philosophers, in order that we might judge them with full knowledge about their cause and refute them, if necessary. At the end of his letter on the union of intellect separate in different individuals he equally declines the responsibility of doctrines which are to be found there. Perhaps this was only a precaution to philosophise more freely under the shade of another man. We must at all events, admit, that this trick is very common amongst the Arabs. Ibn-Tofail remarks that Ibn-Sina sends back those who desire to know his real thoughts to his *Oriental Philosophy*, and that he often says in his commentaries things which he does not believe. Gazzali, in his *Mukacid-al-Pâlsifa* exposes the systems of philosophers with an assurance which might lead one to suppose that he was announcing his own views and yet he has evidently no other object in view than to prepare the refutation which he intends to make of these systems. Probably a good many contradictions of ancient philosophy would thus be explicable by the facility with which people agreed to borrow for the moment the language and the behaviour of a certain school without being committed to them in an absolute manner.

VIII.

Averroes attained celebrity amongst the Latin races in a double capacity : as a physician and as a commentator of Aristotle ; but the fame of the commentator has greatly surpassed that of the physician. Whatever reputation his *Colliget* (*Kulliyât*) might have enjoyed, it has never attained the magisterial authority of the *Canon* of Avicienna. Of the numerous commentaries by Ibn-Rushd on Galen not one has been translated either in Hebrew or in Latin. Besides, in medicine as in philosophy, Ibn-Rushd is a disciple of Aristotle. He has written a book expressly

with a view to conciliate Aristotle with Galen; where no accord is possible, Galen is invariably sacrificed. It is after the doctrine of Aristotle that he regards the heart as the principal organ, and the source of all the functions of animal life. His medical system has, besides, no originality.

As an astronomer and a jurist Ibn-Rushd doesn't offer either any very characteristic physiognomy. It is by his *Great Commentary* that he has come to be regarded as one of the poles of philosophical authority: *Nature as interpreted by Aristotle-Aristotle as interpreted by Averroes*.

Ibn-Rushd has written three species of commentaries on Aristotle: (1) The great commentary; (2) The medium commentary and (3) The Paraphrases. The form of the great commentary belongs, properly speaking, to Ibn-Rushd. Those philosophers who preceded him, like Avicenna and Alfarabi did not employ any other commentary, except that of paraphrase, in the manner of Albert the Great. People melted the Aristotelian text into an exposition that followed in which both the text and the commentary remained indistinct. The method of Ibn-Rushd in his Great Commentary is entirely different. He takes one paragraph after the other of the great philosopher whom he quotes *in extenso* and explains it sentence by sentence by distinguishing the original text by the word *Kâla* (he says) equivalent to inverted commas. The theoretical discussions are introduced in the form of digressions, every book is divided into *sommes* which are again sub-divided into *chapters* and into *texts*. Ibn-Rushd has evidently borrowed from the commentaries of the Koran this system of literal exposition in which that which belongs to the author is carefully distinguished from what belongs to the commentator himself. In what is called the medium commentary, the text of each paragraph is quoted only by its first words; then the remainder is explained without any distinction between what is from Ibn-Rushd and what is from Aristotle.

In the paraphrases, Ibn Rushd always speaks in his own words. He explains the doctrine of Aristotle, adding, retrench-

ing trying to find in other treatises that which completed his thought and introducing an order and, a method of his classification. These paraphrases are in this manner real treatises under the same titles as those of Aristotle. It is particularly by his titles, that Aristotle has ruled over the human mind: the tables of his books have remained during two thousand years the divisions of science itself.

It is certain, that Ibn-Rushd composed his great commentaries only after he had finished the others. At the end of his great commentary, on physics, finished in 1186, we read in the Hebrew translations: "I made another shorter translation in my youth." In his medium commentaries he frequently promises to write others more developed. In fact several books of Ibn-Rushd have signatures which the Hebrew translations have preserved and which afford us the means of ascertaining to a certain extent the series:—

- 1171. Commentaries on *De' Colo et Mundo* (Seville).
- 1174. Paraphrase on the *Rhetorique* and the *Poetique*
medium commentary on the *Metaphysics*
(Cordova).
- 1176. Medium commentary on the *Ethique to Nicomaque*.
- 1178. Certain parts of *De substantial orbis* (Moroco).
- 1179. Methods of the demonstration of religious dogmas
(Sèville.)
- 1186. Great commentary on *Physics*.
- 1193. Commentary on *De Febribus of Galen*.
- 1195. Questions on Logic, (written during his disgrace.)

We possess all the three species of commentaries (either in Arabic, or in Hebrew or in Latin) on the *Analytical seconds*, on *Physics*, on the treatises on *Heavens*, on that on the *Soul* and on the *Metaphysics*. On the other books of Aristotle we have only the medium commentaries or paraphrases or both at the same time. The only works of Aristotle on which we have no commentaries are

Ibn-Rushd are the ten books of his "History of Animals" and the *Politique*. A commentary on the "History of Animals" must certainly have existed Ibn-Abi-Oceiba, Abd-el-Wahid and the Arabic list of the works of Ibn-Rushd which is found in the manuscript No. 879 at the Escorial Library expressly mention it. As regards the *Politique*, Ibn-Rushd tells us himself in the epilogue of his medium commentary on the *Ethics*, that the Arabic translation of this work of Aristotle was not yet known in Spain. At the beginning of his commentary on the Republic of Plato, he expressly says, that he has undertaken the exposition of this work only because Aristotle's books on the same subject had not reached him.

We might conclude from an inspection of the Latin editions of Averroes that he did not know the books, XI, XIII and XIV of the *Metaphysics*. We do not as a matter of fact find in these editions any commentary on the three books cited above. But Monsieur Munk has observed, that there exists in Mebrew a medium commentary on those three books. Monsieur Steinschneider has discovered new traces of Ibn-Rushd's studies of the whole text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* some portions of which had till his time been very much neglected other commentaries are known to us only by vague and indistinct hints. Labbe, Wolf, de Rossi, speak of a commentary on *De Musica*; but it is evident that they have been misled by the double sense of the word which in Hebrew means the *Poetique*, and the books they have in view are the paraphrase of this work translated by Todros Todrosi Bernard Navagero, in a letter written to the *Junts* assures us as having seen at Constantinople the great commentary on the two books about the *Plants*. As Ibn-Rushd has written great commentaries only on books which he had paraphrased or otherwise explained before, it is difficult to believe that he should have taken such pains on this book of which nothing has yet come down to us. In the same way it is by a mistake, that Fabricicius has attributed to Averroes books on *Physiognomy*. In general the commentator has made a distinction between authentic and apocryphal books of the philosopher (Aristotle) with very great precision and accuracy.

Besides these commentaries, Ibn-Rushd has composed a great number of works whose complete enumeration offers very great difficulties. The catalogues which Arab biographers have transmitted to us, are far from agreeing with one another, and with those which we have in our hands. One single title often designates different treatises; more often one treatise is mentioned under different names; sometimes treatises are also formed by the agglutination of several others. In an Arabic manuscript of the Escorial Library (No. 879) where there is a list of the works of Ibn-Sina, of Alfarebi, and of Ibn-Rushd seventy-eight books are mentioned under Ibn-Rushd's name on philosophy, medicine, jurisprudence and theology. Ibn-Abi Oceibia, on his side enumerates at least fifty. Ibn-el-Abbar mentions, only four. Putting together all these different hints, comparing them with the writings we possess, and after cutting down all double enumerations here is a list which we should be inclined to offer to our readers :—

I.—Philosophical treatises.

(1). The work known under the name of the *Destruction* in Arabic. *Tehafot-el-Tehafot*, a refutation of Algazzali's book, called, *the Destruction of Philosophers*. This work is mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia, and in the catalogue of the Escorial. It exists in Hebrew⁽²⁾ and in Latin⁽³⁾. But this last version is very inaccurate, and probably interpolated. The doctrine that is explained here is, in many points, in flagrant contradiction to that of Ibn-Rushd.

(2). *De Substantia Orbis*, or *on the composition of celestial bodies*. The catalogue of the Escorial and that of Ibn-Abi Oceibia mention several distinct works under this title. In fact this treatise consists of dissertations written at different epochs. It is one of those works most widely known in Hebrew and in Latin. Ordinarily joined to the book: *De causis* (*on causes*), it has taken its place along with this treatise in the general body of Aristotelian works.

(2). Wüstenfold, p. 107, No. 10; Steinschneider, p. 23, 50-51.

(3). Gosche, Weber Ghazzali's Leben u Werke, p. 268 et suiv.

(3 & 4). Two treatises on the union (*ittisal*) of intellect separate in individuals are consecutively mentioned by Ibn-Abi Oceibia. One of these treatises is that which is called in Latin : *De animae beatitudine* ; the other is *Epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine* (opp. t. ix). They exist also in Hebrew.

(5). A work mentioned in these terms by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia :—
 “A treatise on the problem to find out if material intellect is able, or not to understand separate forms,—a problem which Aristotle had promised to solve in his book *on the Soul*.” This treatise exists in Hebrew under the title of *the Treatise on material intellect and on the possibility of union*. I have found, besides, a Latin translation of another treatise on the same subject in two manuscripts, both of them of the 14th century and of Italian origin :—(a) At the Library of St. Marc in Venice (cl. vi. No. 52) under the title *the Tractatus Averoy's qualiter intellectus materialis conjugatur intelligentiæ abstractæ* ; (b) At the Imperial Library of Paris (anc-fonds No. 6510) under the title : *Epistola de intellectu* (voir Appendice vi.)

It appears, that Ibn-Rushd had written four treatises on this fundamental principle without counting the great digression of the commentary on the third book of *the Soul* devoted to the same subject.

(6). Commentary on Ibn-Badja's letter, concerning *the union of intellect in Man*, mentioned in the catalogue of the Escorial Library.

(7). Questions on the different parts of the Organon which people usually add to the commentaries and of which there are two in Hebrew.⁽¹⁾

(8). *On conditional syllogism*, mentioned in the catalogue of the Escorial Library.

(1) Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 436.

(9). *Epistola de primilate proedicatorum*, following the *Analytique* in the Latin editions.

(10). *Abridgement of Logio*, published in Hebrew at Rivadi Trents; identical no doubt, with the work entitled in Ibn-Abi-Oceibia and in the bibliography of the Escorial Library: *A book on what is necessary in Logic, and an Introduction to Logic* which is found in the large number of Hebrew manuscripts.⁽²⁾

(11). *Prolegomena to philosophy*, in Arabic, at the Escorial (No. 629); a collection of twelve dissertations: (1) on the subject and the predicate; (2) on definitions; (3) on the Primary and the Second Analytiques; (4) On propositions; (5) On a true or a false proposition; (6) On a contingent or a necessary proposition; (7) On argumentation; (8) On legitimate conclusion; (9) On Alfarabi's notions concerning syllogism; (10) On the faculties of the Soul; (11) On the senso of hearing; (12) On the four qualities.

(12). Commentary on the *Republic of Plato*, mentioned in the catalogue of the Escorial, it exists in Hebrew and in Latin (opp. t. III, edit. 1553).

(13). An exposition of the opinions of Abou-Nasr (Alfarabi) in his treatise on logic and those of Aristotle on the same subject, with a judgment on their opinions; mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia, and probably also in the catalogue of the Escorial.

(14). Different commentaries on Alfarabi, amongst others, on his expositions of the *Organon* as indicated in the catalogue of the Escorial.

(15). On Alfarabi's criticisms of the *Seconds Analytiques* of Aristotle with regard to order, to the rules of syllogism, and to definitions; works mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia.

(16). Refutation of the classification of beings, made by Ibn-Sina, beings absolutely possible and possible by their essence.

(2) Bartolucci, *Bibl. rabbin.* t. I, p. 13—Wolf, I, p. 18; Pasini, I, 20, 66.

externally necessary, and necessary by their essence. In Hebrew, in the Imperial Library of Paris (anc. fond. 356), mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia.

(17). A medium commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Nicolas, mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia, and in the catalogue of the Escurial. It deals no doubt with the Primary Philosophy (*Philosophic Premiere*) of Nicolas de Damas. Nicolas is often quoted by Arab philosophers and particularly by Ibn-Rushd who brings him especially to task for having attempted to invert the order of Aristotle's books on *Metaphysics*.

(18). Treatise on this question:—*If God knows things in details*, mentioned in the catalogue of the Escurial.

(19). Treatise on eternal existence and on temporary existence (*Ibid*).

(20). Researches on the different points of the *Metaphysics* which have been treated in Ibn-Sina's book entitled: *A Schefa*, mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia.

(21). A book on the folly of doubting the arguments of Aristotle concerning the existence of primeval matter and a manifest proof that Aristotle's arguments on the subject are evident truths (*Ibid*).

(22). Question on *Time* (*Ibid*).

(23). Questions on Philosophy (*Ibid*).

(24). Treatise on intellect and the intelligible in Arabic at Escurial No. 879, probably identical with the treatise on *Intellect*, mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia's treatise which Dr. Wüstenfeld wrongly regards as identical with the second part of *De beatitudine animae*⁽²⁾.

(25). Commentary on the book of Alexander d'Aphrodisias on *Intellect*, mentioned in the catalogue of the Escurial. It exists in Hebrew.

(2) Geschichte der Arabischen Aertze u Naturforscher, p. 107.

(26). Questions on the book on *Soul* in the form of *questions and answers* (*Ibid*).

(27). Two books on *the science of the Soul*, distinct from the preceding ones (*Ibid*).

(28). Questions on *the Heaven and Earth* (*Ibid*).

Other titles which are found in the bibliographies and the manuscripts had their origin in errors and in double enumerations. In this manner, the *Bilances speculationum sen staterae subiles*, discussions on God, creation, immortality, prophesy, which exist in Hebrew in the Bodleian Library at Turin, at Parma are by Gazzali. The book: *De generatione animalium tam secundum viam gignitionis quam secundum viam putrefactiones* which figures in the catalogues of the Imperial Library (fonds de sarbonne, 612; anc. fonds. 6510), is only an extract from the commentary on the XIIth Book of the *Metaphysics*. The treatise: *De rerum naturalium mutatione juxta veteres philosophos cum expositione Ben Resched*; *De Cometis*; *De Sensibus*; *De Nutrimento*; *De diluvius*; the commentaries on *Hai bin-Iokzan* of Ibn-Tofail and on, the *Regimen of an anchorite* (*Régime du solitaire*) of Ibn-Bâdja, mentioned by Wolf, Bartolucci and Moreri rest only on vague and indistinct hints. It was only by a mistake that d'Herbelot attributes to Ibn-Rushd the political work, entitled: *The Lamp of Kings*, which was written by a certain Abu-Bekr Moham-mad of Forlose who has nothing in common with Ibn-Rushd.

II.—Theology.

(1). A small work, entitled: *Critique of diverse opinions on the harmony between philosophy and theology*, mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceiba, and whose Arabic text, taken from the manuscript 629 of the Escorial has lately been published at Munich by M. J. Müller. It exists also in Hebrew at Paris (anc. fonds No. 345) and at Leyden.

(2). A resume or rather a sort of appendice of the preceding treatise contained in the same manuscript of the Escorial and published also by M. J. Müller.

(3). An essay to prove that the doctrines of the peripatetics and those of Mahomedan theologians (*motecallemîr*) on the mode of existence of the world very much resemble one another in their real sense mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceiba, and in the catalogue of the Escorial.

(4). *Methods of demonstration of religious dogmas*, a book mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceiba and in the catalogue of the Escorial. It is to be found in Arabic at *the Escorial* (No. 629), in Hebrew at the Imperial Library of Paris (Oratoire No. 111), and at Leyden. It has also been published by M. J. Müller.

(5). Commentary on the *Akidet* of the Imam Mahdi, mentioned in the catalogue of the Escorial. It treats undoubtedly of the profession of faith of Abu-Abdallah Mohâmmad Ibn-Jumarta, the founder or the Mahdi of the Almohades.

III.—Jurisprudence.

(1). *The point of departure of the authoritative doctor (at muglahed) and the supreme term of the moderate (at moslesid) doctor, in the matter of jurisprudence*, a work mentioned by Ibn-el-Abbar, by Mohammed ben-Ali de Xativa, by Ibn-Abi-Oceiba, and in the catalogue of the Escorial. I believe that this is the book which is quoted under the title of the Kitab-el-motekid: "the book" of the doctor universally admitted and attributed to Ibn-Rushd, in the *Index of forbidden books*, contained in our Arab manuscript 525 (suppl.), fol. 39 v.

(2). An abridgement of Algayyali's book on jurisprudence, entitled *El-Mustafa*, mentioned by Ibn-el-Abbar, in the catalogue of the Escorial, and by the historian Abu-Saïd, quoted by Makkari.

(3). *Vigilia super errores repertos in textibus legis civilis*, in three volumes, work mentioned by Lèon l'Africain.

(4). *On the causes of the bar* in three volumes; in Arabic at Escorial, No. 988.

(5). Complete course of jurisprudence, in Arabic at the Escorial, Nos. 1021 and 1022.

(6). *A treatise on Sacrifices* (*Ibid*, the same number.)

(7). *A treatise on Tithes* (*Ibid* the same number.)

(8). Illegitimate gains of Kings, of presidents, of usurers, *Ibid* No. 1127. Ibn-Abi-Oceiba attributes to Ibn-Rushd also a book concerning Mahomedan law, called: *Kitab-el-Tahsil*, and another book called *Prolegomena to jurisprudence*. But these two books certainly belong to Ibn-Rushd, the grandfather.⁽⁴⁾ The numbers 1 and 2 mentioned above are the only ones whose authenticity is assured. Not one of the titles given by Casirinese are to be found in the biographies of Ibn-Rushd. As there had been three celebrated jurists of the name of Ibn-Rushd particularly one who lived about the year 700 of the Hejorah, and whose writings are to be found at the Escorial it would not be surprising, that they had been mixed up.

IV.—Astronomy.

An abridgement of the Almageste, indicated by the bibliographical note of the Escorial. It is to be found in Hebrew in the great number of libraries. It has never been translated into Latin. It was, however, known to Pic de La Mirandole, Vossius and others.

(2). The note of the Escorial mentions a second work, entitled: *That which it is necessary to know of the book.....on the Almageste*. The name of the author is doubtful. It is I believe, the word *Claudius* which the Arabs add to that of Ptolemy. This work would then be identical with the preceding one.

(3). *De Motu sphæeræ Cœlestis*, mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia, and in the catalogue of the Escorial and which Monsieur Wustenfild regards as identical with the book: *De substantia Orbis*.

(4). Munk, *Melanges*, p. 419, note Dozy, *Recherches*, I, p. 359, &c., &c.

(4). On the circular appearance of the Heavens and of the fixed stars, a treatise mentioned in the catalogue of the Escorial. In the second book of his great commentary on the treatise on *Heaven (du Ciel)* Ibn-Rushd announces his intention, if God permits it, to compose a work on astronomy, such as it existed at the time of Aristotle, in order to destroy the theory of epicycles and of eccentrics, and to harmonise astronomy with the *Physics* of Aristotle.

V.—Grammar.

(1). A book on what it is necessary to know concerning Grammar, mentioned by Ibn-el-Abbar and in the catalogue of the Escorial.

(2). On the verb and on the derived noun, mentioned in the catalogue of the Escorial.

VI.—Medical books.

(1). The great work, entitled *Kulliyât* (generalities) which has been made into *Colliget*: a complete course of medicine in seven books. The books II, VI, and VII, were recombined under the title of *Collectanea de re medica*. The book on: *De sanitate tuenda* which is found in Arabic at the Escorial (No. 879) is, without doubt, only the VI of the *Colliget*. This work is mentioned by Ibn-el-Abbar, by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia and in the catalogue of the Escorial.

(2). A commentary on the medical poem of Ibn-Sina, called *Ardjuza*. It is one of the most widely spread books of Ibn-Rushd. It is found in Arabic at the Escorial, at Oxford, at Leyden, and particularly in Paris (anc. fonds, No. 1056).

(3). *On the Thériaque*. Ibn-Rushd cites it himself, (*Colliget*, l. vii, c. ii). It is found in Arabic at the Escorial (No. 879), and in Hebrew and in Latin in many libraries.

(4). Answers or prescriptions concerning *Diarrhœa*, found in Hebrew in the manuscript *Scaliger 2*, of Leyden.

(5). Exposition or a middle commentary of Galen's book on ; *De febris*.

(6). An exposition of the three books of Galen: *De facultatibus naturalibus*.

(7). Exposition of the seven books of Galen's: *De morborum causis et symptomatibus*.

These commentaries are found in Arabic at the Escorial (No. 879).

(8). Exposition of Galen's book on: (Greek).

(9). Exposition of Galen's book, called in Arabic *Istoukisât*. It is, without doubt the (Greek).

(10). Exposition of Galen's book: *De temperamentis*.

(11) Exposition of Galen's book: *Des medicaments simples*.

(12). Exposition of Galen's books: (Greek).

All these commentaries on Galen are mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia and in the catalogue of the Escorial.

(13). *De temperamentorum differentüs* in Arabic at the Escorial (No. 879), identical no doubt with the *De temperaments* mentioned by Ibn-Abi Oceibia, as a different work of exposition on Galen's book which bears the same title.⁽²⁾

(14) A treatise: *De simplicibus* in Hebrew, different from the No. 11, mentioned above and from the *De Simplicibus*, published in Latin which is only the Vth book of the *Coltigel*.

(15). *Des temperaments egaux*, mentioned in the catalogue of the Escorial; opposed, no doubt, to Galen's (Greek).

(16). *De spermatc*. Printed for the first time in Latin in the Part XI of the edition of 1560, mentioned in the catalogue of the Escorial.

2 Wustenfeld, p. 106; Steinschneider, p. 361, note.

(17). *Canons de Medicinis laxativis*, Bibl-imp-anc-fonds Latin, No. 6949.

(18). *Question on intermittent fever*, mentioned by Ibn-Abi-Oceibia.

(19). A book on *putrid fevers* (*Ibid.*)

(20). Treatises exchanged between Abu-Bekr, Ibn-Tofail and Ibn-Rushd on the chapter on medicaments such as is to be found in the book, called *Kulliyat* (*Ibid.*)

We find also in the manuscripts, in the medical collections of the Renaissance and in the bibliographers, the Latin text or an indication of several treatises which bear the name of Averroes, but whose authenticity is very doubtful. Such are:—

De Venenis—De Concordia inter Aristotelem et Galenum de generatione sanguinis—Secreta Hippocratis, Questio de convalescentia a fabre, De Balneis.

X.

The little celebrity which Ibn-Rushd enjoyed amongst Mahomedans and the rapid decline of philosophical studies after his death were the causes that Arabic copies of his works spread very little, and hardly went out of Spain. The enormous destruction of Arabic manuscripts ordered by Ximenes (the number of books burnt at the public place, of Granada was counted to be eighty thousand) finished by making very rare the original texts of the philosophical works of the commentator. The manuscripts that we still possess are all of Morocco character. Casaubon, quoted by Huet, asserts, no doubt, that he had touched with his own hands, a manuscript brought from East by Guillaume Postel which contained a commentary on the five parts of Aristotle's *Organon* as well as on the *Rhetorics* and the *Poetics*. I confess, I have for a long time regarded with great suspicion all the different parts of this statement which the learned archbishop of Avanches has, moreover, covered with his own authority. How, said I to myself, Postel could have brought from the *Orient* a book

which had always been so rare there? Huet himself after having observed that Scaliger had already despaired of coming across any Arabic manuscripts of Averroes, is surprised, that such a *savant* as he had had no knowledge of Postel's manuscript, although Postel was his friend and familiar correspondent. Is this not a peremptory objection, after all? The errors which the treatise: *De interpretatione* abounds in, when it is a question of Oriental versions:—do not they authorise us to call Huet's evidence into question?.....

After having examined the manuscripts of Florence, I have seen a portion of my doubts disappear. This manuscript is, as a matter of fact, exactly composed like the one which Huet speaks of. The commentary on the *Rhetorique* and the *Poetique* are found there along with that on the *Organon*, but this assemblage is far too characteristic for Huet and Casaubon to have come across it by chance. It would not be even a very rash conjecture to suppose, that the manuscript handled by Casaubon is the very same which is to be found to-day on the shelves of the Laurentian Library at Florence. But this by no means weakens the general fact which we want to establish. This manuscript, being in fact written in the purest form of the occidental (*mogrebin*) character of the 14th century, if Postel had really brought it from the *Orient*, could not have been there except by a pure accident. A letter of P. Dupuy, to Scaliger dated from Paris 20th May, 1606, puts us on the traces of another manuscript of Averroes which was equally known to Casaubon.

The manuscript of Florence contains the medium commentary on the *organon* as well as the paraphrases on the *Rhetorique* and the *Poetique* that is to say, a complete collection of the commentaries on the logical works of Aristotle. The examination I have made of this beautiful manuscript has not revealed to me any important difference with the Latin text unless it be in the paraphrase of the *Rhetorique* and particularly of the *Poetique*. I have elsewhere insisted on the interest which a publication of this manuscript might have for Orientalists. Of the two translations that we possess that of Hermann d'Ademand is entirely uninteresting.

legible, while that of Abraham, de Balmes is very different from the text; the Hebrew translator having suppressed or replaced by examples familiar to Jews the Arabic quotations which Ibn-Rushd, himself had substituted for the too Hellenic details of the Greek original. The library of the Escorial at Madrid with that of the Laurentian at Florence is the only one in Europe which possesses a certain portion of the Arabic texts of the philosophical works of Ibn-Rushd. The No. 629 contains several opuscles, known under the combined title of the *Prolegomena to Philosophy*, and the important treatises on the harmony of religion and philosophy (see as mentioned above, p. 72-73). The No. 646 contains the commentary, on the treatise *on the Soul*; the No. 879, a question *on Intellect and the Intelligible* and a complete catalogue of his works. Hadji Khalfa, à propos the *Tehafot* of Gazzali has preserved for us in Arabic the last words of the *Tehafot-el-Tehafot* of Ibn-Rushd. We have, besides, some Arabic texts of Ibn-Rushd in Hebrew characters for the use of the Jews. Our Imperial Library of Paris possesses in this character (Nos. 303 and 317) an abridgement of the *Organon*, the medium commentary on the treatise *on Generation and on Corruption* on the *Meteors*, on the treatise *on the Soul* and the paraphrase of the *Parva Naturalia*.

The Bodleian Library of Oxford possesses in the same character the commentaries on the treatises *on the Heavens*, *on Generation*, and on the *Meteors*.

The Arabic text of the medical works of Ibn-Rushd is less rare than that of his philosophical works. The Escorial possesses several manuscripts of his commentary on the medical poem of Ibn-Sina (Nos. 709, 826, 853), his commentaries on Galen, his treatise on the *Thériaque*, perhaps even the *Colliget*. The Bodleian library, the library at Leyden and the library at Paris possess also manuscripts of his commentary on the poem by Ibn-Sina. Just in proportion as the Arabic text of Ibn-Rushd is rare in our libraries, in the same proportion the Hebrew versions of his works abound there. The ancient foundation (*fonds*) of the Imperial library possesses alone nearly 50 manuscripts that Vienna no less than 40; the collection of the abbey de Rossi

contain more than 28. After the Bible there is probably no other book which is found in greater numbers in the collection of Hebrew manuscripts.

The Latin manuscripts of Averroes are also very numerous, particularly in the collections which represent, as the collection at Sorbonae a great movement of scholastic studies; nearly all of them are of the 14th century.

XI.

No portion of the Arabic text of Ibn-Rushd had been published before the year, 1859. In that year Monsieur J. Müller published at Munich, under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences, the three treatises on the harmony between religion and philosophy, contained in the manuscript 629 of the Escorial. (1) The learned editor has promised an introduction and other elucidations which have not yet been given to the world. Two works of Ibn-Rushd's: his *Abridgement of Logic* and his *Abridgement of Physics* have appeared in Hebrew at Riva di Trents in 1560. Monsieur Goldenthal has published at Leipzig in 1842, the Hebrew translation of the commentary on the Rhetorics.

The Latin editions partial or complete of Averroes are literally innumerable between the years 1480 and 1580; there was hardly a year which did not see a new edition appear. Venice alone counts more than fifty, of which fourteen or fifteen are more or less complete.

Padua had, however, the honour of giving to the world the *edition princeps*, the first or the best edition. In 1472, 1473 and 1474 appeared in this town the different treatises of Aristotle with the commentary of Averroes: *Nobiles Vicentini Joannis Philippi Aureliani et fratrum impenna opera vero atque ingenio Laurenti Canozi Lendenarunsis*.*

(1) *Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes*, extrait No. 3 des *Monumenta Saculariædel' Academic*, 1st class.

*Under the generous patronage of the noble Vicentius Joannis Philippus Aurelianin and brothers with the ingenious colloboration of Laurentius Canozi Lendenarunsis.

In 1481, there appeared in Venice the paraphrase of the *Poetics* with Alfarabi's comments on the *Rhetories*; in 1482, the *Colliget* and the *De Substantia Orbis*. In 1483 and in 1484, appeared a complete edition of Aristotle accompanied by Averroes, in three volumes (very rare), by Andre d' Asolo. In 1489, appeared a second complete edition in two or three volumes, *fol. goth* by Bernardino de Tridino. Since then, editions follow one after another without interruption. The years 1495, 1496, 1497, 1500 saw also appear more or less complete editions; Aristotle shall henceforward never appear again in Venice without being accompanied by his interpreter. André d' Asolo, Octavien Scot Comino de Tridino Jean Gryphins, particularly the Juntas made editions after editions follow one another with an incredible rapidity during the whole 16th century. The best and the most widely spread edition of all is that of the Juntas of 1553. The last complete edition is that of 1574.

Although Venice had, so to say, those acquired a monopoly of Averroes' works, other towns also brought out separate editions of his medical works and even of his philosophical treatises. Thus Bologna in 1501, 1523, 1580; Rome in 1521, 1539; Pavia in 1507 and 1520; Strassburg in 1503 and 1531; Naples in 1570 and 1574; Geneva in 1608. Lyons had also a complete edition, published by Scipion de Tabiano (1524 in—8,°) and other numerous partial editions in 1517, 1531, 1537, 1542.

At the end of the 16th century, these editions become more and more rare; only some medical treatises force themselves still on to publicity. In the 17th century, all these numberless volumes will be buried for ever in dust and in oblivion.

CHAPTER II.

Doctrine of Averroes.

Seeing Averroes' name constantly turning up in the history of philosophy we should be inclined to regard him as one of those great founders of systems who rally round an original doctrine a large family of thinkers. But a more extensive knowledge of Arabian philosophy leads to the apparently strange conclusion that the system known in the Middle Ages during the *Renaissance* under the name of Averroism is nothing but the *ensemble* of doctrines common to Arabian peripatetics, and that this doctrine contains a wrong sense (*contre-sens*) very much the same as if we gave the name of *Themistianism* or *Simplicianism* to the *ensemble* of the peripatetic studies of the Alexandrian school. Literary history does not probably offer another example of a man whose character has been more altered by his reputation on account of a lack of criticism and of the distance of time. Remaining alone in view as a representative of Arabian philosophy Ibn-Rushd had the good luck of the last comers and passed for a founder of doctrines, which he had hardly done anything but to explain more fully than his predecessors.

Not that the doctrine of Ibn-Rushd regarded by itself is lacking in originality. Although Ibn-Rushd never aspired to any other glory than that of a commentator, yet this apparent modesty should not mislead us. Human spirit always knows how to assert its independence. Chain him to a tent and he will know how to recover his liberty in the interpretation of that very text. He will rather falsify that text than renounce the most inalienable of his rights, namely, *the individual exercise of his own thoughts*. Under the pretext of commenting on Aristotle, the Arabs, like the scholastics, knew how to create for themselves a philosophy full of its own elements, and certainly very different from that which was being taught in the lyceums. But this originality is not acknowledged; to Ibn-Rushd's eyes, philosophical science had already

been finished ; there remained nothing but to facilitate its acquisition. We should not, moreover, cherish any illusion on the importance which men specially called *philosophers* had amongst the Arabs. Philosophy was nothing but an episode in the history of the Arabian mind.⁽¹⁾ The real philosophical movement of Islamism is to be found amongst the theological sects : Kadarites, Djabaries, Sifarites, Motazelites, Batenians, Talimites, Ascharites, and above all, the *Kalâm*. But Mahomedans have never given to this order of discussions the name of *philosophy* (*fil safet*). This name does not signify amongst the Arabs the search for truth in general, but rather a particular sect or school, for example, *the Greek philosophy* and those who study it. When the history of Arabian thought is written, it will be very important not to be led astray by *the double sense* of this word. That which is called *Arabian philosophy* is only a very limited section of the philosophical movement in Islamism, to such an extent, indeed, that even Mahomedans themselves almost ignore its very existence. Al-Gazzalli, anxious to know this rare product, called *philosophy*, gives the following proof of the curiosity of his mind :—

“ I have never met” says he, “ one single doctor who has ever given any particular attention to this story.” Just in proportion as the Arabs have impressed their national character on their religious beliefs, on their poetry, on their architecture, and on their theological sects, just in the same proportion have they shown a lack of originality in their efforts to continue Greek philosophy. We should rather say, that it is only by using a very misleading and equivocal term, that we apply the name of *Arabian philosophy* to an *ensemble* of works undertaken, as a reaction against Arabism, in those parts of the Mahomedan empire which were most distant from the Arabian peninsula, that is to say, in Samarkand, Bokhara, Cordova, and Morocco. This philosophy is written in Arabic, because Arabic had become the learned and the sacred tongue of all Mahomedan countries : *That's all*. The real Arabic genius, characterised by the poetry of the *Kasidas*, and by the

(1) Ritter, Geschichte der christ. Phil. III Th. xi Buch Th. Haarbrucker, preface to his translation of Schahristani, p. vii. Do Hammer, Litteraturgeschichte der Araber, I. Abth. I. Bard, S. LXXXI.

eloquence of the *Koran*, was absolutely antipathetical to Greek philosophy. Shut up like all Semitic peoples in the narrow circle of lyrism and prophetism, the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula had never had the least idea of what might be called science or rationalism. It was only when the Persian spirit, represented by the dynasty of the Abbasides got the better of the Arabian, that Greek philosophy penetrated into Islam. Although subjugated by a Semitic creed, Persia always knew how to maintain its rights of an Indo-European race. While Persia was busy reconstructing her epics and her mythology in her own language, she was already disturbing Islam by philosophical efforts which in the first century of the Hejirah would have created only scandal or disdain. Therefore it was that Bagdad, the Abbaside town *par excellence* was the centre of this new movement; that it was the Syrian Christians and those that were allied to *Magianism* who were its prompters and its instruments. It was a Khaliph, an eminent and ardent representative of the Persian reaction, Al-mamoun, who was at the head of it. Brought up by the Barmeides who were known to be attached to the ancient doctrines of Zoroaster, we find him all throughout his life searching with great curiosity, out of the pale of Islam, the rationalistic teachings of India, of Persia and of Greece.⁽¹⁾ The sources of Arabian philosophy thus go back to a spirit of antagonism to Islam and that's why philosophy had always remained amongst Mahomedans a foreign intrusion an abortive and insignificant attempt for the intellectual education of the peoples of the Orient.

If we compare the doctrines contained in Ibn-Rushd's writings with those of Aristotle's, we find, at the very first sight, the serious alterations which peripatetism underwent between these two extremes. But if we want to determine *the point* where the new element was introduced and which transformed one philosophy into another, the question becomes very delicate. The theories of Ibn-Rushd do not differ by any essential character from those of Ibn-Badja and of Ibn-Tofail who on their side, did

(1) Gustav Neil, Geschichte der Chalifen, II Band s. 253.

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nothing but continue in Spain the series of studies which Sina Alfarabi and Al-Kindi had already started in the East. Al-Kindi himself who is usually regarded as the founder of Arabian philosophy does not appear to have had any right to be called a creator. His doctrine is nothing but an echo of that of the Syrians, who directly go back to the Greek commentators of Alexandria. Between these and Alexandre d'Approdisias and between this latter and Theophraste there was no sudden or abrupt innovation. We might, however, say that the origin of the Arabian philosophy as well as that of scholastics, ought to be traced in the movement which carried the second generation of the Alexandrian school towards peripatetism.

Porphry was rather peripatetic than Platonic, and it is not without reason, that the East and the middle ages have regarded him as a necessary introducer to philosophic encyclopædia. Porphry placed the first stone of Arabian and scholastic philosophy, Maxim, the teacher of Emperor Julian, Proclus and Damascius are almost peripatetics. In the school of Ammonius, son of Hermias, Aristotle definitely takes the first place and ousts Plato. The commentators: Themistius, Syrianus, David the Armenian. Simplicius Jean Philopon portend the approach of peripatetism to universal domination. There was the decisive moment which constituted philosophical authority for more than 10 centuries. It is at this peripatetic prolongation of the Alexandrian school that we should find the point of union between Arabian and Grecian philosophies. The reason, that are usually given for the preference accorded to Aristotle by the Arabs are more spacious than real. There was really no *preference* as there was really *no choice by reflexion*. The Arab accepted Greek culture as it reached them. The books which most exactly express this transition, are the apocryphal *Theology of Aristotle*, which we must regard as the composition of an Arab as well as the book, called *De Causis* whose indecisive character held all the scholastics in suspense. Arabian philosophy always preserved the impression of its origin; the influence of the Alexandrians is to be found at every step. Although Plotinus remained unknown to Mahome-

mans⁽²⁾ there is nothing that resembles the doctrine of the *Enneades* more than such and such a page of Ibn-Badja, Ibn-Rushd and Ibn-Gebirol (Avicbron). It is true that influences coming from the East probably combined with those of Alexandria nor is it possible to doubt, that *sufism* which is regarded as having had its origin in India or in Persia had its share in the formation of the doctrine of the union of the active intellect, and of final absorption of course, there is a vast distance from the Hindu secretary to the Arab philosopher, but it is peculiar to mysticism to limit itself at the same time to philosophy as well as to follow and to offer its hand sometimes to the most absolute rationalism and sometimes to the most intemperate superstitions.

In this manner, Arab philosophy appears, from its very first manifestations endowed with all its essential characteristics. Only the titles of Alkindi's (IXth century) works concerning Intellect which we still possess are sufficient to prove, that he already professed on this fundamental point those theories which later on have acquired such a great importance. In Alfarabi (Xth century), these theories are almost as much developed as in the writings of Ibn-Rushd. The mystic theories which Ibn-Badja shall presently explain in his *Régime du solitaire* ("Regimen of an Anchorite") can be wholly traced back to Alfarabi. The end of Man is enter into a more and more intimate union with Reason, *i.e.*, with the *Active intellect*. Man becomes a prophet as soon as every veil has fallen between him and this active intellect. Such a felicity can only be attained in this life; a perfect man finds his recompense here in his own perfection; all that people say beyond that is only fable. But it is in Abu-Sina (Avicienne), that it is necessary to search for the most complete expression of Arabian philosophy. God, being absolute Unity, cannot possibly have immediate action on the world. He certainly, does not enter into the current of particular things; centre of the world. He lets the circumference roll on as he likes. The perfection of a rational soul is to become the mirror of the Universe; she reaches it by moral perfection and by in-

(2). M. Vacherot Histoire de l'école d'Alexandrie, t. III, p. 100.

^ ternal purification which must make the vessel ready for the illumination of the divine intellect. There are, however, men who have no need either of study or of asceticism to acquire intellectual illumination. These favourites of God are called Prophets. In general, Ibn-Sina appears to philosophise with a certain sobriety. Ibn-Rushd takes him bitterly to task for not knowing how to take a certain side and to hold on to a middle course between theologians and philosophers. He admits, that human personality survives after death, and he tries to get a footing in the way of pantheism by placing the world in the category of the possible. This distinction between the possible, and the necessary is the source of Ibn-Sina's theories, and the basis on which he tries to establish divine personality. Ibn-Rushd adds, however, that according to some, Ibn-Sina did not admit the existence of a separate substance at all; and that his true opinions on God and the eternity of the world should be searched for in his *Oriental Philosophy* where he identifies God with the Universe. It was chiefly against Ibn-Sina, that Al-Gazzali directed his book, called, "The Destruction of Philosophers."

✓ Gazzali is, without any contradiction, the most original mind of the Arabian school. He has left us in a curious book his philosophical confessions, and an account of his voyage through the different philosophical systems of his time. No system having satisfied him, he finished with scepticism; scepticism not being able to retain him, he precipitates himself into asceticism and demands from the mystic dances of the Sufis the stunning of his giddy thoughts. Arrived there he stops at death and annihilation. Those who, after having philosophised, embrace mysticism in despair of causes, are usually the most intolerant enemies of philosophy. Gazzali, becoming Sufi, undertook to prove, the radical importance of Reason, and by a manoeuvre which has always misled spirits more ardent than wise, to base religion on scepticism. He employs in this struggle a really astonishing perspicacity of intellect. It was specially by his criticism of the causal principle, that he opened his attack on rationalism. Hume never said anything more than that. We see only simultaneousness, never causality. Causality is nothing but the will of God which ordains that,

things should ordinarily follow one another. Nature's laws do not exist, or are only the expression of a habitual fact: *God alone is immutable*. That is, as it is evident, the negation of all science. Gazzali was one of those whimsical spirits who embrace religion only with a view to bully reason. Unfavourable rumours spread besides, about the sincerity of his motives. Ibn-Rushd states that Gazzali attacked philosophy in order to please theologians and to dispel those doubts that had been raised against his orthodoxy. Moses of Narbonne tells us, that Gazzali had composed for his friends a small private treatise in which he had given solution to the objections which he had presented to the public as insoluble. The little treatise has, in fact, been found in Hebrew in the Library of Leyden. Ibn-Tofail exposed Gazzali's perpetual contradictions and proved with evidence that he had composed esoteric writings in which he had professed doctrines very different from those that he usually gave to the vulgar. "Accept what you see" said he "and let alone what you only hear; when the sun rises it dispenses you from the duty of contemplating Saturn."

Al-Gazzali exercised a decisive influence on Arabian philosophy. His attacks produced the usual effect of contradictions and introduced in the opinions of his adversaries a precision till then unknown. Ibn-Badja was the first who took upon himself the task of enforcing the authority of reason against Al-Gazzali. Gazzali had humiliated science, and asserted, that man could arrive at perfection only by removing the exercise of his rational faculties. Ibn-Badja, in his celebrated treatises on the *Regimen of an Anchorite* tried to prove, that it was only by science and by a successive developement of these faculties, that Man could identify himself with the *Active Intellect*. He added also a political theory to the psychological one:—a sort of *Utopia* or an *ideal model of society*, where Man could without much effort arrive at this identification. The victory of the rational soul over his animal nature is the end of all the struggles of our moral life. An act of intelligence operates by intelligible forms which reach the material or the passive intellect; there they receive from the

Active intellect the form and the reality. When Man, by study and speculation, has arrived at a full possession of his own conscience, then it is called *the acquired intellect* the circle of human evolution; has been finished, and the only thing left for Man is to die.

This exalted rationalism is also the source of the doctrines of Ibn-Tofail (Abubacer of the scholastics). His romance, *Hay-Ibn-Yakzan* a sort of psychological Robinson published by Pococke under the title: *Philosophus autodidactus* or *A self-taught Philosopher* has for its object to prove how human faculties reach by their own natural force the supernatural plane and a union with God. *Hay-Ibn-Yakzan* is a mystical peripatetic of the Alexandrian school. There are passages in it which seem to have been literally translated from Jamblicus. Of all the monuments of Arabian philosophy, this is probably the only one which could offer us more than a historical interest. Hence its singular good fortune. Translated into English, into Dutch and into German, *Hay-Ibn-Zakzan* has been adopted by the Quakers as a book of edification.

In this manner, philosophy, exhausted in the East re-assumes a new *éclat* in Mahomedan Spain under Ibn-Bādja and Ibn-Tofail, but at the same time gets there impressed also with a much more pronounced colour of mysticism. Before these great people, peripatetic pantheism had, however, an illustrious representative in Spain whose existence had remained an enigma as much for the scholastics who quote him at every page, as for our modern criticism which until these last few years was not able to draw him out of his mystery. Monsieur Munk⁽¹⁾ has rendered an eminent service to the history of the human mind, by demonstrating that this Avisebron who has played such a prominent rôle in the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages was nobody else but the Jew Solomon ben Gebirol⁽²⁾ of Malaga, noted in the synagogues;

⁽¹⁾. *Litteraturblatt des Orients*, 1846, No. 46 (Leipzig) et. *Mélanges de la philosophie juive et Arabe* (Paris, 1857 and 1859.)

⁽²⁾. Even the transcription of the name is not without analogy: *Ibn-Gebirol*, *Aben-Gebirol* and *Avicenne*; just as, *Iben-Sina* and *Avicenne*.

as a composer of hymns and especially by discovering in the Imperial Library the Hebrew translation and the Latin translation of *The Source of Life*. But Ibn-Gebirol does not seem to have exercised any influence on Arabian philosophy of his time or on that of his co-religionists.

II.

Arabian philosophy presents itself to us with a character of sufficient uniformity. With all the philosophers (Gazzali excepted) whose gradual succession we have just mentioned, the method is the same, the authority is the same and the doctrine differs only in proportion to the development, more or less advanced which it has reached. It is in the religious sects of Islam that we should search for the variety, the individuality and the true genius of the Arabs⁽¹⁾. Hardly a century had elapsed since the death of the Prophet, that disputes began to undermine the dogmas which he had established. *Liberty* and *Predestination* were the first two problems on which a need for theological activity exercised itself. The *Kadarites* (partisans of *Liberty*) and the *Jabarites* (partisans of *Predestination*) maintained on this eternal field of battle a long warfare between texts and reason. The attributes of God became the next brand of dispute. The extreme severity of monotheism which reigns in Islam, the constant necessity to combat the Christian dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation to retreat without interruption :—"God has no Son ; God has no Mother ; God does not propagate," set many spirits working in this direction. Some (*the Muattils*) denied every positive attribute to God which might be brought into any relation, with created objects, making of Him an abstract. Being of whom nothing could be affirmed. In general, the philosophers and the philosophical sects in opposition to the Hypostesis of the Christian God, were of this opinion and denied distinct attributes to the Divine Essence. Others, such as the *Sifatites* (partisans of

(1). See *Pockocke Specimen hist Arabum* (edit, White, Oxford 1806). *Schaharishani Book of religious and philosophical sects* published in Arabic by M. Br. Cureton (London 1846) and translated by M. Haarbrucker (Halle, 1850-51). *Hadje Khalfa*, Introduction to his bibliographic Lexicon, t, I, p. 64 et suiv (edit. Flugel.)

Attributes), the *Tashbihites* (Assimilators) made God out of the image of Man and attached themselves to different degrees of anthropomorphism. The Asharites attempted to unite the Jabarites and the Sifatites, with certain restrictions, so as not to fall into absolute fatalism and to materialistic anthropomorphism. For the Hashawites on the contrary, God is a corporeal Being, dwelling in a certain definite locality. He is seated on a throne; He has hands and feet, &c. In the face of this intemperate dogmatism, scepticism showed itself in an indefinite variety of sects. The Somanites rejected all knowledge acquired by speculation, and admitted only what they touched and they saw; they passed for indifferent believers. The Talamites, by a different species of scepticism, founded the certitude of conscience on the authority of an infallible Man, *i. e.*, *Imam*. They nearly mixed themselves up with the Batenians, Mahomedan Cabbalists who searched for truth in the numbers and in the alphabet.⁽¹⁾ Finally, the most avowed infidelity formed sects in the bosom of Islam: Karmathes, Fatimites, Ismailians, Druzes,⁽³⁾ Hashishins,—ambiguous sects joining fanaticism to incredulity, license to religious zeal, the hardness of the free-thinker to the superstitions of the mystic and to the indifference of the quietist. Such is, indeed the strange character of Mahomedan scepticism. Floating indecisively between the religious sect and the secret society, it hides the most revolting immorality, and the most insane blasphemy under the veil of mystic initiation. *To believe, nothing and to permit all*: that's the formula. Besides, the vague nature of the diverse names by which Mahomedans call unbelievers do not always permit us to rightly distinguish the *nuances* of opinion which they regard as heterodox. In this manner, under the name of *Zendiks* were mixed up the infamous sects and the communistic out-casts of Bardasones, of Mazdak, of the Manichaeans, and of the free-thinkers (*ahl-el-tahkik*, the people of evidence) who accept only what is proved. People hardly made any distinction between those who did not believe as he did. Sometimes people even traced

(1). *De Sacy*, Chrest. Arab. t, II, p. 250.

(3). *De Sacy*, Exposé de la religion des Druzes, et Chrest Arab. t. I, p. 305, t. II p. 96, 191, 205, et suiv.

the *Zendiks* to Sabcanism and to idolatry. Such were the strange products of this great intellectual ebullition in which all the elements of Islamism of the second and the fifth centuries of the hijrek were floating. A liberal and rationalistic theology such as that of the Motazalites (dissidents) sometimes rallied moderate spirits. Motazalism represents in Islam a Protestantism of the school of Schleiermacher. Revelation is a natural product of human faculties; the doctrines necessary for salvation are derived from reason; reason is sufficient to lead us there, and at all times, even before Revelation, people might have been able to arrive at them. The school of Bassorah under the patronage of the Abbassides was the centre of this great reform movement whose most complete expression is to be found in the *Encyclopaedia of the Brothers of Purity* (*Ikhwan-essaffa*)⁽¹⁾, an attempt at conciliation between philosophy and Islamism which appeared to satisfy neither the devotees nor the philosophers. Thus beyond the study of Greek Philosophy, Islamism furnished to the activity of a large number of spirits a vast field for rational discussions which were generally designated as *Kalam* almost synonymous with scholastics. The *Kalam*⁽²⁾ whose existence is anterior to the introduction of Greek philosophy amongst the Mahomedans under Almansour at first represented no particular system. Under this word was sometimes hidden a great freedom of discussion. But when the favour accorded to philosophy had put the dogmas of Islamism into peril, the *role* of *Kalam* changed, and consisted henceforward in defending assailed dogmas by the arms of dialectics, very nearly as theology with us which was dogmatical at first has in our days become particularly apologetic.

The chief object of the *Motecallemins* is to establish against the philosophers—the creation of matter, the newness of the world, and the existence of a free God, separate from the world and yet acting on the world. The atomic system appeared to them

(1). See the work of M. Flugel on this remarkable Association in the *Zailschrift des deutschen Morgenlandeschen Gesellschaft*, 1859, p. 1 et suiv. Gosche, Gazzali, p. 240 et suiv.

(2). J. Goldenthal, in the *Memoires de l'Academe de Vienne*. Part I, 1850. p. 432 *Mélanges*, p. 320 et suiv.

more favourable to polemics than they cared to admit; they, therefore, chose it. The atoms said they were created by God; God could destroy them, and He is continually creating new ones, God acts freely or directly on all things; all that exists is immediately his work. Privations or negative accidents (obscurity, ignorance, &c.) are even produced by God in the substance in which they take place exactly as the positive accidents. In this manner, God creates death, God creates repose, just as He has created life and as He has created movement. Even the soul is nothing but an accident which God is continuing without cessation. Causality does not reside in the laws of Nature; God alone is the cause. Two facts never necessarily belong to each other in an inevitable chain and the *ensemble* of the universe might be quite different from what it actually is. Such is the system which the *Motecallemins* found to be the best to oppose to the peripatetism of the philosophers, assuredly a very poor system as all those that are conceived for polemical needs, but recommended by that false air of precision which misleads the vulgar crowd.

It is against this system that we shall presently see Ibn-Rushd, Maimonides and the last representatives of Arabian philosophy make a supreme effort which shall only serve to show once more what distance there is between the formulas that satisfy the popular faith and those that independent science has led us to form.

III.

We must do this justice to Arabian philosophy, that it has known how to disengage with hardiess and penetration the great problems of peripatetism, and to follow their solution with great vigour. In this respect, it appears to me superior to our philosophy of the Middle ages which had always a tendency to diminish the problems, and to take them by their subtle and dialectical side.

But the whole spirit of the Arabian philosophy and consequently that of Averroism resolves itself into two doctrines, or as the Middle Ages put it into two great *errors* intimately connected with

each other, and constituting a complete and original interpretation of peripatetism: (a) *The eternity of matter* and (b) *The theory of Intellect*. Philosophy has never proposed more than two hypotheses for explaining the system of the universe. On the one side, a free and personal God, having attributes by which He is limited; Providence; causality of the Universe carried over to God; the human soul substantial and immortal. On the other side, eternal matter, evolution of the premordial germ by its latent force; God undetermined; law, nature, necessity, reason; impersonality of intelligence, immersion and re-absorption of the individual. The first hypothesis rests on a too exalted idea of individuality, the second on a too exclusive view of the *ensemble*. The Arabian philosophy, and particularly that of Ibn-Rushd, is classified in the most decisive manner in the second of these two categories. The problem of the origin of beings is that which most occupies Ibn-Rushd; he comes back to it in all his writings and always with fresh insistence. But nowhere has he treated it with greater development than in his great commentary on the XIIth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. "There are" he says "two antagonistic opinions held on the origin of beings between whom there are other intermediate ones: the one explains the world by evolution and the other by creation. The partisans of evolution assert, that generation is nothing but separation and in a certain way re-duplication of beings; the agent in this hypothesis has no other function but to draw beings one from the other, and to differentiate them; it is, however, evident that the functions of the agent are reduced to those of a motor. As regards the partisans of creation, they say, that it is the agent who produces creatures without its having the need, for all that, of some pre-existing matter. This is the opinion of the *Motecallims* of our religion, and of that of the Christians, for example, of John the Christian (Jean Philopon) who asserts that the potentiaility of a created being resides only in the agent. As regards the intermediate views, they may be reduced into two; but the first admits in its turn two *nuances* sufficiently divergent. These opinions are of accord on one point, *i.e.*, that generation is nothing but a transmutation of substance, that every act of gene-

ation pre-supposes a subject, and that nothing is produced from its own like species. In the first of these opinions, the agent creates the form and imprints this form on some existing matter. Amongst the partisans of this idea, the one entirely separates the agent from the material, and calls him *the giver of forms*. That's the opinion of Ibn-Sina; others maintain that the agent is sometimes not separate from the material as when fire produces fire, or man produces man, and sometimes separate, as it happens in the production of animals and plants which are produced from the dissimilar. That's the opinion of Themistius and perhaps that of Alfarabi. The third opinion is that of Aristotle's. It consists in saying, that the agent creates simultaneously the constituents of the material and of the form, by giving motion to matter and by transforming it until all that was there in potentiality passed into actuality. In this opinion the agent does nothing but lead to action that which was merely potential, and realise the union of matter and form. All creation is thus reducible to motion whose principle is heat. This heat, pervading water and earth produces animals and plants which are not produced by semen. Nature produces all this with order and with perfection as if it were guided by a superior Intelligence, although it is devoid of intelligence. These proportions and this productive energy which the motions of the Sun and of the Stars give to the elements are what Plato called *Ideas*. In the opinion of Aristotle, the agent creates no forms; since if it *did* create, something might come out of nothing. It is a false imagination by which people consider forms as created, which has led certain philosophers to believe, that forms are something actual and that there is a giver of forms. It is the same opinion which has led the theologians of the three religions which exist in our days to say, that something might come out of nothing.

Starting from this principle, theologians of our religion have imagined a sole agent producing all beings without an intermediary,—an agent whose action manifests itself at the same moment by an infinity of opposing and of contradictory acts. By this hypothesis, fire does not burn, nor does water moisten; every thing has the need of a direct and special revelation. Even for

ther. They say, that when a man throws a stone, the movement does not belong to the man himself but to the universal agent. They thus destroy all human activity. But here is another doctrine still more surprising. If God is able to produce something out of nothing, He can equally make anything pass from being to non-being; destruction like generation is the work of God; death is the creation of God. According to us, on the contrary, destruction is an act of the same nature as generation. Every created object carries with it corruption in potentiality. For destruction as for creation, the agent has only to make the potential pass into the actual. In this manner, it is necessary to maintain force agent *vis-a-vis*. If the one was lacking, there would be nothing, or all would be actual: two results equally absurd.

All the doctrine of Ibn-Rushd, the whole basis of his polemics against the *Motecallemins* is contained in this essential passage.

Generation is only a motion; but every motion pre-supposes a subject. This unique subject, this universal potentiality: it is primeval matter endowed with receptivity, but devoid of every positive quality, and capable of receiving the most opposing modifications. This primeval matter is susceptible of no name and of no definition. It is nothing but a simple possibility. Every substance is thus eternal by its nature that is to say, by the potentiality of its existence. To say, that a thing can pass from absolute non-being to being, is to say, that it possesses a disposition which it had never had.⁽²⁾ Matter was never produced, and it is incurruptible.⁽³⁾ The degree of generations is infinite, *a parte ante et a parte post, i. e., antecedently and posteriorly*.⁽⁴⁾ All that is potential shall pass into the real; otherwise, there would be something inactive in the Universe⁽⁵⁾ and *then in the midst of eternity, there is no difference between what is potential and what is actual*.⁽⁶⁾ Order has not preceded disorder, nor has disorder preceded order.

(2). I. Phys. p. 18—VIII, Phys. p. 155.

(3). I. Physics, p. 22—VIII, Phys. p. 194, XII Metaph. p. 341.

(4). VIII, Phys. p. 176 et sqq.

(5). VIII, Phys. p. 184.

(6). III, Phys. p. 47.

Motion has not preceded rest, nor has rest preceded motion. Motion is eternal and continues, because not every thing has its cause in a preceding motion.⁽⁷⁾ Besides, time exists only by motion. We measure time only by the changes of condition which we observe in ourselves. If the motion of the universe stopped, we should cease to measure time that is to say, we should lose the idea of successive living and that of being. We measure time during sleep only by the movements of our imagination; when the sleep is very profound, and when the movements of our imagination are entirely gone, our consciousness of time disappears. Motion alone constitutes *a before and an after* during the interval. Thus without motion there would be no successive evolution, that is to say, there would be nothing.⁽⁸⁾ Thence arises the result, that the motor-agent does not act freely, as *Motecallemins* assert. Ibn-Sina who has made such concessions to them has, in order to humour them, imagined his classification of the possible and the necessary. He places the world in the category of the possible, and supposes that it could have been otherwise than it actually is. But how call that *possible* whose cause is necessary and eternal? Liberty pre-supposes something new, but God has no reason to become new. The world could have been neither bigger nor smaller than it is; because only caprice would have determined rather such and such a measure than another. Chance is not an efficient cause except rarely and by accident. In the meantime, people would be much more apt to attribute to chance the events of this world than the whole order of the celestial bodies. For this reason, Aristotle has treated Democritus more severely as well as those who hold the former view than the partisans of the second. Consequently, God only knows the general laws of the Universe. He occupies himself with species, and not with individuals, because if he knew the particular and the individual, there would be perpetual innovation in his being. Besides, if God ruled everything immediately, evil in the world would also be his work. O it would be necessary to attribute to him the power to realize

(7). VIII, Phys. p. 155-157.

(1). IV, Phys. p. 82 V^o et seq.

the impossible, which would be to admit the principles of the Sophists. The only reverential view of God in that which reduces his providence to be only the general reason of all things. In this hypothesis, all that is good in the world is to be imputed to him, because he wished it; evil, on the contrary, is not his work, but the fatal consequence of matter opposing his designs.

Hitherto Ibn-Rushd seems to me to be only a faithful and intelligent interpreter of the thoughts of Aristotle, explained particularly in the I, and VIII, books of his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Existence, according to Aristotle, being composed of an undetermined element (matter) and of a determined element (form), matter becomes from such a point of view, infinite, — the permanent basis of all things. Matter is the possible, and the possible is the eternal.⁽¹⁾ No doubt, the form of this reasoning is assailable, and it was not without reason, that the *Motecallemins* replied: *Your error lies in regarding the potentiality as the reality*. Potentiality has no substance; it is a pure conception of our minds without any reality. This was rather peremptory against a somewhat coarse expression of the Aristotelian theology, but did not cut down the profound truth which serves as the basis of this theory, namely: *the identity of the permanent source of all things—the eternity of the ocean of Being on whose surface unrol the perpetually changing and variable linements of individuality*.

IV.

The extreme simplicity with which we conceive the invisible world has placed us in the impossibility of forming an idea of the much more complicated system which we find in the religions and in the philosophies of antiquity. *Els, genie, sephiroth, demiurge, metatron, &c.*, all have disappeared since the pitiless ocean has put the gods to flight by his scholastic axiom: *We should not multiply beings without reason*.

Arabian philosophy is far from being equally sober. A numerous hierarchy occupies all the interval between God and Man. "The government of the Universe" says Ibn-Rushd "resembles

(1) Brandis, *Aristoteles u seine Akademischen Zuehgenossen*, (Berlin, 1857).

the government of a city, where everything starts from the same centre, but where everything is not the immediate work of the Sovereign." The profound conception of Aristotle—the God of the XIIth book of his *Metaphysics*, immovable, separate centre of the Universe who directs and moves the world, without seeing it, by the attraction of *the Good and the Beautiful*, this metaphysical Newtonism so simple, does not satisfy the Arabs. Never was God so determined, and so isolated from the world as that of Aristotle. If we apply the name of pantheism to doctrines which hesitate to limit God, no other doctrine was more opposed to pantheism than his. This theodocy would suit a naturalistic as well as a peripatetic school. In order to simplify his object and to remove all that resembles a hypothesis, the naturalist would award to God, once for all, His rôle considerably limited, and banish Him as far as possible from the field of experience. The Arabian school was not capable of bending to such a simple conception.

It was necessary to create a sort of Minister to the invisible King in order to place Him in contact with the Universe. People were in this way led to something analogous of Philo; image and manifestation of powers, hidden in the depths of infinite existence.

The passive never arrives at action except by the agency of an active force, and the contingent could not be explained by a series of infinite causes. No doubt, the circle of causes could not be stopped at a certain given moment. Rain comes out of a cloud, a cloud from vapour, the vapour from the rain; a plant comes out of a plant, a man comes out of a man by the corruption of the generating being without our being able in this continuous chain to seize one moment rather than another for the point of departure. Where shall we search for the cause of the multiple? Only one can come out of one. Only one being can be the immediate product of God, and in direct relations with Him. This Being is the first Intelligence, the first Motor of the fixed stars, a sort of *Demiurge*, whose origin ought not to be searched for anywhere else than in the VII Chapter of the XIIth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, ill-understood, and combined

Alexandrian notions, (or perhaps by a sort of compromise of which the antagonistic sects offer numberless examples) with the doctrines of the *Hypostases* and of *the word* which were otherwise so vigorously opposed. The first intelligence, the first Motor which is for Aristotle God Himself, is for the Arabs only the first agent of the Universe to whom they apply the magnificent phrases by which Aristotle has tried to express the mode of action of Divine Intelligence. The Koran itself furnishes arguments for the theory, since it is written there: "The first thing created by God is Intelligence." Plato, according to Ibn-Rushd, did not mean to say anything else when he said in his figurative style, that God created the angels in the morning, and that after leaving to them the task of creating the remainder, He rested. Gallen evidently perceived the same truth when he spoke of the *informing form* to which, rightly speaking, belongs the name of the Creator. Various religious sects, more or less impressed by gnosticism, the Talimites, the Batenians, and the Sabâeans professed an analogous doctrine and admitted Intelligence as the first-born of all created beings.

"The nature of stars" said Aristotle, "being a certain eternal essence, and that which moves, being also eternal and antetior to that which moves.....it is evident, that as many as there are planets, so many there ought to be also essences, eternal by their nature, and each one immobile in itself.....The one is the first and the other is the second in an order corresponding to the movements of the stars amongst themselves."

"A tradition coming from the most remote antiquity" says he elsewhere, "and transmitted to posterity under the cover of a fable, tells us, that the stars are gods and that the Divinity embraces all nature. All the rest are only myths. But if we separate this principle to consider it alone, namely, that the first essences are gods, we should think, that these are really divine doctrines." This strange view which seems to be a reminiscence of Pythagoras and of Plato, and which has taken all the commentators by surprise (to such an extent that several critics have not hesitated to call in question the authenticity of the book where it

is found,⁽⁴⁾ was the original text of the theory of Intelligence which forms one of the most characteristic doctrines of the philosophy of the Arabs, and to which their syncretism added so many strange elements. The mechanical hypothesis of Newton has so profoundly changed our ideas on the system of the universe, that all the notions of antiquity, of the Middle ages, of the *Renaissance* of Descartes himself on *the World (le Monde)* appear to us to-day as the dreams of another age. Whatever efforts we might make, we could never frankly enough renounce our modern ideas to be able to understand, in other words, not to find absurd books like *de Cælo et Mundo*, *de Monde a Alexandre*, and *De-Substantia Orbis*. The homogeneity of the Universe was then ill-understood. People could not imagine that one and the same system extended to all the parts of the world, and that the same law which determines here below the movement of an atom directs also the revolutions of celestial bodies. Ibn-Rushd is consequently not responsible that his theory of Heavens may have for us something of the fantastical about it, and of the inconceivable. The Heaven is to his eyes an eternal and incorruptible being all one simple act, without weight and moved by a soul. Indeed, the circular motion can only come from a soul, bodies being susceptible only of perpendicular motions.

Heaven is not composed either of matter or of form ; it is in its place only by accident. It is the noblest of animated beings. Infinite in its duration, the motion of the Heavens is not so in quantity. If one single star came to join the celestial body, the celestial body would stop at once ; because the measure of its force is exactly proportioned to the mass ; and if it stopped for a moment, the first motor would be unable to set it in motion again ; it will get corrupted by rest, and with it all the beings whose essence is to be in motion. It is not by its inherent nature, that the heaven is eternal and incorruptible, but by the continuous action of the first Motor, and so could the Prophet say with truth : " Everything is corruptible except His face."

(4). Vicherot, *Theorie des premiers principes selon Aristote*, p. 48 et suiv.
 Rayaisson *Essai sur la Metaph. d'Aristot*, I, p. 103-104.

The Heaven is thus to the eyes of Ibn-Rushd, a living animal consisting of several orbs representing the essential organs of life, and in which the first motor represents the heart from which radiates life to other organs.

Every orb has its intelligence which is its form as the rational soul is the form of man. These Intelligences, hierarchically subordinate to one another constitute the chain of motors which propagate motion from the first sphere down to ourselves. Desire is the mobile which they obey; searching for the best, they move without stopping; since motion is nothing but the appetency after the best. Their intellect is always active and exercises without any decay beyond imagination and sensibility.

They know themselves, and have knowledge of all that passes in the lower orbs. The first Intelligence has consequently a complete knowledge of all that takes place in the Universe.

In this manner, a vague and indecisive view, without any connection with the rest of the peripatetic doctrine, has become in the hands of Arabs, a theory of the first principles of the Universe, whimsical, we must admit, but ingeniously connected in all its parts and from which we shall presently see coming out as a particular application, all their psychology.

The theory of Ibn-Rushd, on planetary Intelligences, is nothing but a commentary amplified from the XIIth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as his theory of the human intellect is only the same of the IIIrd book of Aristotle's treatise *on the Soul*, interpreted with the subtlety, the hazardous reconciliations and the mixture of mystic doctrines which characterise Arabian philosophy.

* There are in the fact of our knowledge two elements analogous to form and matter, that is to say, a passive principle and an active principle; in other words, there are two intellects: the one material or passive, and the other formal or active. The one susceptible of all things by thinking on them and the other making things intelligible. That which acts is superior

to that which suffers ; consequently, the active Intellect is superior to the potential or passive Intellect. The active Intellect is separate, impassable, and imperishable ; the passive Intellect, on the contrary, is perishable and cannot do without the active Intellect. But the *real* Intellect is the intellect separate and that alone is eternal and immortal."

From this doctrine we already find an inference drawn which philosophy itself has a glimpse of and accepts. This intellect in activity is anterior to the intellect in potentiality. And yet in individuals, potentiality precedes activity. We must not, therefore, search in the individual for active intellect anterior in time to the very act of thinking.

"It is not when it sometimes thinks, and sometimes does not, but it is only when it is *separate* that Intelligence is really what it is." The active Intellect is impersonal, absolute, separated in individuals, and yet shared by the individuals. One step more and we should be able to say, that the Intellect is unique, or only one in all human beings and to proclaim what Leibnitz calls *Monopsychism*: *That is the Averroistic thesis*. Aristotle never clearly expressed himself on this point, but we must admit, that Ibn-Rushd and Arab philosophers, by imputing this doctrine to him, has done nothing but drawn the immediate inference of the theory as it is explained in the IIIrd book of Aristotle's treatise *on the Soul*. Other passages elsewhere confirm this interpretation.⁽²⁾ Intellect comes from outside ; it is separable from the body, eternal, impossible and Divine ; it is in the soul a substance apart, independent distinct from the individual as the eternal from the corruptible. It is in a certain way a different species of the soul whose study belongs to the metaphysician and not to the physician. What results from all that is a theory somewhat analogous to that of Malebranche—a kind of objective and impersonal reason that enlightens all human beings, and by which everything is intelligible. That is the interpretation of the majority of Greek commentators, of Alexandre d'Aphrodisias.

(2) *Kastus Psych. d'Arist. Barth. Saint. Hilaine: Traite de l'ame*

dians, of Themistus of Philipon, and of all the Arabs without exception.

Such a doctrine is certainly very little in harmony with the general spirit of peripateticism. But this is not the only time that Aristotle has introduced in his system fragments from more ancient schools without giving himself the trouble to reconcile them with his own views. It is evident, that all this theory is borrowed from Anaxagoras. Aristotle himself quotes him (L III Chapter IV, § 3), and Simplicius has preserved for us a long fragment from that philosopher, which offers the most complete analogy to the passage in Aristotle's *Treatise on the Soul* which we are trying to explain. In the VIII book of *Physics*, the same theory is expressly given as that of Anaxagoras.

In an ingenious thesis presented to the Faculty of Literature in Paris,⁽¹⁾ this interpretation of Ibn-Rushd's has been combated and it has been maintained, that for Aristotle, the active Intellect is only a faculty of the soul. The passive intellect is only the faculty to receive the active Intellect is only the faculty of induction exercising itself on the and drawing from them general ideas. In this manner, people try to harmonise the theory explained in the third book of the *Treatise on the Soul* with that of the *Seconds Analytiques* where Aristotle seems to reduce the role of reason to induction, generalising the facts of sensation. Certainly, I do not dissemble from myself that Aristotle seems frequently to regard *vous* as personal to Man. The constant insistence which he employs to repeat, that the intellect is identical with the intelligible, that the Intellect passes into activity when it becomes the object it thinks upon is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of an intellect separate in Man. But it is dangerous, it appears to me, to make the different views of the ancients forcibly coincide in this manner. The ancients often philosophised without limiting themselves to one system, treating the same subject according to the different points of view which presented themselves to their eyes, or which were

(1) J. Denis, *Rationalisme d'Aristote* (Paris, 1847).

given to them by former schools, without being put into the discrepancies that might exist amongst those diverse statements of the same theory. We must not try to bring them into accord amongst themselves when they themselves were precious little anxious about it. It would be just as well as certain critics have suggested, to declare all those passages as interpolations which we cannot reconcile with others. The theory of the *second* *Analytiques* and that of the third book on *the soul*, without expressly contradicting itself, represent, according to my opinion, two views profoundly distinct and of different origin, on the question of Intelligence.

No doubt, in translating the theory of Intellect into our modern language, explained in the third book on *the soul*, and disengaging it from the too substantial forms of the Aristotelian style, we arrive at a theory of knowledge very analogous to that which since half a century has compelled the assent of all philosophical minds. It entirely rests with us to make Aristotle say: 'Two things are necessary for an intellectual act (1) An impression from outside *received* by the thinking subject and (2) A reaction of the thinking subject on the object of sensation. Sensation gives the *material* to thinking; *le vous* or the pure reason gives the form. But this method of reconciliation is always dangerous. The ancient systems ought to be taken for what they were and accepted as curious products of the human mind, without our trying to interpret them in the terms of our modern philosophy.

Collectively, the peripatetic theory of Intellect, as it comes out of the works of commentators consists of five theorems: (1) Distinction of two intellects, active and passive; (2) The incorruptibility of the one, and the corruptibility of the other; (3) The active Intellect conceived as beyond Man, as the sum of Intelligences; (4) The unity of the active Intellect; (5) Identity of the above Intellect with the earthly Intelligences.

Aristotle's mode of thinking leaves no room for doubt with the first two theorems; it is sufficiently clear without being incontestable with regard to that which concerns the third one.

the last two theorems, they are evidently the work of the commentators who, by inductions and reconciliations have thought of thus completing the work of their Master.

VI.

The immediate disciples of Aristotle, Theophraste, Aristoxene, Discarque, Straton do not seem to be much occupied by the doctrine exposed in the third book *on the soul*. Soul is for them the resultant sound of the organisation of the different parts of the body; the theory of pure Reason could not have place in a system which inclined so strongly towards materialism. With Alexander d' Aphrodisias, on the contrary, this theory reaches great developments. The passive Intellect which since then is called material is nothing in act but evrything in potentiality. Because, being nothing by its own nature before thinking, when it thinks, it becomes the thinking object. The material Intellect is only an aptitude to receive ideas similar to a tablet on which there is nothing written, or rather to that which is not yet written on the tablet; since to compare it even to a tablet would be to compare it to something substantial; but it is nothing except in potentiality. An act of consciousness takes place by the intervention of God who makes use of the individual faculty as that of an instrument. Active intellect, for Alexandre, is thus God himself; but God enters only into a passing relation with the soul; it is nothing but the external motor cause; it does not prevent its falling instantly after into nothingness.

Alexander d' Aphrodisias may be considered as the first author of great importance whom the theory of the third volume *on the soul* won during the last centuries of Greek philosophy and during the whole Middle Ages. Themistus bears testimony, that even in his days, this passage had given rise to endless controversies; and Philopon refutes on this subject, a whole army of dissenters. For Themistus as for Alexandre, the active intellect is outside man or transcends man. He already presents the question of the unity or the multiplicity of Intellect. He says, says he, in its source, that is to say, in God; it

is multiple in the individuals who share in it, just as from a single centre the sun spreads into an infinity of rays. The passive Intellect aspires to unite with the active Intellect, as every object aspires after its perfection. Simplicius did not introduce any new element into the controversy. The passive Intellect is perishable as all that exists by successive life. When it acts, it identifies itself with the thinking object. Philopon is a more original spirit but a much less faithful interpreter. Soul, to his eyes, is simple, immortal and immaterial.

The Intellect when it is active ought to identify itself with the object of thinking. The *vous* is nothing but the Reason of the whole humanity. In fact, *le vous* says Aristotile (L III, C.v. §), always thinks; that is to say, adds Philopon, that humanity always thinks, as we might say in a certain sense that man always lives, because Humanity always lives. Finally, in the apocryphal book of Aristotle's *Theology*, this theory of Intellect is presented in a manner very analogous to what we find amongst the Arabs. The rôle of active Intelligence is to purify the objects of sensation and to render them intelligible. It is the intermediary, *the word* by which God has created the world. God sends his beams of light into the active Intellect; the active Intellect into the human soul; the soul into the body, and thus the Divine Life descends down to inanimate matter.

It was, moreover, necessary, that this doctrine of a unique and universal Intellect should be regarded as an exclusive property of the peripatetic school. All antiquity since Anaxagoras has designated *vous* as the spiritual principal of the universe. The whole Alexandrian school had admitted, that particular intelligences proceeded from the universal Intelligence.

But it was particularly the coarse realism which the Fathers of the Latin Church brought into psychology, and their cut and dried manner of opposing body and soul as two inter-laced substances which served to bring to the front the problem of the unity of souls. St. Augustine moots it with subtlety, but according to his habitude, avoids giving a reply, in a curious manner.

in book 1. *De Quantitate animæ*. This passage was brought forward in the IXth century and became in the abbey of Corbie the text of a sufficiently lively controversy. An Irish monk called Macarius Scotus, pretended to draw from it the doctrine of monopsychism, and imparted his views to another Irishman of the same abbey whose name has not been preserved. Ratramme, the monk of Corbie, one of the most well-known writers of the IXth century, first combated it in a dogmatic epistle; then at the request of Odon, Bishop of Bauvais, wrote against it a work which has never been edited. Mabillon speaks of it according to a manuscript of Saint Eloi de Noyon; there are many other manuscripts of the same in the libraries of England. Ratramme treats his adversary as a heretic, more fit to be repressed by authority than to be fought with arguments and leads him on to say, that there is in this world *one man and one Soul*—an error so absurd adds he, that its author ought to have been called *Baccharius* and not *Macarius*. It appears, moreover, that this doctrine was not rare amongst the Irish people. A collection of the canons for the Irish Church which is found in a manuscript of the *fonds* of Saint Germain (No. 121 written in the VIIIth century) contains (fol. 182—184) a chapter *on the Soul* where several questions are curiously discussed which seem to resemble the errors of Macarius. The same doctrine is, besides, mentioned by Bede, and is found in the *Pantheon* of Golefroi de Viterbe attributed to the *Manichæans*, and to Plato.

VII.

It is chiefly in developing certain theories at the exclusion of others, that the Arabs have altered the *ensemble* of peripatetism; but it is really remarkable, that the theories to which they have thus given preference are precisely those which appear in Aristotle only in an obscure and incidental manner. We have already seen an isolated thesis of the XIIth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* becoming in their hands the kernel of a vast system, embracing, at the same time their metaphysics, their cosmology, and even their psychology; in this case, moreover, it is a doctrine borrowed by peripatetism from a foreign source, in little accord with

the spirit of Aristotle, and whose authenticity has been a question, which becomes the central point of their controversy. The role of Intellect, being to perceive the forms of things, requires, that it should itself be absolutely devoid of any form, like a transparent crystal which only reflects the images of objects. Since, if it had its own forms, those forms would mix up with those of the objects perceived, and would alter the rectitude of our perceptions. The intellect, contemplated in the subject is nothing but pure receptivity. But to stop here as Alexandre d' Aphrodisias has done is not to exhaust the analysis of the facts of our knowledge. It is not sufficient to accord to the Intellect a vague indefinite disposition to receive forms. As a matter of fact, we conceive the Intellect to be devoid of all forms; so that if there were only a simple disposition to receive forms we should be able to conceive *nothingness*. "What Alexandre" cried Ibn-Rushd "you pretend that Aristotle wanted only to speak of a certain disposition, and not of a subject disposed. Indeed I am ashamed of you for such a discourse and for such a singular commentary. A disposition in action is none of the things which it is apt to receive. A disposition is neither a substance, nor a quality of a substance. If Aristotle had, indeed, represented Intellect only as an aptitude to receive forms, he would have made out of it an aptitude without a subject, which is absurd. Consequently we see Theophraste, Nicholas, Themistius and other peripatetics remain far more faithful to the original texts of Aristotle. This hypothesis was nothing but a forgery of Alexander's; all the philosophers of his time agreed to reject it, and Themistius pushes it off as an absurdity, very different in this from the doctors of our days in whose eyes nobody can be a perfect philosopher unless he is at least an Alexandrian." We must, therefore, accord an objective existence to the Intellect, and an act of knowledge takes place only by the concurrence of the subjective Intellect (passive Intellect) and the objective Intellect (active Intellect). The passive Intellect is individual and perishable, as all the faculties of the soul which aim at the variable; the active Intellect, on the contrary, being entirely separate from Man and from every thing

matter is unique, and the notion of numbers is applicable to it only on account of the individuals who share in it. Without being expressed with the precision which we now-a-days demand in philosophical researches, this solution satisfies the chief conditions of the problem, and determines with a sufficient nicety the parts of the relative and the absolute in the facts of our knowledge. The refutations which were tried in the Middle Ages against the theory of Ibn-Rushd have in general been wrongly directed like all refutations which take hold of a system by its weak rather than by its strong side. Certainly if there be any revolting absurdity in this world, *it is the unity of souls*, as people feign to understand it; and if Averroes was ever able to hold literally such a doctrine, Averroism would deserve to figure in the annals of dementia and not of philosophy. The argument that is being constantly reiterated against the theory of Averroes by Albert and Saint Thomas is as follows:—

“What? the same soul, you say, is wise and foolish, gay and sad both at the same time”! This argument which Averroes had anticipated and refuted, would, however, be peremptory and would be sufficient to sweep away this extravagance from the field of the human mind the very next day of its appearance. But by examining it more closely, we find, that such is not the thought of Ibn-Rushd, and that this doctrine attaches in his mind to a theory of the Universe which lacks neither elevation nor originality.

The personality of conscience was never very clearly revealed to the Arabs. The unity of the objective reason struck them much more than the multiplicity of the subjective reason. Consisted moreover, that all parts of the Universe are living and similar, they regarded humanity collectively as a resultant of superior forces and as a general phenomenon of the universe.

No doubt, in a philosophy like that of the Arabs which so vaguely separates the psychological from the ontological, and which never precisely says whether the field of its speculations is within Man or beyond Man, a similar manner of expressing itself was not without danger. We could wish, Ibn-Rushd had said it

more clearly than he has done : *The unity of Intellect does not signify anything else but the universality of the principles of pure Reason, and the unity of the psychological constitution of the whole human Race.* We cannot, however, doubt, that, *that was his thought*, when we hear him constantly repeating that active Intellect does not differ from the knowledge we possess of the Universe, that the immortality of Intellect signifies the immortality of the human species, and if Aristotle has said, that the Intellect is not sometimes thinking, and sometimes not-thinking, we should understand him to mean *space* by it, which shall never disappear, and which on some point of the Universe exercises its intellectual faculties without interruption. *A living and permanent Humanity* : That seems to be the meaning of the Averroistic theory of intellect. Immortality of the active Intellect is thus nothing but the eternal *renaissance* of the human Race, and the perpetuity of civilization. Reason is constituted as something absolute, independent of individuals, as an integral part of the Universe, and Humanity which is nothing but the action of this Reason, as a necessary and eternal Being. Thence also the necessity of philosophy, its Providential rôle and this strange axiom : *ex necessitate est ut sit aliquis philosophus in specie humana.* (It is necessary, that there be some philosopher in all mankind). Since, every force ought to pass into action ; otherwise it would be futile. It is necessary, that at every moment of time and at some point of space, Intelligence should contemplate absolute Reason. But Man alone enjoys this privilege in his speculative sciences. Man and philosopher are, therefore, equally necessary in the plan of the Universe. Such is the original theory developed in the treatise called *on the Happiness of the Soul*, and in the digression of the commentary on the IIIrd book *on the Soul*. It is true, that the technical language of Averroism is much more complicated. In examining the different expressions by which Ibn-Rushd tries to designate the different *nuances* of the facts of our knowledge no less than five kinds of Intellect are mentioned : *active, passive, material speculative, and acquired.* It is particularly that which concerns the *active intellect* that it is difficult to reconcile Ibn-Rushd's language

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of Greek commentators and of other Arab philosophers. Alexandre d'Appradisias, while coining the expression (*vous vlixos*) no doubt meant only to designate *the passive Intellect* which represents *matter* in the facts of our knowledge. In general, the Arabs have taken the same *material Intellect* (*akl hayyoulian*) in the sense of a capacity to know. Ibn-Rushd, on the contrary, regards *the material Intellect* as incorruptible, not produced, unique, eternal, similar in everything to the active Intellect. In reality, this difference is hardly anything more than verbal. Since Ibn-Rushd himself is obliged to admit, like Alexandre, that the first act of Intelligence is only a possibility, a disposition to become common to all men by its essence, but multiple by accident. As regards *the acquired Intellect*, he invariably mentions the external reason which man has made his own, so much of impersonal reason as is shared by a personal being. It is for this reason, that Ibn-Rushd presents it as partially corruptible, and partially incorruptible, according as it is from God or from Man. The defect of this system is to separate too profoundly the two elements of the intellectual phenomenon, and to introduce a cosmical agent into a problem which ought to be solved by simple psychology. To dress up Man as a statue in the face of the Sun and to wait that life should descend to animate it: That's to wait for the impossible. Any system that places the source of Reason beyond Man condemns itself to be never able to explain the facts of knowledge. Psychology should not appeal to any external motor in order to fill up the gaps of its hypothesis. Ibn-Rushd does not, however, hide the difficulties of his system. If the Intellect is unique in all people, it is in all in the same degree; the disciple has nothing to learn from the master. When a man perceives an intelligible, everybody perceives it with him at the sametime; the psychological fact loses every individuality. Just as in the case of celestial bodies, each space consists only of one individual because each space possesses only one motor, plurality would be as useless as if a man had many ships under his orders or a workman several tools. In the same way, if there be but one motor for several souls, there would be superfetation in nature. Moreover, the capacity to

create intelligibles, which is the sphere of the active Intellect, does not exist always in the same degree in the same man. It is born and grows with the acquired or speculative Intellect; and it is for this reason that Theophraste, Themistius, as also others have identified the speculative and the active Intellect. Ibn-Rushd replies with reason, that the active Intellect entering into communication with a relative being must submit to the conditions of relativity; that the union of the active Intellect with the individual soul takes place neither by the multiplication of Intellect nor by the unification of individuals, but by the action of the Intellect on the images or sensation, an action analogous to that of the form on matter; that this union is nothing but the eternal participation of humanity in a certain number of principles eternal as itself. These principles by communicating themselves to a corruptible being do not contract anything of its corruptibility. These principles are independent of individuals and are as true in the desolate regions of the globe as in those where there are men to perceive them. The uncreated types of Plato are chimerical, if they are taken literally, but are nothing but veritable, if they are interpreted in the sense of the objective reality of the universals. In this manner, the Intellect is unique and multiple both at the same time. If it had been absolutely unique, it would have followed, that all would have perceived only the same object. If it multiplied itself with the number of those who know, community of Intelligences would be destroyed and science would be incommunicable. On the contrary, if we maintain the unity of the object and the multiplicity of subjects both at the same time, all objections are solved.

VIII.

The passive Intellect aspires to unite with the active Intellect as force leads to action, as matters leads to form, and as flame reaches towards the combustible body. But this effort does not stop at the first degree of possession which is called the *acquired Intellect*. The soul can arrive at a much more intimate union with the universal Intellect, at a sort of identifi-

union with the primordial Reason. The acquired Intellect has ceased to lead Man up to the sanctuary, but it disappears as soon as the end is reached very nearly as sensation prepares the way for imagination and disappears as soon as the act of imagination is too intense. In this manner, the active Intellect exercises two distinct actions on the soul, one of which has for its object to elevate the material Intellect to the perception of the intelligible and the other to lead it on beyond up to the union with the intelligibles themselves. Man, arrived at this condition, comprehends all things by the Reason, which he has appropriated to himself. Become similar to God, he is in a certain sense all beings and he knows them as they are; since the beings and their causes are nothing beyond the science which he possesses. There is in every being a Divine tendency to receive as much of this noble end as it suits his nature. Animal itself shares in it, and carries within itself the power to arrive at the first Being. "How admirable is this condition" cried Ibn-Rushd, "and how this mode of existence is strange! Consequently it is not to the origin but to the end of human development that we arrive, when everything in Man is in reality and nothing in potentiality."

Such is the doctrine of this *union* (*Ittisal*) or as the *Sufis* put it, the problem of *We and of Thou*, the basis of all Oriental psychology, and the constant object of the pre-occupations of the Spanish Arabic school. We have seen the important place which it occupies in the writings of Ibn-Badja and of Ibn-Tofail. Ibn-Bádja has *ex-proresso*, i.e., purposely devoted two treatises on the subject, often quoted by Ibn-Rushd. An important *nuance*, however, separates the doctrine of Ibn-Rushd from that of his two countrymen. With Ibn-Badja, the union takes place by asceticism, by exercises analogous to the unitive virtues of Jamblichus. With Ibn-Tofail it is mysticism that predominates. People reach this *union* (*Ittisal*) by the whirlings of a Dervish leading on to vertigo, shutting one's self in a cavern, with the head bent, the eyes closed, and banishing every idea derived through sensation. In Quietism, the East has never known to stop on the border-land of extravagance and of immorality. Identification with the universal

Intelligence by external processes has always been the chief goal of the mystics of India and of Persia. Seven degrees, say the *Sufis*, lead Man up to the final goal, which is *the disparition of the disparition, i. e., the disappearing of the disappearing* the Buddhistic *Nirvana*, where Man arrives by the annihilation of his personality, and when he says: "I am God," (Poetry itself has become the echo of these dreams. Absorption in God and death to created objects is, under the veil of a strange allegory, the perpetual subject of the Persian and Hindustani schools. "Don't go" says Wali,⁽²⁾ "to ask Avicienne to analyse this love; he does not know the rules of this art. It is necessary to efface all books on morals if the real Plato (God) has come to belong to your school."

Ibn-Rushd has always remained foreign to such follies. He is without contradiction the least mystical of all Arab-Spanish philosophers. He loudly proclaims, that we arrive union by science. The supreme point of human development is in his eyes the point where all human faculties have been carried to their highest potentiality. Man reaches God as soon as by contemplation he has pierced the veil of things, and finds himself face to face with transcendental verities. The asceticism of the *Sufis* is vain and useless. The object of Man's life is to make the higher part of his soul to triumph over his sensations. This done, Paradise has been attained, no matter what religion a Man professes to believe. But this happiness is rare and reserved solely for great men. We can obtain it only in old age by a persevering practice of meditation by renouncing all superfluities, and on condition at the same time of not wanting in the necessities of living. Many people taste it only at the moment of death, because this perfection is almost always in *inverse ratio* to bodily perfection. Alfarabi having waited in vain for this supreme felicity till the last days of his life, declared that it was nothing but a chimera. But this aptitude for union is not the same in all men. There is in this respect a sort of *Grace elective* as well as *gratuitous*.

(2.) *Oeuvres de Wali*, publiques par. M. Garcen de Tassy. p. vii.

This theory has a name in the history of philosophy: it is called *rationalistic mysticism*. It is of the Alexandrians; it is the exaggeration of what Aristotle had said with wisdom and moderation on the effects of meditation, which makes us approach God and which makes us share in His felicity. Aristotle is always adequate to explain the most hazardous doctrines of the Arabian philosophy. It is impossible to doubt that this theory of union is chalked out of the description of the Divine life such as we read in the VII, IX, and XII Chapters of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The *vous* thinks always, and thinks always on the most Divine subject, which is itself. The Divine thought seized the *Good* at an indivisible moment; it is the actuality of all Intelligence, that is to say *the Supreme God*, because thinking is the greatest happiness, and the most excellent object. And what is admirable in this matter is, that God eternally enjoys this perfect happiness of which we have only flashes.

In the Xth book *on the Morals of Nicomache*, the supreme happiness of a spiritual and a contemplative life is described in still more magnificent phrases. "But such a life" adds Aristotle, "is perhaps above and beyond Humanity, since we do not enjoy this bliss in our capacity as human beings, but on account of what there is in us of the Divine." In this way, individuality and the limits of human nature were and scrupulously respected.

To the theory of union is very intimately connected in the Arab mind the question of the perception of separate substances. A problem which Aristotle put to himself but which he did not solve has suggested endless conjectures to the Arabs. After having explained how the *vous* conceives abstract things, the philosopher adds:—"We shall see later on, whether it is possible or not for Intelligence, without being separated from the understanding, to think of something which is separate from it." It is not easy to say in what place Aristotle has kept his promise.

Ibn-Rushd undertook to supplement his silence in a treatise which has not been edited but of which we have a Hebrew translation under the title: *A treatise on the material Intellect, or on*

the possibility of Union, and which two Jewish philosophers Joseph ben Schem—Tob Moses of Narbonne have accompanied with their commentaries.

The Arabs, like our scholastics have understood by Aristotle's separate Intelligences, the angles, the spheres, and the active Intellect. The question is, however, to know, whether Man can by his natural and experimental faculties arrive at a knowledge of invisible beings. The reply of Ibn-Rushd is in the affirmative. "If Man" says he "did not perceive these substances, Nature would have acted in vain, inasmuch as she would have created an intelligible without an intelligent being to comprehend it;" "a reasoning" says Zamara "which was refuted by the angelic Doctor (Thomas Aquinas), and the subtle Doctor (Duns Scotus.)" "It is" followed Zamara "as if somebody argued as follows:—*Nullus homo currit; ergo nullum animal currit.* (No man runs, therefore no animal runs). But in this regard, Ibn-Rushd was perfectly consistent, because he accorded to Man alone the faculty to perceive the Intelligibles, and that in his thinking, the speculative Intellect was reflected only in humanity. This question had, moreover, for Ibn-Rushd, a much greater importance than what his interpreters have attached to it. Reason being for him a cosmic principle, distinct from the individual, to inquire whether individual Intellect is able to perceive separate substances is to put in doubt the transcendental faculty of the human spirit. To deny this capacity to Man would be to humiliate Reason below sensation; because the Intellect would then be no longer in potentiality, whereas sensation, though only applying itself only to particulars would be always in action. Besides the understanding is in exact parallelism to sensation. But just as in sensation, the external agent, light, for example, is separate from its subject, in the same way, in the understanding, the intellectual agent is separate or abstract; in such a manner, that the problem to solve, if the Intellect can communicate with abstract substances reduces itself to this, whether the exercise of the Intellect is possible or not.

No philosophy has insisted so vigorously as that of the Arabs on the objective existence of the Intellect, and has drawn with such a rigorous logic the consequences of this principle. If the Intellect is outside ourselves, where can it be? Who is the being who makes us what we are, who concurs more than ourselves in all our intellectual acts? Neither Aristotle nor his commentators have answered these questions, or rather have not even thought of proposing them. It is with the XIIth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that the Arabs have tried to fill up this deficiency. According to them, the intellectual agent forms part of that hierarchy of the first principles which guide the stars and transmit Divine action to the Universe. The first is the one which guides the most distant sphere, and the last is the one which guides the sphere nearest to us. The active Intellect comes next. We must, however, admit that this hierarchical order is not in complete harmony with the doctrine which is ordinarily attributed to Averroes, and which is, indeed, explained in the *Abridgement of Metaphysics*, one of his most important works. According to this doctrine, the active Intellect would be identical with the last of the planetary Intelligences, that is to say, with the one most neighbouring to Man. The Averroists divide themselves, besides, on this point from their Master. Several of them even identify active Intellect with God, although Ibn-Rushd has formally combated this opinion in *Alexandre*. One point at least is beyond doubt: it is, that the active Intellect, common to the whole human Race, as Ibn-Rushd understood it, in no way resembles the universal soul of the Universe, which is found in several schools of antiquity, for example, amongst the Stoics. If the personality of every man is seriously compromised by the Arab system, the individuality of the human spirit is rather exaggerated than disregarded, inasmuch as it is transformed into an elementary principle entirely distinct from individuals.

In this manner, the philosophy of Ibn-Rushd appears to us as a system of naturalism, very strongly connected in all its parts. The Universe is constituted by a hierarchy of eternal principles,

original and autonomous, vaguely attached to a higher Entity. One of them is Thought which is constantly manifested in some point of the Universe, and forms the permanent conscience of the human race. This immutable Thought knows neither progress, nor retrogression. The individual shares in it in different degrees; all the more perfect, all the more happy in proportion as this participation approaches more and more to perfection. What should be the part of immortality in this system? Logic could not permit any hesitation on a subject like this.

IX.

The extreme precision with which peripatetism had separated the two elements of the understanding, the relative element and the absolute element, should have led him to separate human personality in the question of immortality. In spite of the efforts of orthodox Aristotelism to impute to the Master a doctrine as conformable as possible to Christian ideas, the opinion of the philosopher in this respect should not be doubtful. The universal Intellect is incorruptible and separable from the body; the individual Intellect is perishable and ends with the body. All the Arabs have understood Aristotle's thought in this manner. The active Intellect alone is immortal, but the active Intellect is nothing but the common reason of the human race. Therefore, Humanity alone is eternal. The divine Providence, says the commentator, has accorded to the perishable being the power to propagate itself, in order to console it and to give it in the absence of any other this species of immortality. It is true that at times Ibn-Rushd's opinion might be construed to mean, that the inferior faculties such as sensibility, memory, love, hatred &c., had no sphere of activity in other life, whereas the superior faculties such as Reason, &c., alone survived the dissolution of the body. That is very nearly the interpretation which Albert and Saint Thomas gave to Aristotle's ideas. But the constant doctrine of Arab philosophers which Ibn-Rushd in general is far from trying to modify ought to serve to complete his idea on this point, which, it must be admitted, he has never expressly treated. But the denial of immortality and

resurrection the doctrine that Man should expect no other recompense except that which he finds here below in his own perfection constituted the chief rebuke which the zealous adherents of the orthodox creed, Gazzali and the *Motecallemins* threw at the philosophers. I cannot explain except by a manifest contradiction certain passages of *the Destruction of the Destruction* where in order not to compromise philosophy before its adversaries, Ibn-Rushd seems to admit immortality.

I have already made the observation, that it is not in this book, that we should search for the real thoughts of Ibn-Rushd. The soul is sometimes presented in this book as absolutely independent of the body. "The sight of an old man is feeble, not because his visual faculty is enfeebled, but because his eye which serves him as an instrument is enfeebled. If the old man had the eyes of a young man, he would see just as well as the young man. Sleep, moreover, furnishes an evident proof of the permanence of the *substratum* of the soul; since all the operations of the soul and all the organs which serve as instruments for its operation are all but annihilated during this period; and yet the soul does not cease to exist. In this manner, the *savant* comes to share in the belief of the vulgar on Immortality. The Intellect is, moreover, not attached to any particular organ, whereas the senses are localised, and can be effected in the different parts of the body by contradictory sensations." If we only consider this passage in an isolated manner, we might be inclined to attribute to Ibn-Rushd orthodox ideas on Immortality which are contradicted in the following page. There he maintains more precisely than ever that "the soul does not divide itself according to the number of individuals, that it is the same in Socrates as well as in Plato, that Intellect has no individuality, that individuation comes only from sensibility."

It was, however, not without some reason, that several Averroists of the *Renaissance*, Niphus for example invoked the theory of the unity of Intellect against the absolute negations of Pomponat. Averroes himself had tried this step to preserve a *simulacrum* of Immortality.

If the soul were limited and individualised in the individual, it would get corrupted with it as a loadstone with iron. The distinction of individuals comes from matter; the form, on the contrary, is common to several. But that which makes for permanence: It is the form and not the matter. The form gives name to things; an axe without an edge is no longer an axe but only a piece of iron. It is only by an abuse of term, that a dead body can be called a man. Consequently, in so far as it is pluralised, the individual disappears, but in so far as it represents a type, that is to say, in so far as it appertains to a species, it is immortal.

Moreover, the individual soul perceives nothing without imagination. Just as the sense is affected only in the presence of the object, in the same way, the soul thinks only in the presence of an image. Whence it follows, that the individual thought is not eternal. Because, if it were so, the images would be so also. Incorruptible in itself, Intellect becomes corruptible by the conditions of its exercise. As regards popular myths on future life, Ibn-Rushd does not hide the aversion with which they inspire him. "Amongst dangerous fictions" says he, "we must count those which tend to make us regard virtue only as a means to arrive at happiness. Thence virtue is no longer anything at all, inasmuch as people would then abstain from voluptuousness only with the hope of being repaid with compound interest. The brave would go to death only with a view to avoid a greater evil. The just man would respect another's property only in order to acquire double the amount." Besides, he takes Plato severely to task for having tried, by the myth of the Her l' Armenien, to represent to the imagination the state of the souls in another life. "These fables" says he, "serve only to mislead the spirits of the people and especially those of children, without passing any real advantage for improving them. I know men perfectly moral who reject all these fictions and yet do not yield in virtue to those who admit them."

Ibn-Rushd's opposition to the dogma of *Resurrection* is to be traced in the same way to his antipathy towards too precise imaginations which people usually want to form about the other life. The difficulties of grasping the idea of a survival of our moral being in this fashion were not few. Already the Sadducees and the free-thinkers whom the Talmud calls Epicureans, had professed a frank incredulity in this respect. We must find out in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (Ch. XV) the subtle and original argument which Saint Paul opposes to them. In the Koran, there appears at every page a pre-occupation with the difficulties raised by this dogma, and the objections which it would encounter. The same uneasiness is betrayed in the whole Mahomedan theology by the number of contraversial treatises which this subject has provoked; the degree of liveliness of the *apologetics* can, indeed, always serve to measure the effort which the human spirit makes under the pressure of a dogma to escape it. As for Arab philosophers, all without exceptions, rejected *Resurrection* as a fable. It is one of the chief rebukes which Gazzali administers to them. The ambiguous position in which Ibn-Rushd found himself in the face of this adversary, inspired him with something of that caution which those who defend liberty of thought against the orthodox impose on themselves. "The first" says he, "who have spoken of *Resurrection* are the Prophets of Israel after Moses, then the Gospels of the Christians, then the Sabeans whose religion, according to the saying of Ibn-Hazm, is the most ancient in the world. The motive which induced so many founders of religions to proclaim this dogma was the efficacy which they imagined this dogma to possess for moralising human beings and for exciting them to virtue by a consideration of their own personal interest. I do not blame Gazzali or the Motecallemins for saying, that the soul is immortal, but I blame them for saying, that the soul is only an accident and that Man will resume the same body which is fallen a prey to corruption. No; it will resume another similar to the original one, since that which has once become corrupt cannot come back to life. Regarded in space, these two bodies make only one, but in number, they are two. Aristotle has said it in the last lines of

his treatise on : *Generation and Corruption*. A corruptible body can never become again identical with itself but it can go back to the specific variety of which it formed a part. When air comes out of water, water out of air, neither of the substances returns to the individual from which it came at first but to the space whence it originally was."

X.

Morality occupies a very small place in the philosophy of Ibn-Rushd. In general, the *Ethics* of Aristotle, (inasmuch as they carried a much more Hellenic stamp) had not undoubtedly with the Arabs the same good luck as had his works on logic, physics and metaphysics. Ibn-Rushd's discussion with the Motecallemins on the principles of morals, deserve only to draw our attention. The *Motecallemins* maintained that the *Good* is that which God wills, and that God wills it, not in accordance with an intrinsic reason, and anterior to His will but uniquely because He wills it. We have already seen them attribute to God the power to realise contradictions, and to transfer to His free-will the whole government of the Universe. That constituted a system which Ibn-Rushd has not ceased to combat under all forms. On this occasion, he has no difficulty to show, that such a doctrine in morals upsets all the notions of the just and the unjust, and destroys the very religion which it pretends to consolidate. Man is neither absolutely free nor absolutely predestined. Liberty, considered in the soul is integral and without restrictions, but it is limited by the fatality of external circumstances. The efficient cause of our acts is within us, but the occasional or the immediate cause is outside ourselves. Since that which draws us is independent of us, and proceeds only from natural laws, that is to say, from Divine Providence. That's why the Koran represents Man as sometimes predestined and sometimes as an arbitrator of his own acts. This intermediate solution between the doctrines of the Jabarites and those of the Kadarites is given by Ibn-Rushd in his treatise, entitled : *Methods of demonstration for religious dogmas*, as an example of philosophical and eclectic interpretation.

which it is possible to give to theological doctrines. "Just Matter" says he elsewhere "is equally apt to receive contrary modifications, in the same way the soul has the power to decide for itself between contrary acts. This liberty, however, is neither caprice nor chance. The active powers do not know a state of indifference; the same contingency is met with only in the world of passivity.

Ibn-Rushd's politics, we might reasonably expect, have no great originality. It is to be found in full in his *Paraphrase of the Republic of Plato*. Nothing more strange than to see this curious phantasy of the Grecian mind taken seriously and analysed as a technical treatise on Politics. Government ought to be entrusted to old people. It is necessary to inspire the citizens with virtue by teaching them rhetoric, poetry and methods of argument and discourse (Topics). Poetry, especially of the Arabs, is pernicious. The Ideal of a State is to have no need either of Judges or of physicians. The army has no other functions except to watch over the safety of the people. How would it be, if the dogs of the shepherds would eat up the sheep. Military fiefs are the scourges of States. Women differ from men in degree and not in nature. They have aptitude for all that men do, war, philosophy, &c., only on a smaller scale. Sometimes women surpass men as in music, so much so, that the perfection of this art is possible only when the music is composed by a man and executed by a woman. The example of certain African States proves that women have a great aptitude for war, and that there would be nothing extraordinary if they should arrive at the Government of a republic. Do'nt we see as a matter of fact that the female dogs of shephards watch over their sheep just as well as the male dogs? "Our social state" adds Ibn-Rushd, "does not permit to women all the capabilities they possess; it appears, that they are destined only to give birth to children and to suckle them and this state of servitude has destroyed in them their capacity for great things. That's why we do not see amongst us a single women, endowed with moral virtues: their life passes away like that of plants and they are in

charge of their own husbands. Thence also the misery which devours our cities; since the number of women there is double that of men, and these women are not able to earn the necessities of life by their own labour. A tyrant is he who governs for himself and not for the people. The worst of all tyrannies is that of priests. The ancient republic of the Arabs partially reproduced that of Plato. Moawia, by founding the Ommeyyad autocracy, spoiled this beautiful Ideal and opened the era of revolutions from which our island *i.e.*, Andalusia, adds Ibn-Rushd, is far from having fully emerged.

XI.

It is difficult to decide at this distance of time to what extent Averroes really deserved to become the typical representative of incredulity and of the contempt of all existing religious beliefs. Religion being the most profound expression of the conscience of Humanity at a certain given epoch, in order to comprehend well the religious system of a century, it would be necessary to live its life with a depth which even the most penetrating historian would hardly be capable of. Surely, there is nothing absurd, that minds so cultivated as Arab philosophers and particularly Ibn-Rushd should have shared the religious beliefs of their countrymen. In fact, a dominant religion ordinarily creates a privilege against criticism. Can we put in question the perfect good faith of so many great spirits of the past centuries who have admitted without the least hesitation certain beliefs which, in our days, trouble the conscience of a child? There is no dogma so absurd which has not been admitted by men who in all other matters were endowed with a great subtlety of mind. There is, therefore, nothing to prevent us from supposing, that Ibn-Rushd believed in the religion of Islam especially if we consider how little the supernatural has been mingled with the essential dogmas of this religion, and how much this religion approximates the purest form of Deism.

It is remarkable that Ibn-el-Abbar and Ibn-Abi-Ocebia do not permit any suspicion to throw its shadow on Ibn-Rushd.

orthodoxy. El-Ansary, Abd-el-Wahid and Leon l'Africain, on the contrary, testify, that the religious beliefs of the commentator were a subject of very different judgments on the part of his contemporaries. People wrote books *for* and *against* his orthodoxy. Leon or his translator assures having had in hand a poem in the form of a dialogue, where one of the interlocutors exalts the knowledge and virtue of Ibn-Rushd, while the other represents him as a heretic. This last opinion appears also to have been that of a biographer quoted by Leon. Relating the story of Ibn-Badja who was released from prison by Ibn-Rushd's father, he added: "This father did not know, that some day his son shall be a still greater heretic." On the contrary, one of his intimate friends, Abd-el-Kebir, a religious devotee, whose words are quoted by El-Ansari, assured, that these accusations had no basis, and that he had seen the philosopher several times going to his prayers and making his ablutions "God only knows what it really is" said another "so far at least is certain, that it is the intrigues of the envious that have condemned him. For himself, he thought of nothing but writing commentaries on Aristotle and of trying to establish a harmony between religion and philosophy."

If Averroes has remained in the eyes of Christians the flag-bearer of incredulity, it is chiefly because, we must say, his name having effaced that of other Mahomedans, he became the representative of Arabism which in the thinking of the Middle ages, approached very closely to incredulity. Ibn-Rushd does not dissemble, that some of his doctrines, that of the eternity of the world, for example, are contrary to the instructions of all religions. He philosophises freely without going out of his way to offend theology, of troubling himself, about avoiding an indispensable shock. He assails theologians only when they venture to place their feet on the ground of rational discussions. The *Motecallemins* who pretended to demonstrate their dogmas by dialectics are refuted in every page of his writings. Particularly, Gazzali, "this renegade of philosophy, this ungrateful wretch who has drawn all that he knows from the writings of philosophers and has turned against them the very arms he has borrowed from them."

is assailed with something like fury.⁽¹⁾ We can attribute this only to a total reversing of his mental equipment, or to a desire to reconcile himself with theologians to whom he was an object of suspicion, the composition of his book.

The destruction of philosophers.

Theologians have always been enemies of philosophers and he desired to fortify himself before-hand against their hatred. "As for us" adds Ibn-Rushd "we shall place in broad day-light the hidden poison of his book, though at the risk of exposing ourselves to the rage of the persecutors of our Mother, i. e., Philosophy." Sometimes, the incredulous thought discovers itself with still greater liberty. In the first book of *Physics*, after having tried to establish the impossibility of the dogma of creation, he asks the question what could possibly have been the origin of such an absurd opinion? "Habit," answers he "Just as a man used to poison can take it with impunity, in the same way, habit can make us accept the strangest of doctrines. But the opinions of masses are formed only by habit. The masses believe what they hear continually repeated. And it is for this reason, that their faith is stronger than that of philosophers; since, a man of the people is not in the habit of listening to the contrary of his beliefs, which very frequently happens to philosophers. Consequently, we frequently meet people in our days who suddenly entering into the study of speculative sciences lose their religious faith which they held only as a matter of habit, and become *zendiks* or infidels." Even the very germ of the blasphemous thought is not to be found in his writings, the idea, namely, of comparing the three chief religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) which weighed so heavily against Ibn-Rushd during the Middle Ages. These expressions: *Omnes leges, loquentes trium legum quoe hodi sunt* (All the laws, speaking of the three Scriptures which are existing to-day), recur frequently under his pen, and seem to imply in his mind a hardy generalisation. The difference in religion is, besides one of the reproaches which

1 M. Goxho Ueber Gazzali's Leben u Werke, p. 268.

Gazzali hurls against philosophers. "The source of all their errors," says he, in the preface to his *Destruction of Philosophers*, "is the confidence they cherish in the names of Socrates, Hippocrates of Plato, of Aristotle, the admiration which they profess for their genius and their subtlety and then their conviction, that these great masters were led by the profundity of their minds to reject all religions and to regard all religious precepts as the work of artifice and of imposture."

We possess, moreover, two treatises in which Ibn-Rushd has attempted to develop his religious system; *the one, on the harmony of religion and philosophy, and the other, on the demonstration of religious dogmas.*

Philosophy is the most elevated goal of humanity, but very few men can attain to it. The prophetic revelation is added to it for the masses. Philosophical disputes are not intended for the people, because they serve only to weaken faith. Disputes are reasonably prohibited, because it is sufficient for the happiness of the common people that they understand what they are able to understand. Ibn-Rushd makes an effort to prove against Gazzali, by quoting verses from the Koran, that God commands search of the Truth by the method of science; that only the philosopher truly understands religion; that not one of the sects which divide the Mahomedan world, such as the Asharites, Batenians, and Motazalites possesses the absolute truth, &c., that it is not possible to force a philosopher to take any particular side amongst these different sects. "*The religion special to philosophers*" says he "*is to study that which really is; since the most sublime worship that we can render to God is the knowledge of his works which leads us to know him in all his reality. That is, in the sight of God, the noblest of actions, whereas the vilest is to tax with error and vain presumption him, who renders this worship in various ways, nobler than all other worship, who adores God by this religion the best of all the religions.*"

The same ideas are reproduced in the last chapter of the *Destruction of the destruction* with a remarkable firmness. The

popular beliefs on God, the angels, the prophets, the words, the prayers, the sacrifices have the effect of exciting men to virtue. Religions are an excellent instrument of morals, especially in those principles which are common to all of them and which are derived from natural reason. Man always begins to live by general beliefs before he begins to live his own life, and even when he has arrived at a more individual way of thinking, instead of despising the doctrines in which he has been brought up, he ought to try to interpret them in a nicer manner. Consequently he who inspires a people with doubts about its religion and points out contradictions in their prophets is a heretic, and ought to bear the penalty established in his church against the heretics. At epochs when there are several religions in vogue, we should choose the noblest of them all. It was thus that the philosophers who were teaching in Alexandria embraced the religion of the Arabs as soon as it came to their knowledge, and that the sages of Rome became Christians as soon as the Christian religion became known to them. Religions are besides, composed exclusively neither of reason nor of prophecy but of both in diverse proportions. The material and figurative portion of their dogmas ought to be explained in a spiritual sense. A true sage never engages in a war against the established religion of the country. He, however, avoids speaking of God in the ambiguous manner of the masses. The Epicurian who tries to destroy religion and virtue both at the same time deserves death.

Surely, we should be prepared for more toleration after such a frank declaration of rationalism. But we should remember, that Ibn-Rushd, making in his *Destruction of the Destruction* an apology for philosophers against their enemies who had accused them of impiety was obliged to show severity towards those whose errors compromised philosophy. His opinion about the harmony of religion and philosophy appears, besides, to have been professed by the majority of Arab philosophers. "That which I do" says one of them introduced by Gazzali, "I do on the authority of nobody; but after having studied philosophy, I understand very well what prophetism really means. *Wisdom and moral*

perfection : there is the long and short of it. Its commandments have the object of putting reins on the common people, to prevent them from destroying one another, from quarreling amongst themselves and from abandoning themselves to their vicious inclinations ⁽¹⁾. But as for myself who have nothing in common with this ignorant multitude, I don't feel embarrassed at all. I am out of the number of sages. I cultivate wisdom. I know it, and it suffices me, and with her aid I can do without authority. It is there, adds Gazzali, where culminated the faith of those who studied philosophy such as we see in Ibn-Sina and Alfarabi." The rationalistic theory explaining prophetism as a psychological fact and as a faculty of human nature elevated to its highest power is found in all Arab philosophers, and forms one of the most important and characteristic points of their doctrines.

But we must not, however, demand in Ibn-Rushd's doctrine an extreme severity about the relations of philosophy and prophetism. We shall take care not to take him to task for it. Inconsistency is an essential element of all human things. Logic leads us to abysses. Who can sound the unfathomable mysteries of his own conscience, and in the great chaos of human life, what reason ever precisely knows where the changes of right-seeing come to an end, and its right to make positive affirmations ?

The orthodox doctors amongst Mahomedans have perceived these *nuances* with great sagacity. Every rationalistic science is an object of suspicion to them, because it teaches to do without a revelation. Theology is something only on condition of its being everything. To pretend to do without her authority in explaining God, man and the World is to render her useless and whether we wish it or not, to declare ourselves to be her enemy. The inevitable consequence of these sciences, said the adversaries of Arabian philosophy, is to believe in the necessity and in the eternity of the world, to deny *Resurrection*, the last Judgment, and to live without any restrictions by abandoning ourselves to passions. Rationalistic science we must confess, frequently led

(1). *Treatise on the Destruction of errors* by Gazzali, published by M. Schmoeld. *etc.* p. 29.

Mahomedans to a sort of materialism. The redoubtable Assassins were also philosophers whose assassins used to make men tremble, and dealt their blows even to the persons of Caliphs. Retired within the castle of Alamout, they passed their time in composing treatises on philosophy. When the Tartars penetrated into *their nest of vulture*, they found there a complete scientific establishment, an immense library, a physical laboratory and an observatory provided with the most perfect instruments. The philosophers were generally regarded as people not particularly religious. Ibn-Sina was a frank debauchee, after the manner of the poets of Mahomet's time, leading a merry life, drinking wine, loving music, and passing nights in orgies with his disciples. "Wine" said he, "is forbidden, because it excites quarrels and enmities, but being kept from excess by my wisdom, I take it to sharpen my mind." The Arab philosophers were thus amongst their co-religionists very nearly what the *libertines* were in the 17th Century. It is impossible to believe, that such clear-sighted men did not know longer than the common people about the dogmas which have a need of mystery. "Often" says Gazzali "we see one of them read the Koran, take part in religious ceremonies and in prayers, and praise religion by the word of mouth. But when we ask him: If prophetism is false, why then do we pray? He replies: It is an exercise of the body, a custom of the country, a means of leading a life of safety. In the meantime he does not cease to drink wine and to give himself up to all sorts of abominations and of impieties." We cannot doubt, that there is a good deal of exaggeration in these declamations of Gazzali. It is probable, that this enthusiast, incapable of philosophising with calmness, and carried away towards Sufism by his ill-regulated imagination, has slandered his old comrades in philosophy to satisfy his passion, and his taste for excess in everything. People are often annoyed to see others march peaceably on the road which they themselves were unable to tread; and ardent spirits begin to imagine, that they are consistent only when they are in extremity. It is possible, that Gazzali was also not absolutely wrong, in that the philosophers truly deserved the reproach either of inconsistency, or of mental narrowness. God only knows.

SECOND PART.

AVERBOISM.

Chapter I.

Averroism amongst the Jews.

I.

Arabian philosophy was really taken very seriously by the Jews. In Islamism the philosophers were isolated people, regarded with unfavourable eyes, persecuted and the two or three princes who protected them incurred the anathema of Orthodox Mahomedans. Their works are hardly found except in Hebrew translations or in transcriptions in Hebrew characters made for the use of the Jews. The entire literary culture of the Jews in the Middle Ages was nothing but a reflexion of Mahomedan culture much more analogous to their genius than Christian civilisation. It was under Arabian influence that there manifested in the 10th century in the Academy of Sora (near Bagdad), the first attempt at a rational theology to which the name Saadia is attached. The Mahomedan domination in Spain produced the same results. *Never did conquerors push toleration and moderation further towards the conquered than the Arabs of Spain.* Since the 10th century, Arabic was the language common to Mahomedans, Jews and Christians.⁽¹⁾ Mixed marriages were frequent in spite of the opposition of the clergy. Latin and ecclesiastical studies had fallen into the greatest discredit. A bishop was found composing *Kasidas* and observing all the delicacies and rhythm of the language.⁽²⁾ Alvare of Cordova strongly reproaches his countrymen for

(1) We find manuscripts in Spanish language written in Arabic characters, and conversely. See *Journal des Savants* and V. 16 germinal, No. 7; *Notices et Extraits* t. V. p. 626 articles by M. de Saucy; Viarot *Histoire des Arabes and des Mores at Cordova* t. II. p. 186. note.

(2) *Galongos*. "The History of the Mahomedan dynasties" t. I. p. 157-161.

preferring Arabic to Christian literature, ignoring their religion and language both at the same time and for eagerly seeking the assonances and elegances of Mahomedan rhetoric. The Jews accepted even still more willingly the conquest of the Arabs. The poor race found at last a little rest in its long journey in foreign lands, and a sort of *souvenir* of Jerusalem. Spain was from a long time a second fatherland to the Jews. Since the year 1200 A. D. under Adrian, a large number of families escaped from the disaster which befell their race, had taken refuge in Spain. Persecuted by the Visigoths, the Jews received the Arabs as their emancipators. Science and a taste for the same studies completed by operating a fusion of the two races. People saw Jews presiding at the Academy of Cordova. A community of intellectual culture has always been the best means to establish religious toleration.

Although Jewish philosophy since Maimonides was nothing but a reflexion of that of the Arabs, we must at the same time acknowledge, that the initiation of the Jews of Spain into philosophy came particularly from the impulse given to those studies in the east by Saadia. Hasdai ben-Shaphrout, physician to Hakem II, employed the influence which he possessed with this Caliph to make flourish amongst his co-religionists in Spain the rationalistic studies inaugurated by the school of Sora.⁽³⁾

Ibn-Gebirol (Avicèbron) preceded Ibn-Badja by one generation the Arab-Spanish philosopher whose name acquired a veritable celebrity. Ibn-Gebirol, it is true, was amongst his co-religionists an almost isolated phenomenon. He displeased the theologians by his rashness, and by the concessions he made to the orthodox party on the dogma of creation, he found himself left behind by Averroistic peripatetics, successors of Maimonides. Thence the oblivion into which the Hebrew text of his *Source of Life* has fallen, whereas this work enjoyed in Latin a very great authority. Nevertheless, since the second-half of the 11th century Aristotelism was highly accredited with the Jews, and the oppo-

(3). Munk. *Mélanges*. p. 479 et suiv. Philoxene Luzzatto *Notices sur Hasdai ben-Schaprout* [Paris.]

The doctrine of the Arab *Motecallemins* was universally rejected. Theology took alarm, and tried a re-action represented especially by the famous book *Khozari* or *Cosri* de Juda Hallevi. A great perturbation entered into the consciences of people; all possible methods were tried to conciliate the Jewish dogma with reason. Then appeared *the second Moses*, who resuming by his genius all former efforts in the same direction, deserves to be considered as the real founder of philosophical Judaism.

II.

If we are to believe Leon l'Africain, Moses Maimonides was the disciple and even the host of Averroes up to the moment of the latter's disgrace. Moses, then, out of fear to find himself in the alternative either to give away his master or to refuse him hospitality, had taken refuge in Egypt. Mr. Munk⁽²⁾ has proved all that is impossible in the story. When Ibn-Rushd was prescribed it was more than thirty years that Maimonides had left Spain in order to escape from the persecutions of the Almohades. Maimonides says, no doubt, in the *More Neboukim* (II, IX) that he was the disciple of a disciple of Ibn-Bad, but nowhere in this book, he speaks of Ibn-Rushd. Moreover, we have the precise date at which he began to know the writings of the Commentator, and this date carries us back to the last years of his life. In a letter addressed from Cairo in the year 1190-91 to his beloved disciple Joseph ben-Juda, he expresses himself in the following manner: "I have lately received all that Ibn-Rushd has composed on the works of Aristotle except the book: *On the sense and the sensible*, and I have found that he has discovered Truth with great impartiality; but up till now, I have not yet found leisure to study his writings. Basnage is therefore wrong in saying, that it was from Averroes that Maimonides learnt indifference in religious matters. Maimonides could not have the advantage of being a disciple of Ibn-Badja as Leon l'Africain says and as people have since repeated after him, in as much as Maimonides was only three years old when Ibn-Bâdji died in 1138.

(2) In his notice on Joseph ben-Juda, disciple of Maimonides, *Journal Asiatique*, July 1842, p. 31-32.

Altogether, it was in an indirect manner, by the influence which he gave to Jewish studies, that Maimonides established the authority of Ibn-Rushd amongst his co-religionists. Maimonides and Ibn-Rushd drew from the same source, and each accepting on his own side the traditions of Arab peripatetism, they both arrived almost at an identical philosophy.⁽³⁾ It is, therefore, not surprising, that Brucker and other historians of philosophy, struck by the resemblances, and fortified by the authority of Léon, have placed Maimonides amongst the disciples of Averroes. It is only in his polemics against the *Motecallemins*, that the sympathies of the Jewish doctor for Arab philosophers appear. The hypothesis of atoms, the negation of natural laws and of causality are vigorously combated by him. If he does not maintain like some Jewish peripatetics that matter is eternal, and that Moses, in the first book of the Genesis meant only to describe the natural order of things, he does not believe either, that the eternity of the world is a grave heresy. His doctrine on the hierarchy of spheres and on Divine action which attaches them to one another is identical with that of philosophers. Like them also he rejects every approximation of God to creatures:—*We can say of God what He is not, but we can't say what He is!* He does not even venture to attribute to God existence, unity and eternity out of fear, that these attributes might be regarded as distinct from the Divine substance, and particularly out of an apprehension to admit anything that resembles Christian hypostases. That is the doctrine pure and simple of the *Moattils*. His doctrine of the Intellect hardly differs from that of Ibn-Rushd. Beyond the material Intellect, depending on senses, there is the acquired Intellect formed by the emanation of the universal Intellect, in perpetual activity, which is God Himself. Beings separated by corporeity do not admit of multiplicity; there is, after all, only one God. Maimonides appears, however, to individualise Intelligence more than the Commentator does it, and to attribute a distinct substance to the Soul. Resurrection embarrasses him. He tries

(3) On the doctrine of Maimonides, see an excellent article by H. B. in the *Dict. des sc. phil.*, t. IV See also, Geiger, *Moses ben Maimon* [Breslau, 1857]

explain it without being able to arrive at anything satisfactory. We must even acknowledge, that his objections sometimes go so far as to attack immortality. The perfection of Man consists in cultivating and elevating his nature by science. Science is the true worship which we owe to God. By science, the beautiful vision may begin here on earth, but science is not accessible to everybody. For the sake of the simple and the illiterate, God has supplemented science by prophetism. Prophetism is a natural condition more perfect than that of the vulgar which only a few privileged men are able to reach. Prophetic revelation does not differ, at bottom, from the infusion of the active Intellect, in other words, from the permanent revelation of pure Reason.

III.

In order that such a doctrine might be called Averroism, the only thing wanted was the name of Averroes. Under the high recommendation of Maimonides, the name of Averroes became almost instantly, the highest philosophical authority amongst the Jews. A curious letter of Joseph ben-Juda, disciple of Maimonides, addressed to his master, reveals to us in one word the importance which the Commentator, probably even when living, had acquired amongst the Jews:—"Yesterday, your most beloved daughter, Pleiade, the beautiful and the charming, has found grace before me. The young girl has pleased me, and I have got honestly betrothed to her, according to the law given on the Mount Sinai. I have married her by three things: by giving her a dowry silver of friendship, by giving her in writing a love-contract as I loved her, and by embracing her as a young man does a virgin. And after having acquired her by all these means, I invited her to the nuptial bed of love. I employed neither persuasion nor violence, but she gave me her love because I had given her mine, and that I had attached my soul to hers. *All this has passed before two well known witnesses my friends Ben-Allah (Maimonides) and Ibn-Rushd.* But even when she was on the nuptial bed, and under my power she was already getting

faithless to me and began to turn her eyes towards other lovers ” This betrothed is Philosophy which Joseph ben-Juda had received from his master in marriage, and from which he did not derive, from what it appears all the desirable satisfaction. We are indebted to Joseph ben-Juda's taste for allegories, an interpretation not less curious of the *Cantique des Cantiques* (The song of Solomon). The Sulemite is the individual soul seeking to unite in love with the active Intellect. It is the same in the case of Jacob's fight with the soul. It is *the intellectual soul* of Jacob that fights and makes an effort to reach the stage of *the active intellect* represented by the Angel; but it cannot reach there as long as it is chained by physical bonds and the combat lasts *till the beginning of dawn*, that is to say, till the soul, delivered from the darkness of matter, should reach the eternal Light.⁽³⁾ An interesting story which has been preserved for us by Jamal-eddin-al-Kifti in his “History of Philosophers,” and which has been copied by Abulfaradj, finishes by making us acquainted with the analogy that exists between the doctrines of Joseph ben-Juda and those of Ibn-Rushd. “I was linked with him” says Jamal-eddin “in intimate friendship; one day, I said to him: ‘If it be true, that the soul survives the body, and that it preserves after death a knowledge of external things, give me your word, that if you die before me, you will come to tell me what it really is, and if I die before you, I shall do the same to you. We kept our mutual promises. He died and made me wait some years. At last I saw him in a dream. ‘Physician’ said I, “was it not agreed between us, that you would come to communicate to me your experiences beyond the grave’? He turned his face, smiling; I seized him by the hand and said: ‘It is absolutely necessary that you should tell me all that has happened to you and how people really are after death.’ ‘*The universal*’ replied he ‘*has joined the universe*, and the *particular* has entered into the part. I understood at once what he meant to say, namely, that the soul which is *the universal* element had returned to the universe while

(3). Munk, op. cit. p. 55.

the body which is *the particular* element, had returned to the terrestrial centre; and being awakened, I admired the subtlety of his reply."

The whole school of Maimonides remained faithful to Averroistic peripatetism. This fact was so notorious that Willam d' Auvergne did not fear to say, that amongst the Jews subject to the Saracens there was not one who had not abandoned the faith of Abraham, and who had not been infected by the errors of Saracens or those of their philosophers.

A rationalistic movement so pronounced could not but excite violent opposition amongst theologians. Maimonides and philosophy were, during more than a century, the subject of a bitter fight between the synagogues of Provence, of Catalogne and of Aragon. People excommunicated each other; some even went so far as to invoke ecclesiastical authority against their adversaries. Montpellier, Barcelone, and Toledo condemned to the flames the writings of the son of Maimon; for a moment, Narbonne alone defended them. Treatises for and against Aristotle and Maimonides followed year after another. In 1305, the chief of the theological party, Salomon ben-Adereth was strong enough to have philosophy condemned at Barcelone, and to have it forbidden under the penalty of excommunication to begin its study before the age of twenty-five. It required the authority of David Kinchi and the fruitful activity of Schem-Tob-ben-Falaguera, of Jedaia Penini de Bezurs, of Joseph ben-Caspi to assure definitely the triumph of peripatetism in the synagogue. It is one of the rare victories which philosophy has obtained over theologians. It had the result of making the Jewish people the chief representative of rationalism during the second half of the Middle Ages.

IV.

Two facts characterised this second period of Jewish philosophy. (1) The theatre changes; the fanaticism of the Almohades, while strangling philosophy amongst the Mahomedans, forces the Jewish civilisation to reflow in Christian Spain, in Provence and

in Languedoc Barcelona, Saragossa, Narbonne; Lunel Bezier, l'Argenture and Marseille become the centres of this new movement. (2) The Jewish philosophy investigated trail for trail, the physiognomy of that of the Arabs. Up to Maimonides, this philosophy, though essentially peripatetic, develops itself in a fairly independent manner. Saadia, Ibn Gebirol, Juda Hallivi remind us of the first scholastics such as Abelard, Roscelin, &c., previous to the translation of the complete body of Aristotelism. Moses Maimonides, Levi ben-Gerson, on the contrary, remind us of the second, scholastics, such as Albert and Saint Thomas embracing *the ensemble* of the peripatetic encyclopaedia. The works of Aristotle, accompanied by the great Commentary of Ibn-Rushd shall henceforth be the exclusive basis of Jewish philosophy. It is to the Jews that Averroes is indebted for his reputation as a commentator. It is from them that he received the title since solemnly confirmed by the school of Padua, as *the Soul and the Intelligence of Aristotle*(1). As a matter of fact, the pure text of Aristotle is very seldom found in the Hebrew manuscripts. On the contrary, treatises accompanied by Ibn-Rushd's commentaries and sometimes even his paraphrases simply bear the name of Aristotle there.

When the civilisation of the Jews had emigrated from the Mahomedan Spain into Provence and into the adjacent regions of the Pyrennese, Arabic which till then had been their usual and learned language, ceased to be familiar to them, and they felt the need of transferring into Hebrew all the important writings in science and philosophy. These versions have in most cases survived their originals and are found in great number in the libraries, so much so that a knowledge of the Rabbinical Hebrew is much more necessary than that of Arabic to write a history of Arabian philosophy. The course adopted in these translations is besides, one of the most simple. The text is rather counterdrawn than translated; many Arabic words are preserved in their primitive forms. Each Arabic root is rendered by its corresponding

(1). Delitzsch. *Anecdota zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Scholastik der Juden u Moslemen*, (Leipzig, 1841), p., 302.

Hebrew even when the meaning is different in the two languages. It is the same in the case of grammatical forms, so much so, that following a certain method, we could re-establish without hesitation the Arabic text which the Jewish translator had before his eyes.⁽²⁾ It is only in treatises of a particular physiognomy, as the paraphrase of the Rhetoric, of the Poetic, of the Republic of Plato, and the *Destruction of the Destruction* that the translator permits himself to speak in his own name, partly to substitute certain special and intranslatable details by others more interesting in the eyes of his co-religionists, and partly to make the author speak a more orthodox language. The chief glory of this great work of translation which occupies the whole of the 13th century and the first half of the 14th, belongs to the family of the Tibbonides of Andalusian origin and established at Lunel.⁽³⁾ If we are to believe in the catalogue of manuscripts of the Imperial Library of Paris, Juda Aben-Sibban, the chief of this laborious family, surnamed *the prince of translators*, had already translated the Commentaries of Ibn-Rushd on the *Physics* on the treatise *on the soul and on the Meteorology* (Heb-314). But that is an error. Juda lived at the end of the 12th century at an epoch when there could be no question of translating Ibn-Rushd in Hebrew. It was equally by a mistake that Bartolucci and Wolf attributed to Samuel Aben-Tibban the translation of Ibn-Rushd's paraphrase of *the Physics*. All these works belong to the third Tibbonite, Moses Aben-Tibbon. Samuel however, (beginning of the 13th century) was in a certain sense the first translator of the physical and metaphysical works of Ibn-Rushd in Hebrew. His great work, called *The opinions of Philosophers* is a sort of encyclopaedia often quoted almost word by word from Averroes whom the author declares to be the most faithful interpreter of Aristotle. The author worked on Arabic texts. This remarkable work ceased to be read when a few years later on people possessed even complete versions of Averroes' texts.

(2). Goldenthal, Averrois in Arist. Rhetor. Comment. Pref; in Hebrew, p. 113 and in the *Memoires de l'Academie de Vienne*, 1850; *Grundzuge u Beitrag zur vergleichenden raffinisch philosophischen Worterbuche*, p. 422-423.

(3). Wolf, I, p. 454 — "Histoire litt de la France" t. X, p. 381-86.

We must say the very same about the peripatetic encyclopædia called *The Search after Wisdom* by Juda ben-Salomo Cohen of Toledo, one of the *protéges* of Frederic II. Juda composed his work in 1274 in great portion after Averroes. The technical terms of this writer differ much from those which were chosen by the Tibbonides, and which ever since have had the force of laws in the Jewish schools of philosophy. Schem-Tòb, ben-Joseph, ben-Falquera, ben-Joseph ben-Falquera, Spaniard born about 1226, makes also a great use of Ibn-Rushd, and sometimes inserts long passages from the Commentator in his own writings.⁶¹³ It is the same case with Gerson ben-Salomon in his *Gate of Heavens* (the second-half of the 13th century). A native of Provence, settled at Naples and related to the family of the Tibbonides (he was son-in-law to Samuel) was the author of the first translation, properly so called of Averroes. Jacob ben-Abba-Mari, son of Rabbi Simson Antoli was one of those Jews whom Frederic II pensioned for seconding his projects of vulgarising the science of the Arabs. At the end of his translation of the commentary of Ibn-Rushd *on the Organon*, finished at Naples in 1232, he extols the munificence of Frederic II, his love of science, and expresses a wish that the Messiah might appear during his reign! Antoli is also the author of the Hebrew translation of *the Abridgement of Logic*. Moreover, the libraries of Paris, of Turin and of Vienna possess under his name a translation of Ibn-Rushd's *Abridgement of the Almageste*, finished at Naples in 1231. It is probable, that Antoli's versions, made especially in view of Latin translations, penetrated little in Provence; because thirty years later on, about the year 1260, we find Moses Aben-Tibbon giving his co-religionists almost a complete translation of Ibn-Rushd's Commentaries, and even of some works on medicine, such as the commentary *on Ardjuza*⁶¹⁴. Towards the same epoch, in 1259, Solomon ben-Joseph ben-Job, of Grenada origin, but settled at Beziérs translated the Commentaries of the treatise *on Heaven and on Earth*. In 1284, Zarachia ben-Isaac, of Bar-

(1) Wolf, I, p. 19, 655; III, p. 13; IV, p. 752—Biblo, imp. No. 314, 327, 336, 350—Pasini, *Codd. taur* I, p. 14—Lambecins, I, p. 285—Steinschneider, p. 302—307.

(1) Munk, *Melanges*, p. 441, 454, 458, 484 et, suiv.

Calona translated the *Commentaries on the Physics, on Heaven and Earth and on the Metaphysics*. Jacob ben-Machir translated in 1298, the *Abridgement of Logic*, and in 1300, the *Commentaries on the books XI-XIX of the History of Animals*.

In this manner, since the 13th century there existed no less than three different versions of the same *Commentaries*, and during the first half of the 14th century, we shall presently find a crowd of new translators at work. There is nothing in this double occupation that should surprise us. In the Middle Ages, it was often easier to make fresh translations than to procure those that already existed. Many of these versions were made for such and such personages, and never went out of the provinces where they had been elaborated.

One of the most laborious translators of this new series was Calonyme, son of Calonyme, son of Meyer, born at Arles in 1287. In 1314, he translated the commentaries on the *Topics* (Methods and Arguments), the *Sophistical Arguments*, and the *Seconds Analytics*; in 1317, the *Commentaries on the Metaphysics on the Physics, on the treatise on Heaven and Earth, on Generation and Corruption, and on the Meteors*. We find also under his name translations of the commentary on the treatise on the soul, and on the letter on *The Union of the Intellect separate in Man*. Calonyme knew Latin; since in 1328, we find him translating into Latin: *The Destruction of the Destruction*.⁽¹⁾ Calonyme, son of David, son of Todros, translated about the same time from Arabic into Hebrew the *Destruction of the Destruction*.⁽²⁾ We must not confound him with Calo Calonyme or Calonyme ben-David, physician of Naples, living at Venice who, in the 16th century, translated the *Destruction* and the letter on the *Union of the Intellect separate in Man* from Hebrew into Latin. The resemblance of the name of these three personages has given rise to many confusions.⁽³⁾ Rabbi Samuel ben-Juda ben-Meschullam of Marseille whose father was called Miles (Emile) Bongudas, translated in 1321, the

(1). Munk, *Melanges*, p. 441, 454, 458, 484 et suiv.

(2). Steinsehneider, p. 50-51.

(3). Wolf, I, p. 31, 1003, 1006; Bartolucci, I, p. 14, 131-132.

Commentary on *the Ethics of Nicomache*⁽⁴⁾ and the *Paraphrase* on the Republic of Plato.⁽⁵⁾ Todros Todrosi (Theodore, son of Theodore) of Arles translated in 1337 in the borough of Trinquetaille on the Rhone, opposite to Arles, the commentaries on *the Topics* (Methods and Arguments) *the Sophisms*, *the Rhetoric*, the Poetic and the Ethics.⁽⁶⁾

It is this version which has been published by M. Goldenstam. A crowd of other more obscure translators whose date is uncertain, such as Schem-Tob ben-Isaac de Tortose (commentary on *the Physics*) and the treatise on the Soul), Jacob ben-Schem-Tob (*Premiers Analytiques*) Juda ben-Tachin Maimon (*Physics*, treatise on heaven, on Generation), Moses ben-Tabora ben-Samuel ben-Schudai (treatise on *Heaven*), Moses ben-Salomon de Salon (*Metaphysics*), Juda ben-Jacob (books XI-XIX of *the Animals*) Salomon ben-Mosè Alguari (on *Sleep and Waking*) applied themselves successively to this stupendous work. The work, called *De Substantia Orbis* (on the Substance of the Worlds), composed of separate dissertations, and translated from Arabic into Latin was in its turn translated from Latin into Hebrew by Juda ben-Mosé ben-Daniel of Rome with several other scholastic treatises of Albert, Saint Thomas and Gilles of Rome. This example of the influence of the Latin scholastics on that of the Jews is not isolated; the polemics of orthodox Christians against the Averroists has left more than one trace of it in the writings of Hebrew authors.

V.

The 14th century was the period of the supreme authority of Averroes amongst the Jews. The most illustrious of the philosophers of this epoch Levi ben-Gerson, de Bagnols (Messier Léon) commented the different Commentaries and the real works of Averroes, such as *De Substantia Orbis* and the treatise on

(4). Pasini, I, 33, Wolf IV, 753.

(5). Lambecius, I, p. 292 and 384.

(6). Lambecius, I, 292.—Pasini, I, 12, 13.—Labbe, p. 306, No. 2270.—Wolf, IV, 753.—De Rossi, t. II, p. 307.—Krafft, p. 134 sqq.—De Rossi, t. II, p. 9—10.

Possibility of Union.⁽²⁾ For certain persons, his glossary became inseparable from the text of Averroes, as the Commentary of Averroes himself had become inseparable from that of Aristotle. It appears, that the Middle Ages preferred these analyses made by second and third persons to original texts. The doctrine of Levi ben-Gerson is, moreover, Arab peripatetism in all its purity. Much more daring than Maimonides, he makes the Mosaic dogmas adapt themselves to the exigencies of peripatetism, and admits without shift, the eternity of the world, the natural gift of prophecy, the existence of primitive matter without form, and the impossibility of creation. In this manner, Averroes has replaced Aristotle amongst the Jews. It is him that they comment, it is him that they abridge and it is him that they cut short for the needs of instruction. Moses de Narbonne (*Messer Vidal*) contemporary of Levi ben-Gerson, did at Narbonne that which Levi was doing at a few miles' distance from there at Perpignan. In 1344, he wrote a commentary on the treatise on *The Possibility of Union*; in 1349, on *De Substantia Orbis* and other physical dissertations of Ibn-Rushd's. The *Physics*, the *Ethics*, the Commentary on the book of Alexander d' Aphrodisias on Intellect, almost all the parts of the Averroistic programme underwent a new manipulation in his hands. Several translations of Averroes are attributed to him as well as to Levi ben-Gerson. But it was an error arising from the fact that people have regarded as translations treatises which these two masters have composed on those of the Commentator. It was also by a mistake, that people have regarded as translations the commentaries of Joseph ben-Caspi (about 1330) on the *Ethics* of Aristotle and on the *Politics* of Plato, after the manner of Averroes.

The influence of Arabian philosophy extends up to the Karaites, and produces amongst them a number of free-thinkers.⁽²⁾ Averroes is frequently quoted in the work of Ahron ben-Elia de

(2) Wolf, I, 728; II, 650.—Bartolucci, I, 481—Delitzsch, *Codd. Lips.* p. 306, 328.—Pasini, I, p. 10 et suiv.—Hottinger, *Bibl. Orient.* p. 47.

2. Ewald and Dukes *Beitrage zur Geschichte der aeltesten Auslegung des alten Testaments*, p. 266.

Nicomédie, finished in 1346 at Cairo under the title of *The Tree of Life* and in which the author has tried to imitate the *Guide of Maimonides*. The theory of Ahron on Intellect is very nearly the same as that of Arabian philosophy. Just as the soul is the form of the body, the acquired intellect is the form of the soul. The soul entirely potential at first enters into action only by its union with the body. When the body dies, all that in the soul belonged to the body perishes; but the purely intellectual element which constitutes the essence of Man is imperishable. Ahron ben-Elia is, however, not an Averroist like Lévi ben-Gerson or the Moses of Nerbonne. He even goes so far as to refute the Commentator's views on the simple, incorporeal and the imperishable nature of the Heavens, and tries to prove the newness of the world by the divisibility and the accidental nature of the celestial body.

VI.

The 15th century is the age of decadence of the Jewish scholastic. The Provincial school was exhausted; the boldness of philosophical speculations had passed out of fashion. Averroes is meanwhile still studied; the majority of the Hebrew manuscripts which we possess of his work even belong to this period. Joseph ben Schem-Tob of Segovie wrote in 1455 a great commentary on the *Ethics*; he informs us in the Preface, that he wrote it to make up for the silence of Ibn-Rushd. He equally commented on the treatise on the *Possibility of Union*⁽³⁾ and an analysis of the book of Alexandre concerning Intellect (*vide*, p. 70, No. 25). Schem-Tob, his son Moses Falaquera, Michel Hacohen wrote also Averroistic treatises and commentaries. Besides, the didactic poem of Moses de Riati, imitated from the *Divine Commedia* of Dante and published at Vienna by M. Goldenthal (1851) contains considerable extract from the philosophy of Averroes and of Lévi ben-Gerson.

(3). Wolf, I, 571—Bartolucci I, III, 850. Steinschneider, *Catal*, p. 21, and in Munk, *op. cit.* p. 438, 508—509. Ersch and Gruber art, Joseph ben Schem-tob, p. 92.

Elie⁽¹⁾ del Medigo is the last famous representative of Averroistic philosophy amongst the Jews. He taught at Padua towards the end of the 15th century and counted amongst his disciples Pic de la Mirandole, for whom he composed different philosophical works, amongst others, a treatise on *Intellect and on Prophecy* (1492) and a commentary on *De Substantia Orbis* (1485). His Annotations on Averroes, his questions on Creation, the first Motor, the Being, the essence and the one have been printed several times in Venice (1506, 1544, 1598), with the questions of Joan de Tandum. By the intermediary of Elie del Medigo, the Jewish philosophy whose role was henceforth over, makes its junction with the school of Padua which on its side continued the spirit and method of the Arabs. I have been able to assure myself, that even to-day the traditions of the teachings of the Middle Ages have not entirely disappeared from amongst the Jewish savants of Padua. The Abridgement of Logic by Ibn-Rushd, published at Riva di Trento in 1550, and reprinted several times, has remained as a classic with the Israelites up to a very recent date.

In the more elevated spheres of the Intellectual movement amongst the Jews, Averroistic peripatetism falls into profound discredit from the beginning of the 16th century. The Jewish theology that had slumbered to such an extent as to have allowed the hazardous doctrines of Lévi ben-Gerson pass without anathemas awakened with a start. Joseph Albo, Abraham Bibago, Isaac Abravanel defend creation, revelation and immortality against the philosophers. Rabbi Mosé Almosnino (about 1538) goes searching for arms against them in the arsenal of Gazzali, and writes a Commentary on the Destruction of Philosophers.⁽²⁾ The influence of Plato so opposed to Averroism and to scholastics is seen on the other hand in the *Dialogues of Love* of Léon Hebrew. The manner in which he explains the emanation of love and its propagation from sphere to sphere down to human intel-

(1). Wolf, I, p. 168, II, 107, Bartolucci, I, 182. Munk, Dict. des sc. phil. t. III, p. 366.

(2) Wolf, I, 806.—Holtinger, Bibl. Orient. p. 22—23.

ligence the trouble he takes to expose the different nuances which the theory of emanation had taken amongst the Arabs, and the points in which Averroes differs from the other philosophers of his race, prove that the works of the Commentator were well known to him.⁽²⁾ But how very remote is this amorous metaphysics, inspired by the Florentine school, from the form and the spirit of peripateticism! The philosophical rôle of the Jews so brilliant in the Middle Ages came to an end at the threshold of the modern Age. The illustrious men whom Judaism shall henceforth furnish to the history of philosophy, will draw their inspiration, not from the traditions of a national philosophy, but from the modern spirit itself. No doubt, even in the very best types of their character, Spinoza and Mendelssohn, the Jew is discernible. The first act of worship being the deepest, we always return, no matter what we may do and what transformations we may undergo, to the religion in which we first felt the Ideal. That Spinoza, as has been alleged, drew his system from a study of the Rabbins and of the Cabbala is surely saying too much.⁽¹⁾ But that he carried into his Cartesian speculations a reminiscence of his first studies: Nothing is more evident than that to any reader, however little initiated he might be in the history of Rabbinical philosophy of the Middle Ages. To investigate, if Averroes, can claim something in the system of the thinker of Amsterdam, would be to go beyond the limit where in questions regarding the filiation of philosophical systems, our just curiosity should make a halt. It would be like trying to trace the source of a stream when it has lost itself in the meadows.

(2) Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 522 et suiv.

(1). See the following two books by J. G. Wachter: *Der Spinozismus im Judenthum* (Amsterdam 1699, in 8°) and *Elucidarius Cabbalisticus* (Rome, 1706 in 8°) Foucher de Careil, *Refutation inédite de Spinoza par Leibnitz*, (Paris, 1854).

CHAPTER II.

Averroism in the scholastic philosophy.

I.

The introduction of Arabic texts in occidental studies divides the scientific and philosophical history of the Middle Ages into two perfectly distinct epochs. During the first epoch, the human mind in order to satisfy its curiosity has only the meagre *débris* of the teachings of the Roman schools, accumulated in the compilations of Martien Capella, of Bede, of Isidore, and in some technical treatises which their usual character saved from oblivion. During the second epoch, it is indeed, the ancient science which returns to the Occident, but more complete this time, in the Arabic commentaries or the original works of the Grecian science over which preference was given to abridgements by the Romans. Medicine reduced at first to Célius Aurelianus and to the compilation of Gariopontus finds again Galen and Hippocrates. Astronomy, limited to a few treatises of Hygin and of Bede, and to a few verses of Priscian, returns through Alfergan Thabet ben Corrah and Albumasar to the precision of ancient science. Arithmetic, limited during so many centuries to the simple methods of the *abacus* or the Pythagorean multiplication table and of indigitation was enriched by new methods. Philosophy, instead of a few fragments of the *Organon* and of the apocryphal Categories of Saint Augustine receives a complete body of Aristotelism, *i. e.*, an encyclopaedia of the ancient sciences. In general, the first works translated from the Arabic were not philosophical books. Medicine, mathematics and astronomy had excited the curiosity of Constantin l' Africain, of Garbert, of Adelard of Bath and of Plato of Tivoli before people ever dreamt of asking for philosophical teachings from such heretics as Alfarabi and Avicenne. The honour of this new enterprise which was to exercise such a decisive influence on the destinies of Europe belongs to Raymond, Archbishop for Toledo and the Grand Chancellor of Castille from 1130-1150. Raymond formed around himself a college of transla-

tors at whose head we find the archdiacre Dominique Gonsalve (son of Gonsalve). Jews, of whom the most well-known is Jean Avendeah or Jean of Seville worked under his orders. This first attempt was chiefly directed towards Avicenna. Gerard of Cremona and Alfred Morley added, a few years later on, different treatises of Alkindi and Alfarabi. In this way, from the first half of the 12th century, very important works on Arabian philosophy were known to the Latins.

One of the most singular phenomena of the literary history of the Middle Ages is the activity of intellectual commerce and the rapidity with which books used to spread from one end of Europe to the other. The philosophy of Abelard even when he was alive, had penetrated into the very interior of Italy. The French poetry of the *Trouveres* in less than a century, counted translations in German, Swedish, Norwegian, Icelandish, Flemish, Dutch, Bohemian, Italian and in Spanish. Such and such a work composed at Morocco or Cairo, was known in Paris or Cologne in less time than it is necessary in our days for an important work of Germany to go beyond the Rhine.

The Jews performed in these communications an essential rôle which has not been sufficiently appreciated in the history of civilisation. Their commercial activity and their facility to acquire languages made them natural intermediaries between Mahomedans and Christians.⁽²⁾ We must read the itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela, in order to understand the importance which the Jews had acquired on the Mediterranean littoral from Barcelona to Nice. The princes and lords who were in need of their money and of their medical advice favoured the Jews; only the common people had antipathy against them. As regards men, anxious to learn, they felt no scruples to make themselves in philosophy disciples of teachers who belonged to other religions. Science was something neutral and common to all. The relations of Europe with the Mahomedans took place on the one side through Spain and particularly through Toledo, and on the other side

(2). Dozy *Recherches* I, p. 478-479, note (1st edition).

ough Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples. The work of translation was carried out in these two places with equal ardour and by similar ways and means. Almost always a Jew, often a Mahomedan convert elaborated the work and applied a Latin or a vulgar word in the place of an Arabic word. A clerk presided at this work took charge of the Latinity and gave his name to the book. Sometimes, however, the name of the Jewish Secretary prevailed. Hence comes the fact, that the same translation is frequently attributed to different personages. In the 12th and 13th centuries, translations were always made directly from the Arabic. It was not till very much later on that people translated Arab philosophers from Hebrew versions.

The character of these translations is that of all the translations of the Middle Ages. "The Latin word hides the Arabic word just as pieces in a chess board suit their squares." The contexture of the phrase is rather Arabic than Latin. The majority of technical terms and the words which the translator did not understand are transcribed in the ugliest manner possible. The system of literal translations is found everywhere in the infancy of philosophy. People in the Middle Ages hardly imagined translation to be anything else but a superficial mechanism in which the translator, sheltering himself behind the obscurity of texts delegates to the reader the trouble of making out some sense. The literary history of the Middle Ages shall be complete only when we shall have, according to manuscripts, made statistics of the Arabic works which were read by the learned men of the 13th and the 14th centuries. It is, indeed, essential to observe, that the quotations which are made from an Arabic author by the writers of this epoch are no proofs, that they were made from a translation, since no scruples were made in quoting second-hand. For this reason, I am of opinion, that Avonpace and Abubacer (Ibn-Tofail) are quoted only from Averroes. Alkindi, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Costa ben-Luca and Maimonides were hardly read before the 13th century. In the 14th century, Avicenna and particularly Averroes take the place of all the rest; in the 15th at last, Averroes remains the only interpreter of Arabian philosophy.

II.

The first introducer of Averroes amongst the Latins appears to have been Michel Scot. It was an important event and a propitious moment in the fortunes of Aristotle, according to the statement of Roger Bacon, when in 1230 Michel Scot appeared with the new works of Aristotle and the learned commentaries, *cum expositoribus sapientibus*. What were the commentaries which till then were unknown to the Latins? The Manuscripts inform us. Michel Scot is expressly mentioned there as the translator of the following two works of Averroes:— (1) The controversy on *De Cælo and Mundo* (Heaven and Earth) (3) and (2) The commentary on the *Treatise on the Soul*. The first of these translations is dedicated to Etienne de Provins in the following terms: “Tibi, Stephane de provins hoc pus quod ego Michel Scotus dedi latinitati, exdictis Aristotelis specialiter commendo, et si aliquid Aristoteles incompletum dimisit de constitutione mundana in hoc libro, recipies ejus supplementum ex libro Alpetrangii, quem similiter dedi latinitati, et es in eo exercitatus.”

These are the only two commentaries which bear the name of Michel Scot in the manuscripts. But as almost always we find following them and in a certain order the commentaries on *Generation and Corruption*, on the *Meteors*, the paraphrase of *Parva Naturalia* and the *De Substantia Orbis*, we are justified to attribute equally the translation of these works to Michel Scot. In the manuscripts 943 of Sorbonne, and 75 of Navarre are found added to the translations quoted before the commentaries on the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. Do the translations of these works belong also to Michel Scot? We should be inclined to think so, because in a fragment of Michel discovered by Haureau and which we shall presently speak of the doctrine, the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* are very neatly explained. M. Jodain was, however, by no means justified to bring forward authorities; in his enumeration of the translations of Michel

(3) Sorbonne 932, 943; Saint Victor 171; Navarre 75; Bibl. Saint-Venise, cl. VI. cod. 52.

the catalogues given by Bale and Pits.⁽¹⁾ It is evident that these two authorities base their statements on the spoiling of a similar one appertaining to the Nos. 924 and 950 of Sorbonne, and that they had no other reasons to attribute to Michel Scot the translation of the commentaries on *Generation and Corruption* on the *Parva Naturalia*, on the *Meteors*, and on the book, *De Substantia Orbis* except those that we have ourselves. Their authority corresponds to no particular evidence, and all that we possess is a conjecture drawn from the composition of manuscripts. But as this composition was almost never arbitrary in the Middle Ages, we are authorised to regard the manuscripts where this dedication to Etienne de Provins is found as representing to us the same edition published by Michel Scott and those new texts which, according to the statement of Roger Bacon, he introduced in the scholastic philosophy in the year 1230.

This date indicates undoubtedly the moment when the works of Michel reached the knowledge of the English monk. It seems to be at least certain that William d'Auvergne and Alexandre de Halès have known before this time the works of the Commentator. An only translation of Michel Scott, that of Alpetrangi bears a certain date, and this date is the year, 1217. The translations of Averroes must have been carried out about the same epoch ; because Michel Scott does not appear to have remained at Toledo except a few years. Along with these translations he probably also composed the philosophical message (l'envoi) which Frederic II addressed to the Universities of Italy, with the famous circular which we read in the collection of Pierre de Vignes : "*Compitationes variae quae ab Aristotele abisque philosophis sub graecis arabicisque vocabulis antiquitus editae nostris aliquando sensibus occurrerunt.*" It was at Toledo, that Michel Scott finished his translations which gave him so much importance after his return from Spain, and led to his being so graciously received at the court of the Hohenstauffen. He had for his auxiliary in this work a Jew, called Andre. Roger Bacon in a moment of severity accuses him of plagiarism and rebukes him as being ignorant of the languages and the sciences which he borrows of in his writings. It is certain, that the Latins who in

(1) Bale, *Script. M. Maj. Brit.* p. 351 Pits, *De rebus angl.* p. 371 Nicéron, *Hist. des Français*, Bibl. medet. inflatint. V. p. 233.

those days undertook a trip to Toledo made no scruple of appropriating the works of their secretaries, and that in the Middle Ages, as in our own days, the name of the translator was often fiction and no more.

Michel Scott has, moreover, other claims to be regarded as the founder of Averroism, since M. Haureau⁽²⁾ has discovered in the No. 841 of Sorboane, certain extracts which seem to belong to one of his most important works which till now was only known by the severe criticism which Albert had written on it. "*Toleda dicta inveniuntur in libro illo qui dicitur Quaestiones Nicolai Peripatetici Consuevi dicere quod Nicolaus non fecit librum illum, sed Michael Scotus qui in rei veritate nescivit naturus, nec bene intellexit libros Aristotelis.*"

But the fragment exhumed by M. Haureau under this title: *Haec sunt extracta de libro Nicolai Peripatetici*, offers the most striking analogy to a digression of the commentary on the XII book of the *Metaphysics*—a digression which in the manuscripts often forms a separate little book (see p. 7) and whose first words are: *sermo de quaestionibus quas accepimus a Nicolas, et nos dicemus in his secundum nostrum posse.*

The doctrines that are explained there are, moreover, expressly accredited to Averroes:—"Omne coelum est circulare et omne circulare est perfectum; ergo omne coelum est perfectum; sed ullum perfectum indiget motu; ergo ullum coelum indiget motu. Partes autem sui quum videant bona quae non habent, perpendentes se indigere illis bonis, in motum prorumpunt, ut acquirant illa bona quae non habent.....Ergo salus nostra est per quietem; coeli finis autem per motum partium ejus: et hoc est quod dicit Averroes." Michel Scott in his role in the Court of Frederic where he represented the spirit of Arabian philosophy in such a strange manner, and by the diabolical acquaintances which the legends attributed to him really opened that series of evil thinkers who from the 13th century down to Vayini, disguised their unbelief under the mask of Averroes. Probably the harsh words of Roger Bacon and of Albert and the severe condemnations

(2) *De la philosophie scolastique*, t. Ier, p. 470 et suiv.

tion of Dante (Inf. Cant. XX, V, 115) expressed the reprobation to which public opinion had already condemned these suspicious incidents. We shall presently see how all this wicked spirit was a fruit of the Court of Hohenstauffen.

III.

Another translator of Averroes, Hermann l'Allemand⁽¹⁾ was like Michel Scott attached to the house of Hohenstauffen. In the XXV chapter of the *opere Pertriem* of which an analysis has been published by M. Cousin⁽²⁾, Roger Bacon has thus qualified him:—*Hermannus Alemannus et translator Manfredi nuper a D. rege Carlo deviciti*. In general, Hermann appears to have devoted himself to the most neglected texts of Aristotle, viz., the *Rhetoric*, the *Poetics*, the *Ethics* and the *Politics*, and as the Arab abridgements of these works were more widely spread and more accessible than the original texts of Aristotle, it was to these abridgements, that Hermann addressed himself by preference. In this manner, as a substitute for Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, he translated the glosses of Alfarabi on this work, and as a substitute for the *Poetics* the abridgement of Averroes.⁽³⁾ Having tried "says he" to put my hand to the translation of the *Poetics*, I found so many difficulties on account of the difference in metres between Greek and Arabic, that I despaired of bringing it to an end. I, therefore, took the edition of Averroes, in which the author has put in all that he found intelligible, and I have rendered it into Latin as well as I could." These two translations are dated Toledo, 7th March, 1256. M. Jourdain has not ventured to decide if it is a question of the vulgar era or of the Spanish era. But the statement of Roger Bacon who tells us, that Hermann was in the service of Manfred, leaves no doubt whatever in this respect. In his prologue to Alfarabi's glosses, Hermann informs us, that he had also translated the *Ethics* from an Arabic abridgement, but that his work had been rendered useless by the translation of Robert Grosse-l'ete, made from the Greek. This Arabic abridgement was nothing but the medium

(1). Jourdain, *Recherches*, chap. III, S. II.

(2). *Journal des savants*, 1848, p. 299, 348.

(3). Sorb. 1799, 1782. Bibl. Chigi, in Rome.

commentary of Averroes. The Laurentian library possesses a manuscript of this translation and we can read it in all the printed edition of the works of the Commentator. In a final note, Hermann informs us, that he finished this work in the chapel of the Holy Trinity of Toledo, on the third Thursday of June, 1240. We can justly entertain doubts about the correctness of this date. We recollect, in fact, that the version of the *Poetics* is of 1256. That Hermann should remain 16 years in Toledo and make only one or two translations, seems difficult to believe.

The Imperial Library possesses under the Nos. 1771 of Sorbonne and 610 of Saint-Germain a short abridgement of the six books of the *Ethics* on the top of which we read:—*Incipit summa quorundam Alexandrinorum, quam excerpserunt ex libro Aristoteles nominato Nicomachia, quam plures hominum Ethicam nominaverunt. Et transtulit eam ex arabico in latinum Hermannus Alemannus.*

This abridgement is quite distinct from the medium commentary of Averroes. Probably it represents to us the *Abridgement* of Averroes which has not come down to us. Bandini and M. Jourdain have got into some errors with regard to these translations of Hermann. Bandini, without perceiving that the text of the manuscript of Florence was that of the medium commentary of Averroes, published as inedited and under the name of Hermann the epilogue which Averroes had placed immediately after this commentary. M. Jourdain reproduced this error and epilogue of Bandini. In the second edition of his book, the epilogue was restored to Averroes; but however strange it might seem to the new editor to have seen an epilogue of Averroes thus separated from the rest of his commentary, he did not seem to realise, that the text which terminated this epilogue was the often-published commentary of Averroes. That of which we should have a right to be more surprised in a work generally conscientious are the errors of M. Jourdain with reference to the manuscripts of the Imperial Library. In the first place, M. Jourdain regards as identical the versions of the *Ethics* known under the Nos. 1771, 1773, 1780 of Sorbonne. But the short abridgement contained in the No. 1771 which alone bears the name of Hermann.

(2) Bandini, *catal codd Latin Bibl. Lauren.*, t. III, p. 178.

has absolutely no resemblance to the complete versions of the Nos. 1773, 1780. Moreover, it was enough to compare the first lines of these different manuscripts with the *incipit* given by Bandini to find out :—(1) That the manuscripts of Florence which bears the name of Hermann does not resemble any of the manuscripts of Paris; (2) That the two manuscripts of Florence, described by Bandini, the one, vol. III, p. 178, and the other, vol. III, p. 405, are by no means identical; that only the first bears the name of Hermann that the second is similar to Nos. 1773, 1780 of Sorbonne; and that consequently the date 1243, given by the second, and which, moreover, is in contradiction with the date 1240 given by the first, does not apply to the translation of Hermann. In this manner, instead of five manuscripts of this translation as M. Jourdain supposes, we find only one which is the manuscript of the Laurentian library, described by Bandini, vol. III, p. 178.

Hermann acknowledges himself, in the preface to Alfarabi's glosses that he had only a very feeble share in the work of his translations. Roger Bacon who in his *opus Majus* and in his *opus Tertium* frequently criticises Hermann's translations with great liveliness, has got hold in *opus Majus* p. 21, 46, 59. Of this passage :—“ *Hermanus* ” says he “ *confessus est si majis adiutorem fuisse translationum quam translatorum quia Saracenicis tenuit secum in Hispania qui fuerunt in suis translationibus principales.* ”⁽¹⁾ Several indices testify, that Hermann employed for his work Mahomedans versed in the knowledge of the learned tongue. In this way, the *nunnation* and the casual verbal terminations are scrupulously observed in the transcription of proper names : *Ibn-Arredin, Aby-Nasrin, Abubekrin, Ducadatin, Sceifa addaulati, Abi-taibi, Alkamaitu.*⁽²⁾ Besides, the style only gains in barbarism : Here is a sample : “ *Inuarikin terra al kanarnihy, stediei et baraki et castrum munitum destendedyn descenderunt adenkirati ubi descendit super eos aqua Eupratis veniens de Euetin.* ”

After that, we understand why Roger Bacon held Hermann's translations to be unintelligible and unsuitable.

⁽¹⁾ *Opus tertium*, p. 5.

⁽²⁾ *Opus tertium*, Vol. 55, 61 Vol., etc.

In this manner, about the middle of the 13th century, almost all the important works of Averroes had been translated from Arabic into Latin. Only the commentaries on the *Organ* and the *Destruction of the Destruction* do not seem to have been known to the Christian philosophers of the Middle Ages. It is true, there existed an ancient Latin version of this last work, made in 1328 by the Jew Calouyme, son of Calonyme, son of Meir, but this translation appears to have been little read.⁽²⁾ I don't think, that it is possible to make a single quotation from the *Destruction* before the 16th century.

With reference to the medical works of Averroes, they were generally known only after his philosophical works. Of all the physicians of the 13th century, who have been mentioned by M. Littre in the XXI volume of "L'Histoire litteraire de la France," Gilbert Anglais about (1250) is the only one who quotes Averroes,⁽³⁾ and it is just probable, that he knew him also from his philosophical works. Spurger is of opinion, that Gilbert has borrowed from Averroes his theory of the heart as being the source of life.⁽⁴⁾ But this theory is not so peculiar to Averroes that we must necessarily believe that Gilbert had read *Colliget*, i. e., the *Kulliyat* of Averroes. Gerard de Berry, Ganthier Alebrand de France who cite all the other Arabs, do not speak of Averroes.⁽¹⁾ We have no information about the translation of the *Colliget*. The manuscript of the Arsenal (Sciences and Arts, 61) bears this: *Translatus de Arabico in Latinum i.e., translated from Arabic into Latin*. The Arabic words preserved in the text and a crowd of other peculiarities, besides, incontestably establish, that this version was made from Arabic and not from Hebrew. We could probably carry it back to the middle of the 13th century. The treatise: *De formatione Corporis humani* by Gilles de Rome (Paris, 1515) consists to a great extent only of extracts from the *Colliget*. It is, however, remarkable, that the *Colliget* is never quoted in the *Conciliator* of Pierre d'Abano, written in 1303, where quotations from the commentaries of Averroes abound in every page.

(1). Hist. litt. t. XXI, r. 405, 413, 416.

(2). Steinschneider, Catal, p. 50-51. Gosche. *Gazzali*, p. 268.

(3). Hist. litt. t. XXI, p. 399.

(4). Sprenger, Hist. de la medicine, t. II. p. 453.

In 1284, Arnangand, son of Blaise physician of Montpellier translated or rather got translated from Arabic the commentary on the medical poem of Avicenne. Raymond Martini had already quoted this work under its Arabic title in the *Pugio fidzi*,⁽¹⁾ but Raymond had often direct information on works written in Arabic and in Hebrew. An old translation of the treatise on the *Theriague* is found in the manuscript of the Arsenal (sciences and Arts, 61). The *Canones de medicinis laxaticis* were translated from Hebrew in 1304 as we learn from the following note which I quote from No. 6949 (anc. fonds.) “*Expliciunt articuli generales proficientes in medicinis laxaticis magni Abolys, id est Averrois, translati ex hebraes in latinum per magistrum Johannem de Planis de Monte Regali Albiensis diocesis, apud Tholosam anno Domini M.^oC.C.C.^o III^o; interprete magistro Magnotunc temporis judaeo et posteo dicto Johanne, converso in Christianum, in expulsione Judaeorum a regno Franciae.*” The translation of the medical works of Averroes is therefore, to a great extent the work of the Montpellier School. The work was done as usual through the intermediary of the Jews. Numerous facts establish the relations which Montpellier had with the Saracens of Spain, the importance which the Jews had acquired there, and the share that they had in the splendour of this great School.⁽³⁾

The abridgement of the *Almageste* was not known to the Latins. M. Littre⁽¹⁾ has pointed out important quotations from Averroes in the treatise on Astronomy by Bernard de Verdun (about 1300), particularly that which relates to the theory of epicycles. But these subjects are frequently treated in the philosophical commentaries, especially in the XI, and XII books of the *Metaphysics*.

IV.

We have determined in an approximate way the epoch when the Latin translations of Averroes were made. It is much more difficult to fix the moment when the influence of these new texts

(1) P. 159 (Paris, 1651); Steinschneider, p. 317 note.

(2) Jourdain, *Recherches*, p. 91—92.

(3) *Hist. Litt. de la France*, t. XXII., p. 318—319.

begins to make itself felt on the doctrines and teachings of the Middle Ages. Pierre de Blois, continuator of the chronicles of Ingulph, explaining the programme followed in the School of Cambridge about the year 1109, expresses himself thus: *horum vero primam. F. Terricus acutissimus sophista, logicam Aristotelis juxta Porphyru et Averroes isagogas et commenta adolescentioribus tradibat.* Launoy du Boulay, l'Histoire littéraire de la France have copied this passage without remarking the apparent interpolation it contains. Averroes was not born in 1109! The abbey Lehent⁽¹⁾ adding blunders after blunders has tried to make out that at Orleans as well as at Cambridge, the dialogues of Aristotles after Porphyry and Averroes were taught in the 11th century, and that Jean de Salisbury had them transcribed in Normandy, under the auspices of Richard Lévêque, archdeacon of Contances. Leboeuf has mixed up with the passage of Pierre de Blois a letter of Jean de Salisbury, in which he mands, in fact, from Richard the works of Aristotles, but where, evidently, there is no question of Averroes.⁽²⁾

The first manifest appearance of Arabian philosophy in the bosom of the scholastics took place in the Council of Paris in 1209. The Council, after having condemned Amaury de Béne, David de Dinant and their disciples, adds: *Nec libri Aristotelis de naturalis philosophia, nec Commenta legantur Parisiis publice vel secreto*⁽¹⁾ Certainly, we might be induced to regard these *Commenta* as *Commentaries par excellence*, the only ones to which properly speaking this name was given in the Middle Ages, i.e. those of Averroes. Mansi, M. Jourdain and M. Hauréau have also adopted this opinion.⁽²⁾

It is not impossible, we must admit, that the Commentaries of Averroes were translated and studied 10 years after the decease of their author. Nevertheless, as Michel Scott about the year 1217, seems to have been the first introducer of the new

(1) Dissertation sur l'état des sciences en France depuis la mort du roi Robert, p. 78.

(2) Jourdain, p. 253.

(1) Apud Martene, Thes. Novus, Anecd. t. IV, p. 166.

(2) Mansi, add. Ann. eccl. Baronii, t. I. p. 289.

It is difficult to believe, that Averroes could have suffered from the condemnation of the Council of 1209. Besides, it is necessary to observe, that the translation of Averroes is more than half-a-century later than that of the first texts of Arabian philosophy and that consequently the texts translated by Dominique Gondisalvi must have been adopted in studies before those which till then had neither recommendation nor celebrity. That which rests indubitable is, that the Council of 1209 condemned the Arabian Aristotle, translated from the Arabic and explained by the Arabs.

The statute of Robert de Courcon in 1215 is a little more explicit:—*Non logantur libri Aristotelis de metaphysica et naturali philosophia, nec summa de usdem, aut de doctrina Magistri David de Dinant aut Almarici hoeretici aut Mauriti, Hispani.*⁽¹⁾ The expression *summa de usdem* would very well suit the abridgements of Avicenne. But who is this *Maurice Epagnol* whose doctrine closely resembles the pantheism of David and Amaury? When we have seen in the manuscripts the name of Averroes so strangely disfigured as to become on the one hand *Mahuntius* (anc. fonds, No. 7052), *Menbutius* (anc. fonds, 6949), *Maunicius* (Arsenal, sc. et ars. 61), and on the other *Avenryz*, *Benriz*, *Beuritz*, &c., we should find no difficulty in believing, that it might have become also *Mauritius*. This is, however, only a conjecture to which we should not attach too much probability. The bull of Gregory IX, of 1231, only renews with less precision once more the condemnations of 1209 and 1215.

That which is remarkable in all these condemnations, is that the cause of Arabian Aristotelism is always identified there with that of Amaury de Bene and of David de Dinant. The oft-quoted passage of William le Breton, continuator of Rigord,⁽¹⁾ that of Hagues, continuator of Robert d' Auxerre, quoted by Launoy supposes the same affinity. Must we really suppose any Arab influence in the apparition of the heterodox sects which agitated the School of Paris in the last years of the 12th

(1). Du Boulay, *Hist. Univers. Paris*, t. III, p. 82. Launoy *De variet. Aris. fortuna in Acad. Paris*, Cap. IV.

(1). Apud dom Bouquet, t. XVII, p. 84.

century and the first years of the 13th? We can find an analogy between the realism of Amaury and that of Avicbron. The doctrine of David de Dinant on primeval matter devoid of form, serving as a common *substratum* for all things is verily that of Arabian peripatetism. We might almost believe, that these two sectaries had in their hands the book, *De Causis*, already known to Alain de Lille.⁽³⁾ For all that, Amaury and David seem to me to be only an altered reflexion of the heterodox sects comprised under the name *Cathares* or *Albigensis*. Some of their doctrines have a striking resemblance to those of the heretics of Orleans of 1022 whom M. C. Schmidt trace, without hesitation, to the Cathare church;⁽⁵⁾ others are nothing but pure Joachism; others again have their origin evidently from Scot Erigena.⁽⁶⁾ The identity of the whole Human Race in God, the Holy Ghost incarnating Himself in every one of us as the Son was incarnated in Mary, God as the material principle of all things : what could be more similar to the theories of the Scotch thinker? Here we have assuredly more than is required to dispense with the necessity of seeking amongst the Arabs the antecedents of Amaury and of David, especially if we give to Amaury that share of his own originality which he deserves. Moreover, Realism, in affirming that the individuals of one same species share in one single Essence, and that Intellect in general really exists anticipated the Averroistic theory of universal Reason and of the unity of souls. Abelard perceived this result and he opposed it in his *Petites Gloses on Porphyry* with the same argument which was subsequently urged against Averroes.⁽¹⁾ Gilbert de la Porree expressly denied human personality. The illustration which the Realists chose most willingly to explain how one *Essence* could be common to several individuals was that of the soul. It is in Alexandre Hale's that we should search for the first entirely manifest traces of Arabian influence. Avicenne and Algazel are frequently quoted in his *Somme* as philosophical authorities. Averroes appears there only in a vague manner little characteristic of himself. Moreover, it is well known, that this vast com-

(3). Jourdain, p. 196—197.

(5). *Histoire des Cathares ou Albigeois*, t. I. p. 23; t. II, p. 151, 287.

(6). Saint Rene Taillaudier, *Scot Erigene*, p. 236.

(1). Remusat Abelard, t. II, p. 98.

dates from the declining years of Alexandre's life (from 1241 to 1245) and that it was not finished till, towards 1252, after his death⁽¹⁾ Alexandre consequently could have read Averroes only when he was already old, and this reading does not seem to have had any influence on his doctrines. The questions relative to Intellect do not in his writing even go beyond the terms of Aristotle.⁽²⁾ The Arab influence is also very perceptible in Robert de Lincoln. Roger Bacon quotes him as one of the masters whom he heard profess the theory of separate Intellect in Man⁽³⁾; but no more than Alexandre de Hale's does Robert seem to have known Averroes in the period of his first philosophical activity.

V.

William d' Auvergne is the first of the scholastics at whose place we find doctrines which might bear the name of Averroes. I have found the name of the Commentator only once in his works; but Averroism is refuted there in each page, sometimes under the name of Aristotle and sometimes under very vague titles such as *Expositores, sequaces Aristotelis, Aristoteles et sequaces ejus graeci et arabes, qui famosiores fuerunt Arabum in disciplinis Aristotelis, Avicenna et alii qui in parte ista Aristoteli consenserunt*. William always places in the same Category the Greek and Arab commentators. In general, the 13th century regarded the Arabs as ancient philosophers, *philosophi antiqui* in contradistinction to the *philosophie latine* or scholastic philosophers. The simplest notions of chronology were misunderstood in such a manner that people did not seem to know who had lived before the other: Alexandre d' Aphrodisias or Averroes? Averroes, at the epoch of Guillaume d' Auvergne, had not yet become the representative of the dangerous doctrines of Arab petipatetism; but these doctrines were then perfectly known to the Latins and counted many partisans. While Aristotle is opposed with vigour, and while Avicenne is treated as a blasphemer, Averroes is quoted by Guillaume d' Auvergne as a

(1) *Hist. litt. de la France*, t. XVIII, p. 316, 318.

(2) *Summa theol.* pars. II, qnaest, 69, art 3, p. 116 V et sqq.

(3) *Fragments of l'opus tertium* translated by M. Cousin in *Journal des Savants*, 1847-1848.

very noble philosopher, although people were already making an abuse of his name and his thoughtless disciples were denaturalising his views. "Debes autem" says he, "circumspectus esse in disputands cum hominibus, qui philosophi habere volunt, et neo ipsa rudimenta philosophiae adhuc apprehenderunt. De rudimentis enim philosophiae est procul dubio ratio materiae et ratio formae, et cum ipsa ratio materiae posita sit ab Averroe, philosopho nobilissimo expediret ut intentiones ejuse et aliorum qui tanquam duces philosophiae sequendi et imitandi sunt hujus modi hominee qui de rebus philosophicis tam inconsiderate loqui praesumunt, apprehendissent prius ad certum et liquidum."⁽¹⁾ The *De Universo* seems to offer another quotation from Averroes; but the incertitude and the contradiction which we notice there prove how little the philosophical individuality of the commentator was yet grasped by the spirit of the scholastics. At the page 713 (opp. t. I) of the *De Universo* Guillaume quotes a passage of the commentary of Abubacer on the *Physics*. A little further on (p. 801), the same passage is found again as drawn from the commentary of Abumasar. But neither Abubacer (Ibn-Tofail) nor Abumasar has ever composed any commentary on the *Physics*. Abubacer was, besides, known to the scholastics only by quotations made by Averroes. It is, therefore, very probable that the passage quoted by Guillaume belongs to the commentary of Averroes himself.

Besides, nothing more is wanting in the writings of Guillaume than the name of Averroes, in order that Guillaume might be regarded as the first and the most ardent adversary of Averroism. The theory of the first Intelligence, created immediately by God, and which is the Creatrix of the universe is, vigorously refuted under the name of Algazali: The wisdom born of God, the *Logos teleios*: that's the veritable first Intelligence which neither the Arabs knew, nor the Jews ever since they became the disciples of the Arabs, but which was adored by Plato, by Mercury, Trismegiste, and the theologian Avicbron, whom Guillaume for this very reason makes out to be a Christian. The eternity of the world is

(1) De Univ. opp. t. t, p. 851.

a damnable error of Aristotles and of Avicenna. For a moment, it seems to be attributed to *Abubacer Sarracensus*, but evidently Guillaume did not perceive whom did he hit under that name.

Nor is Averroes more mentioned in the long argumentation of Guillaume against the Averroistic theory *par excellence*, viz., *The Unity of Intellect*. All this polemics is directed against Aristotle or against his anonymous disciples. "Debes scire quia eousque excaecati sunt, et eusque intellectu deficientes ut crederunt unam animam mundi numero quicquid in mundo est animatum animare nec aliud esse secundum essentiam et veritatem animam Socrates quam animam Platonis sed aliam animam et hoc ex alietate animationes et animati. "De intelligentiarum numero," says he elsewhere, "Aristotles non tam errasse quam etiam insanissime de lirasse vedebitur evidenter."

In the following page, the same doctrine is attributed to Aristotle, Alfarabi and others; a little further on, to Alfarabi, Avicenne and to those who have in this respect embraced the opinion of Aristotle; elsewhere it is said, that Aristotle has imagined this doctrine to escape from the archetypai or ideal world of Plato. It is, therefore, really Aristotle who, in the thinking of William, is responsible for the monstrous doctrine of *the Unity of Intellect*. Nevertheless, he exposes this doctrine with all the particular details which Averroes has added to it, and of which we find no trace in the *Treatise on the Soul*. This active Intelligence is the last in nobleness of earthly intelligences; the happiness of the soul is in her union with it; all the separate souls of the different bodies are identical and make only a single Soul; souls differ only by their bodies; the only difference of accidents makes the numerical distinction." The arguments which Guillaume opposes to this doctrine are those which Albert, Saint Thomas and all the adversaries of Averroes shall subsequently repeat to satiety. It destroys personality, it leads to *imarmene* to fatalism; it renders the progress and the difference of individual intelligence inexplicable. There are, no doubt, general laws of Truth that are binding on all minds, but these principles have no substantial reality outside the mind. By a singular inconsistency,

Guillaume, in his treatise on *De Anima*, established the sovereign Truth, illuminating all men and Roger Bacon is able to invoke his testimony against those who pretend, that the active Intellect forms a portion of the individual soul.⁽³⁾ But Guillaume is a timid and superficial spirit. All that resembles the pantheism of Amaury frightens him. Providence, liberty, creation, spirituality of the spirit, and immortality are always understood by him in their narrowest possible sense.

Not merely the doctrines of Averroes were, at the epoch of Guillaume, introduced into the scholastics; it appears, that the blasphemies which later on were associated with his name began also to manifest themselves. In his treatise on *the Immortality of the Soul*, Guillaume informs us, that this dogma has met with more than one sceptic. Discontented and ill-adjusted spirits of the times pretended, that it was nothing but an invention of princes to keep their subjects in hand. The 16th century had no wicked thoughts to show about which the 13th had not had already before it.

VI.

Although Averroes plays in the writings of Albert le grand a more characteristic *role* than in those of Guillaume d'Auvergne, he has not yet reached the predominant position which he is to occupy during the second age of the scholastics. Avicenne is the great teacher of Albert. The form of his commentary is that of Avicenne; Avicenne is quoted at every page of his writings and at times quoted only to be rebuked for having ventured to contradict his master Albert, however, appears to have had in his hands all the commentaries of Averroes which the Middle Ages knew except those of the *Poetics* and perhaps of the *Ethics* which were translated rather late by Hermann. We can believe that the Commentaries on the *Metaphysics* was equally wanting to him. In fact we find only a very few quotations from Averroes in his *Metaphysics*. But Albert had the habit of melting into his text, all that happened to fall into his hands. It must be, that the doctrine of the *Unity of Intellect* had already acquired great importance.

(3) *Opus tert* (*Journal des Savants*, 1848, p. 346, Art. Conain.)

round it a great number of partisans in order that Albert, not satisfied with having opposed it on diverse occasions should feel himself bound to devote a special treatise⁽²⁾ which he himself subsequently inserted almost textually in his *Somme*⁽³⁾. He informs us himself, that it was at Rome and by order of the Pope Alexandre IV (about 1255) that he composed it. The distinction between theology and philosophy acknowledged as two contradictory authorities—a distinction that has characterised Averroism at all the epochs was already in vogue; and Albert condescending to notice it, forces himself to solve the problem entirely by syllogisms, by making an abstraction of every revealed authority. *Thirty* arguments are brought forward in favour of those who think, that of all human souls, there remains only one Soul after death. With a scruple and an impartiality entirely worthy of high praise, Albert enumerates all the *thirty* arguments one after the other. He pushes his good nature so far as even to imagine proofs in support of the theory he opposes and to offer to the weapons of his adversaries a force which they did not possess in their own writings. But *thirty-six* arguments not less strong uphold the opposite doctrine;—hence the solution is clear enough: individual immortality has a majority of six arguments! It appears, however, that Averroism did not consider itself beaten by this arithmetic. We shall meet the old athelete under arms again when we shall have occasion to expose the fights of Averroism in the University of Paris, about the year 1209.

In his small work, *De natura et origin Animæ* and in his commentary on the IIIrd book of the Soul (tr. II. Chap. VII), Albert returns again to this controversy and treats his adversaries with greater severity. The theory of separate Intellect, illuminating Man by irradiation, anterior to the individual and surviving the individual now appears to him as an absurd and detestable error. Intellect being the form of the Man, if several individuals share in the same Intellect, it would follow, that several individuals of

(2) *De Unitate intellectus Contra Averroistas*, cpp. t. V, p. 218.

(3) II, pars, trans XIII, quaest. 77, memb. 3. (opp. t. XVIII.)

the same species would share in the same form, i. e., in the principle of individuality which is absurd. The active Intellect is, therefore, not distinct *from the soul*, and we cannot separate it except by abstraction. Reason, however, is universal, and Albert lifts himself with energy against *the Latin philosophers, i. e.,* against his scholastic contemporaries who, by exaggerating the principle of individuality went so far as to admit the existence of as many understandings as there are intelligent beings.

We must confess, that the doctrine of Albert does not always offer that firmness which later on shall characterise the Dominican school. Sometimes the Arab doctrines surprise his authority. His doctrine of creation is unsteady; the intellect appears sometimes as the source whence intelligences emanate⁽¹⁾; the influence of superior beings on human intelligence is expressly admitted. In the small works grouped in the XXI, volume of his works and which hardly belong to his school, Arabian philosophy invades on all sides. In the bosom of the active Intellect, the intelligent and the intelligible are identical. In the passive Intellect, on the contrary, this identity takes place when the intelligent thinks on himself. The agent draws the species from matter makes them simple and general; thus prepared, the species move and inform the possible Intellect. The intellectual agent unites itself to the possible as light to transparency, and elevates it to the dignity of speculative Intellect. The speculative Intellect in its turn serves as a step to the soul to raise herself to the region of the acquired Intellect. This last goal is reached when the possible Intellect has received all the intelligibles, and has indissolubly attached itself to the active Intellect. Man then becomes perfect and in a certain way similar to God. In this condition the Intellect acts divinely and becomes capable of knowing everything which is the highest contemplative felicity. Although this strange treatise from which I have quoted this passage is far from representing the thoughts of Albert, it proves at least how much the language as well as the most hazardous doctrines of the Arabs had penetrated into the Albert School.

(1) Ritter, *Geschichte der Christ. Phil. IV, part, p. 199, 254.*

VII.

Saint Thomas is both the most serious adversary the Averroistic doctrine has ever encountered as well as, we might say so without contradiction, the first disciple of the great commentator. Albert owes everything to Avicenne; Saint Thomas as a philosopher, owes almost everything to Averroes. The most important thing he has borrowed from Averroes is, undoubtedly, the very form of his philosophical writings.

We must remember, that Averroes is certainly the creator of the form of the Grand Commentary. Avicenne and Albert, his imitator composed treatises under the same titles and on the same subjects as Aristotle, but without distinguishing their glosses from the texts of the philosopher. Averroes and Saint Thomas, on the contrary, take the text of Aristotle sentence by sentence, and make each phrase of it submit to the most patient exegesis. One single commentary of Albert, that on the *Politics* is composed after the method of Averroes and Saint Thomas, but we have the best of reasons to contest his claim for this work. We must at least acknowledge, that if this commentary is by Albert he must have composed it after the others, and after having seen those of Saint Thomas.

Albert is a paraphrasist; Saint Thomas, on the contrary, is a commentator. That's what Tolomé de Lucques meant to say when he told us, that under the pontificate of Urban IV, Saint Thomas wrote commentaries in Rome, the philosophy of Aristotle, *quodam singulari et novo modo tradendi*.⁽¹⁾ From whom did Saint Thomas learn this new manner of commenting that was unknown before him? I do not hesitate to say: he learnt it from Averroes, the Commentator, *par excellence*. In this way, the double rôle of Averroes amongst scholastic philosophers is already perfectly characterised in Saint Thomas. He is, on one side, the great interpreter of Aristotle, respected and authorised as a master, and on the other, he is the founder of damnable doctrines, the representative of materialism and of impiety, that is to say, a heresi-

arch William of Toco, author of the legends of Saint Thomas, enumerating the heresies overcome by his master, gives the first place "to that, of Averroes who taught that there existed but one Intellect an error subversive of the merits of saints, since there would then be no difference between men." (2) We shall presently see the triumph of the angelic Doctor (Saint Thomas) over the infidel become, under Dominican inspiration, the favourite subject of the schools of painting of Pisa and of Florence.

Saint Thomas, like Guillaume d'Auvergne and like Albert but with greater elevation than the first, and with greater decision than the second, directs all the efforts of his polemics against the heterodox propositions of Arab peripatetism; the primeval and indeterminate matter, the hierarchy of the first principles, the intermediate rôle of the first Intelligence created and creatrix both at the same time the denial of Providence, and above all, the impossibility of creation. The commentary of the VIIIth book of *the Physics* is almost entirely devoted to the refutation of the commentary of Averroes. To this argument which he imputes to the Arab philosopher and which, as a matter of fact very well resumes his thought: namely, *Fieri est mutari; atqui mutari nequit nisi subiectum aliquod; ergo fieri nequit nisi subiectum*, he replies by denying the major premise. The universal production of beings by God is neither a movement nor a change but a sort of emanation. Aristotle does not hurt our religious faith by deciding that every motion has the need of a mobile subject or agent; that is true in the actual state of the Universe. The ancient philosophers who considered only particular changes and multiple phenomena could not regard the notion of *Becoming* (as opposed to *Being*) except as an alteration of a pre-existing subject. But Plato and Aristotle who had arrived at a knowledge of the first principles, were capable of conceiving in the Universe something else than movement and mentioned; since beyond the action and re-action of secondary causes, they perceived the Unity of the first Cause. No doubt, Aristotle has seriously erred in holding the eternity of Time and the eternity of Motion; but nothing

(2) Bolland. Acta. S. S. Martini, I, p. 666.—Oudin, Descript. eccl. Gallie, p. 271.

authorised Averroes to conclude from such principles the impossibility of creation *ex nihilo*. It is chiefly against the theory of the Unity of Intellect, that Saint Thomas displays all the resources of his dialectics. Not being satisfied with returning incessantly, to this subject in his *somme theologique*, in *the somme contre les gentils*, in his commentary on the *Treatise on the Soul*, in the *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, he has composed on this subject one of his most important minor works, *De Unitate intellectus adversus Averroistas*. We shall try to find out later on who are the adversaries whom Saint Thomas has in view in this treatise. But the form of his polemics sufficiently reveals to us, that he directs it against an organised school, pretending to represent the real spirit of peripatetism against *Latin philosophers*, that is to say, against orthodox scholastics, and attaching themselves to Averroes as the highest authority, even superior to the authority of religious faith. Saint Thomas gets indignant to see Christians thus make themselves disciples of an infidel, and to prefer to the authority of all the other philosophers that of a man who deserves less the title of a peripatetic than that of a corrupter of the peripatetic philosophy. He, therefore, tries to refute, not by the authority of the Latins which does not, says he, suit everybody, but by philosophical arguments borrowed from the Greeks and the Arabs. Neither Aristotle, nor Alexandre d' Aphrodisias, nor Avicenne, not even Theophraste and Themistius whose thoughts were altered by Averroes, ever dreamt of the strange doctrine of the Unity of Intellect. All have regarded the Intellect as individual and as peculiar to every Man. And without that, what would be left there of human personality? Would not the intellectual faculty be destroyed, because man would not be intelligent except at the moment when his intelligence was put into action?

For Averroes the principle of individuation is the form; for Saint Thomas, it is the matter. If the individuation comes from the form (form being the same thing with all the beings of the same species), realism and Averroism win the case. Albert had already proposed to transfer to matter the principle of individua-

tion. But Saint Thomas was the first to make the distinction on this point.⁽¹⁾ The same form suits several, but matter suits only to one. Therefore, it is matter that makes the difference between beings; not the indeterminate matter which is the same in several, but the delimited matter, the individual quantity. Such is at least the explanation given to the thoughts of Saint Thomas by Gilles de Rome, and which have remained traditional in the school of Saint Thomas. No doubt, the reasoning of Saint Thomas is without any reply when he defends human personality against the Averroists.⁽²⁾ Reason says: *I*, as the other faculties; and every system which cannot explain individuation and consequently the multiplicity of reason as considered in the subject betrays by that very act its insufficiency. But the school of Saint Thomas fell into an exaggeration equally as dangerous by attributing to matter the power to determine the individual. In the eyes of a more complete philosophy and in the eyes of Aristotle himself, individuality is the result of a union between matter and form: a being is created at the hour when the indefinite substance enters into one of the thousand possible forms, and becomes by this determination susceptible of a name. The orthodox school never replied in a satisfactory manner to this objection of the Averroists: if there be an intellect for every man, there must, therefore, be several intellects; there is a certain fixed number of intellects, neither more nor less. The hypothesis of the scholastics on the origin of the soul: *creando infunditur, infundendo creatur* authorised this subtlety. If, at a given moment, about the fortieth day after the conception, as they said, God creates a soul to inform the body, souls must be created incessantly; the number of souls must, therefore, indefinitely increase. Such difficulties were the consequences of a system which regarded man as a binary compound of two substances. It was necessary to have the notion of a human unity more explicit than what the Middle Ages had, in order to be able to see that our conscience is formed, as everything else, without

(1). Vide, opusculum, XXIX, *De principio individuationis*; Summa contra gentes, I, II, cap. 78 sqq.

(2) Jourdain, op. cit. II, p. 98 et suite.

by a regular development of the Divine laws of nature. Can we not reproach Saint Thomas, by an exaggerated reaction against Saint Thomas, as having attacked the infinite and universal character of Reason! After having admitted that Man shares in the active Intellect, as in an external illumination, he puts the question, if this Intellect is the same for all.⁽¹⁾ And in order, that there remains no ambiguity about the gravity of the question concerned, let us hear the argument which he lends to his adversaries and which he tries to answer in the following manner: "*Omnes homines conveniunt in primis conceptionibus intellectus; his autem assentiunt per intellectum agentem. Ergo conveniunt omnes in uno intellectu agente.*" Well! he answers negatively to this question so neatly put, and by an argument which must surprise us: "*Intellectus agens est sicut lumen. Non autem est idem lumen in diversis illuminatis. Ergo non est idem intellectus agens.*" It does not, however, appear, that Saint Thomas perceived the grave consequences of such a solution. Because, putting this question to himself: "*Utrum homo possit alium docere?*" he criticises the opinions of Averroes with the most perfect justice. No doubt, says he, if we regard only the unity of the object, knowledge is the same in both the master and the disciple; but the subject fact of knowledge is diversified according to the subjects.

Saint Thomas does not show himself less opposed to Averroes on the question of the union with the active Intellect, and of the perception of separate substances. "Averroes" says he, "supposes, that at the end of this life, man is able to comprehend separate substances by his union with the active Intellect which being separate naturally perceives the separate substances; in such a manner, that united with us, it makes us understand in the same way as potential Intellect, by uniting with us, makes us understand material things."

This union with the active Intellect is effected by the perception of the intelligibles. The more we perceive the intelligibles, the more we approximate this union. If we reach the

perception of all the intelligibles, the union is perfect, and thereby means of the active Intellect, we come to know all the material and the immaterial things which is the highest felicity." (1)

To this theory of Averroes Saint Thomas opposes the peripatetic principle :—

We comprehend nothing without images ; but the separate substances cannot be comprehended by any corporal image. Can we at least arrive at the highest knowledge by successive abstractions as Avempace has supposed, after subtilising more and more the data of our sensations ? Not even then ; because, the image however purified it might be, could never serve to represent a separate substance. The orthodoxy of the school of Saint Thomas ought to be frightened at such an arbitrary proposition. In fact, in the third part of the *somme* (3) which was not written by the angelic Doctor, but which was collected by his disciple Pierre d' Auvergne from his commentary on the IVth book of the Sentences, we can prove with the assistance of Saint Denys, the Areopagite, that human intelligence is capable of seeing God in His own essence. And how is this vision effected ? It is neither by a quiddity that the Intellect would separate from the substance as Alfarabi and Avempace would have it nor by an impression which the separate substance would produce on the Intellect as Avicenne imagines it. It is by a direct union with the substance itself as Averroes and Alexandre d' Aphrodisias assert it. In this union, the separate substance plays the *role* of matter and of form both at the sametime ; it is that which makes us comprehend and that which we comprehend. Whatever may be the case with the other separate substances, continues the Thomistic author, we must admit, that the vision of the Divine Essence take place as it has been just explained. When the Intellect perceives the Divine Essence, this Essence is to the intellect, that which the form is to the matter, and that which the light is to colours. Material substances can, therefore, never become the form of the Intellect ; because, matter cannot become the form of any other substance.

(3). *Summa*, art. 2.

that is possible only when it is the question of a Being in which everything is intelligible; and it is for that reason, that the Master of the Sentences has said, that the union of the body and the soul is an image of the union of the soul with God. We might reasonably doubt that Saint Thomas had, like his disciples, pushed the interpretation to such an extent as to accept from Averroes the explanation of a theological dogma.

These attacks on Averroes appear to be combined in Saint Thomas and in the Dominican school, to a desire to save to a certain extent the orthodoxy of peripatetism by sacrificing his interpreters and especially the Arabs. Thence this perpetual endeavour to show, that Aristotle believed in the immortality of the soul⁽¹⁾ and in the other dogmas of Natural Religion. Besides, apart from a few harsh words in the treatise: *De Unitate intellectus*, Saint Thomas is far from treating Averroes as a blasphemer, and from showing against him that rage which we find in such a characteristic manner in Raymond Lulle and Petrarca. For Saint Thomas as well as for Dante, Averroes is a heathen sage worthy of pity, but not a blasphemer worthy of execration. He owes him too much to condemn him. Besides, Averroes had not yet become the standard bearer of incredulity and had not taken his place in the circular pit of the *Inferno*.

VIII.

The lively hatred which the Dominican school has persistently displayed towards the Arabian doctrines we can follow in the whole history of scholastics. The propositions which Raymond Martini in the first part of his *Poignard* attributed to the Moors are nothing but the theories of Arabian philosophy and particularly of Averroes which he took for the pure doctrines of Islam. The arguments of Raymond are almost all borrowed from Algazzali; because says he, it is the right thing to refute philosophers by a philosopher.⁽¹⁾ There are seven reasons to prove the eternity

⁽¹⁾ *Summa cont. gent.* I. II, cap. 79—81. In I Phys. lect. XII. In XII, Metaph. lect. III. *Quodlib.* X. quæst 5, art. I.
⁽²⁾ *Pugio fidei adversum Mauros et Judæos*, p. 167—168 (Paris, 1631.)

of the world on the side of God, seven others on the side of creatures and four on the side of factions ; eighteen reasons, in all. But these eighteen reasons are upset by another eighteen reasons of equal force ; the balance hitherto being perfectly equal. A reserve of five new reasons comes *a propos* to decide the victory in favour of the thesis : *the newness of the world*. But these five reasons are not entirely apodictical, and to speak the truth, religious faith alone can give certitude in this respect. The theory of the Unity of Souls is treated by Raymond with less discretion : It was not from Aristotle but from Plato that Ibn-Rushd borrowed this extravagance. Raymond equally refutes with a great show of dialectics the opinion which tries to limit Providence, and to take away from God the knowledge of internal things (*vilia et mala*). Raymond Martine like Saint Thomas places the principle of individual diversity, not in the body, but in the proportion and in the reciprocal relation of the soul and the body. Gilles de Lessines ⁽²⁾, Bernard de Trilia, and Harve Nedellec ⁽⁴⁾ fought with no less energy for the Thomistic doctrine of individuation, and against the unity of Intellect. The *Questions* of Bernard de Trilia on the Soul are only a long programme of Arabian questions, always solved in a sense contrary to that of infidel philosophers. Durand de Saint Poureain although a declared adversary of Thomism, equally combats the Averroistic thesis, as offering a hand to realism. Henri de Gand himself, a non-conformist in the bosom of the Dominican school, shows himself greatly opposed to the theory of a separate agent, imparting science to the human mind in the same manner as a seal imprints its type on the wax. The intellect is a portion of ourselves. Science is the result of work and experience. ⁽¹⁾ In his book *Summa Theologiae* and in his *Quodlibeta*, he combats the ordinary intellect on several occasions. He informs us himself, that he formed a party in the Assembly of Theologians which took place at the residence of the Archbishop Tempier in 1277, and where Averroism was condemned.

(2). Haureau, Phil. scot. t. II, p. 251—252.

(4). Jourdain, Philos. de S. Thomas II, 120 et suiv.

(1). Haureau, t. II. p. 274.

Finally, Dante who in so many respects belongs to the Dominican school, has thought it to be his duty, like, so many other orthodox Doctors, to deliver his stroke of lance at Averroes. Stace has just explained to him the mystery of generation. "But how" adds he "does the animal foetus become Man? You do not see it yet; it is just the point that has misled people more learned than yourself; since by his doctrine he separated potential intellect from the soul, because he did not find it attached to any organ. Open your heart to Truth and know that as soon as the articulation of your brains is complete. In the foetus, *the first Motor* joyously turns towards this *chef d'œuvre* of Nature and inspires it with a *new breath* full of virtue, which attracts into its substance all that is active, and creates a unique soul which lives, feels and reflects her ownself. And in order that these words may seem to you less astonishing, consider the heat of the Sun which makes wine, added to the moisture which distills the vine. When Lachesis has no more flax the soul detaches herself from the body and carries away with herself both human and divine. The other powers then become dumb: Memory, intelligence and will, on the contrary, become more active."

Who is this philosopher whom Dante acknowledges to be more learned than himself? Benvenuto d'Imola declares that he means Averroes and takes occasion to explain in all details and with a remarkable lucidity the Averroistic theory of Intellect—a false theory adds he as all the other theories of the same philosopher and which well justifies the name of their author, *Averroys cioè Senza Verità*.

Benvenuto believes, moreover, to find the trace of a reprobation of Averroes.⁽¹⁾ Dante, however, as the whole Dominican school distinguishes Averroes as the great commentator, the authorised interpreter of the philosopher Aristotle, and the heterodox author of a dangerous system. The commentary on the treatise *on the Soul* is quoted with respect in *the Convito*.⁽²⁾ Dante had probably studied Averroes at the street of Fouarre, under Siger, and re-

(1). *Purg.* IV. init (Ms. cit. fol. 168).

(2). Ozanam, *Dante*, p. 189.

collecting what he had been to his masters; he has placed his forces in that honourable region of the *Inferno* where he has with regret placed *men* of great worth whom his religious faith forbade him to grant salvation.

Euclide geometrae Tollomes, Ippocrate, Avicenna e Galieno, Averrois che' gran cemento feo. ⁽⁴⁾

IX.

Gilles de Rome deserves to figure in the suite of Guillaume d'Anvergne, of Albert and of Saint Thomas as the most declared adversaries of Averroism. His treatise, *De Erroribus philosophorum* is nothing but a catalogue of heretical propositions drawn from Arabian philosophers such as Alkindi, Avicenne, Averroes and Maimonides. The doctrines of Averroes are presented here in an entirely new light. According to Gilles de Rome, Averroes is already considered as the contemner of the three great religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), and the inventor of the doctrine, that all religions are equally false, though they may be useful. His exposition of the opinions of Averroes is, besides, conceived from a sufficiently personal stand-point. Gilles was content to read, pen in hand, the commentary on the XIIth book of the *Metaphysics* and to tack together propositions which he did not understand, or which sounded nasty to his ears.

We find, moreover, amongst the works of Gilles de Rome a great number of treatises, specially directed against each of the Averroistic errors: *De materia coeli contra Averroem*. *De intellectu possibili quaestio aurea contra Averroem*, &c., ⁽²⁾ Gilles has collected these different theses in his *Quodlibeta*. The article devoted in this collection to the question of the unity of Intellect has had some importance in the history of Averroism, ⁽¹⁾ in so far as it has for a long time amused those who have spoken of the life and doctrines of Averroes. Even Leibnitz does not seem to have known Averroes except by this passage. He quotes, also

(4). *Inferno Canto IV, V. 142 et suiv.*

(2). *Ossinger, Bibl. Augustinianorum*, (Ingolstadt, 1768).

(1). *Quodl. II, quaest. 20, n. 101—102.*

Finally the argument which Augustine, the theologian, attributes here to the Commentator: The world being eternal, if we must attribute to each man an individual intellect, there would be since the beginning an infinite number of intelligences; and if we admit, that these intelligences are immortal, we should be led to suppose the infinite inaction, which implies contradiction. Entirely maintaining, that Aristotle has acknowledged the individuality of Intellect, Gilles de Rome confesses, that he did not sufficiently anticipate this difficulty. After all, he was a man; he has probably not perceived all the consequences which could be drawn from his principles. But his commentator Averroes who lived in a century when the Christian religion was in vogue, (people had even seen his sons at the court of the Emperor Frederic) must have felt the inconvenience of this doctrine. We shall prove later on, that Gilles de Rome or his interpolater has spread a false rumour concerning this trip of Averroes' sons to the court of the Hohenstaufen. Gilles does not reject less energetically the theory of union in the terms in which it was proposed by the Commentator. Man could never in this world comprehend separate substances. In fact, the intellect can never go beyond sensible species. But there are no species for separate substances. We are with regard to them what the blind are with regard to colours, with this difference, however, that we know that they exist, although we are ignorant of their quiddity, and that we can argue or syllogise about them, while the blind, in so far as he is blind, does not know colours nor the existence of the quiddity, nor can he syllogise about them.⁽²⁾

Gerard de Sienne, disciple of Gilles de Rome, continued to attack his master and maintained during the first half of the 14th century the Anti-Arab traditions of the Augustine school. The *Directorium Inquisitorum* of Nicolas Eymeric is also as far as it concerns Arabian philosophy and especially Averroes only a reproduction, almost literal of the *De Erroribus philosophorum* of Gilles de Rome. Eymeric hardly bothers himself about metaphysics. The doctrine of the Unity of Souls is a heresy; because it would

⁽²⁾ Quodl. I, quaest. 17, et quodl. III., quaest. 13.

then necessarily follow, that the damned soul of Judas is identical with the holy soul of Saint Peter. Already the real Averroes has entirely disappeared behind the incredulous Averroes. This heretic denied creation Providence, supernatural Revelation, the Trinity, the efficacy of prayer, of alms-giving, of litanies, the immortality and the resurrection and he has placed the highest felicity in voluptuousness.

X.

But the hero of this crusade against Averroism was undoubtedly Raymond Lulle. In his eyes Averroism was philosophical Islamism; and the destruction of Islamism was, it is well-known, the dream of his life. From 1310 to 1312 particularly the zeal of Lulle reached its paroxysm; we find him at Paris, at Vienne, at Montpellier, at Genoa, at Naples and at Pisa, pursued by this fixed idea and refuting Averroes and Mahomet by a combination of the magic circles of his *Grand Art*. In 1311, at the Council of Vienne, he addresses three requests to Clement V, the creation of a new military order for the destruction of Islamism; the foundation of colleges for the study of Arabic; and the condemnation of Averroes and of his partisans.⁽¹⁾ Raymond desired the absolute suppression of the works of the commentator in the schools, and that a prohibition should be published to all Christians not to read them. It does not appear, that the Council took any of these demands into consideration.

Paris became particularly the theatre of exploits of Lulle against the Aerrorists. He has consigned into a multitude of small works, dated the years 1310 and 1312, the verbal processes of its disputes.⁽¹⁾ The most ingenious of these polemical pamphlets it is said, was the one which had for its title: *De lamentatione duodecim principiorum, Philosophiae, contra Averroistas*, dated 1310, Paris, and dedicated to Philippe le Bel. Raymond, conforming to the taste of the period for allegories introduced into it the *Lady Philosophia* complaining of the errors which the Averroists

(1). *Acta S. S. Juni*, t. V, p. 668.

(1). *Acta. S.S. Juni*, p. 668—677; Antonio, t. II. p. 128—129, etc. *Philosophie*, p. 375.

were making in her name, and particularly of the damnable doctrine, that certain things are wrong according to natural light, while they are right according to philosophy. *Philosophia* declares solemnly before the *Twelve Principles*, that she never had such foolish ideas: "I am" said she "nothing but a humble servant of *Theology*. How could I venture to contradict her? Unfortunate that I am! Where are those pious scholars who would come to my help?" People quote several other treatises of Raymond equally directed against the Averroists, and which are found, for the most part, inedited at the convent of Saint Francis of Majorica: a *Liber Natalis, or De Natali pueri Jesu*, dedicated to Philippe le Bel, and mentioned by the biographers of Raymond as one of the most vigorous libels against Averroes; *Liber de reprobatione errorum Averrois*; *Disputatio Raymundi et Averroistoe de quinque quæstionibus. Inc. Parisius fuit magna controversia.....*; *Liber contradictiones inter Raymundum et Averroistam de centum syllogismis circa mysterium Trinitatis* (Paris, February, 1310). *Inc. Accidit quod Raymundista.....*; *Liber de existentia et agentia Dei, contra Averroem* (Paris, 1311); *De ente simpliciter per se contra erroes Averroes*, made at the period of the Council of Vienna; *Arstheologiae et philosophiae mystica contra Averroem*; *Liber contra ponentes aeternitatem mundi*; *Liber de efficiente et effectu. Inc. Parisius Raymundus et Averrois ta disputabant.....*; *Libe-utrum fidelis possit solvere et destruere omnes objectiones quas infideles possunt jacire contra sanctam fidam catholicam* (Paris, August 1311)...; *Declaratio per modum dialogi, edita contra ducentas decem et octo opintones erroneas aliquorum philosophorum, et damnatas ab episcopo parisiensi*. His biographer even mentions his sermons against Averroes.⁽²⁾ It appears, that what particularly annoyed Raymond Lulle in the doctrines of the Averroists of Paris, was the distinction made between philosophical and theological truths—a distinction set off with so much warmth by the Italian Averroism of the Renaissance, and which became from the 13th to the 17th century the breast-plate of incredulity. Lulle maintained with a decision which did not lack in hardihood, that if the Christian dogmas were absurd in the eyes of Reason, and impossible to com-

(2) *Acta S. S. Jun. t. V, p. 670.*

prehend, it was not possible, that they could be true from any other stand-point. The most absolute rationalism and the extreme vagances of mysticism followed each other as a mirage in the dialectical hallucinations of this perturbed brain.

XI.

In this manner the most respectable doctors of the 13th century are in accord about opposing Averroism and the forms of their polemics do not permit us to imagine, that these disputes were for them idle and without adversaries. There was evidently in the presence of orthodox scholasticism a school which pretended to cover its evil doctrines under the authority of the Commentator. But where to search for this school, not one of whose writings has come down to us? I hope to demonstrate, without abusing my conjecture, that we could designate as the two centres of Averroism in the 13th century, the Franciscan school, and particularly the University of Paris.

In general, the Franciscan school appears to us as much less orthodox than the Dominican school. Having had its origin in a popular movement, very irregular very little ecclesiastical and very little conformable to the ideas of discipline and of hierarchy, the order of Saint Francis never lost the idea of its origin. While the Dominicans, faithful to the directions they received from Rome, ran through the world like the true blood-hounds of the Church to dog the steps of heretics, and to make to heterodoxy the rude warfare of syllogism and of the burning pile, the family of Saint Francis never ceased to produce ardent spirits who maintained, that the Franciscan reform had not yet produced all its effects, that this reform was superior to the Pope and to the dispensations of Rome; that the appearance of the seraphic Francis was neither more nor less than the advent of a second Christianity, similar to the first in everything but superior to it by its poverty. Hence almost all the democratic and communal movements had their origin in the spirit of the Franciscan school and further on in the old leven of catharism, joachimsim and of the eternal Evangelium. The third order of Saint Francis

the beguards, coliards, bizoques, fraticelli, spiritual brothers, the families, the *pauvres de Lyon*, were exterminated by the imprisonment and the funeral pile of the Dominicans. Hence this long number of hardy thinkers almost all hostile to the court of Rome which the Franciscan order never ceased to produce: Brother Elie Jean d'Olive, Duns Scot, Okkam Marsile de Padua, &c. The bitter struggle which it was necessary to maintain by all means against Thomism; was it not already the beginning of emancipation? Was it quite sure to openly attack a doctor of such high authority whose system became more and more that of the Church, and one of whose Popes, a Dominican, no doubt, had said: *Tot fecit miracula quot scripsit articulos?*

Alexandre de Hales, the founder of the Franciscan school is the first scholastic who accepted and propogated the influence of Arabian philosophy. Jean de la Rochelle, his successor, followed the same traditions and adopted on his own account almost all the psychology of Avicenne.⁽¹⁾ M. Haureau has observed with justice, that the majority of the propositions condemned at Paris by Etienne Templier, in 1277, belonged to the Franciscan school, and that they had been borrowed by the most audacious disciple of Alexandre de Hale's from the glosses, enjoying an evil reputation for a long time, of Avicenne and of Averroes. The same year, the Dominican Robert de Kilwardy, Archbishop of Canterbury, in a Council held in Oxford, which was the centre of the Franciscan school, censured propositions almost identical, and where the influence of Averroes could no longer be denied. We can, therefore, believe, that some of those philosophers against whom Guillaume d'Auvergne, Albert and Saint Thomas express themselves with such severity, belonged to the order of Saint Francis.

An important passage of *l'opus tertium*, published by Monsieur Cousin, has just confirmed this conjecture. The doctrine of the active Intellect separate from Man is presented there as traditional in Oxford. "The active Intellect is, in the first place, God Him-

(1) Haureau, *Phil. Scot. t. I. p. 475 et suiv.*

self, and in the second, the angels who illuminate us. God is to the soul what the Sun is to our eyes; and the angels they are the stars. I do not say this, says Bacon, only to announce my own personal opinion but to combat one of the greatest errors to be found in theology and in philosophy. The moderns (that is to say, the Dominican school) say that the Intellect which acts on our souls and illumines them makes a portion of the soul. That is false and absurd, as I have shewn by authorities and by convincing arguments. All the philosophers of the past generation of whom some are still alive have identified the active Intellect with God. Twice have I heard the venerable Pontiff of the Church of Paris, Monsieur Guillaume d' Auvergne before the assembled University, reproving these innovators, dispute with them, and to prove to them by the same arguments that I have already given, that they were in error. Monsieur Robert, Bishop of Lincoln and the brothers of Adam de Marsh, the greatest writers of the world, and perfect in science, human and divine, as well as the elders of this monastery were of the same opinion. Some presumptuous minor friars, having asked friar Adam with a view to tempt and ridicule him: What is this active Intellect? he replied to them: *It is the Raven of Elie*, desiring thereby to signify either God or an angel."⁽¹⁾

In the *opus majus*, discussing the same question, he openly adopts the opinions of the Arab masters. The human soul by itself is incapable of knowledge; philosophy is the result of a transcendental and divine illumination. The active Intellect which is the source of this illumination is surely not a part of the soul, but a substance separate from the soul, as an artisan is from his material, as light is from colours, and as a pilot is from his ship.⁽²⁾

The respect with which Roger Bacon speaks of Averroes equally proves, that he had found in his own order traditions very different from those of the Dominican school about the commentator. "Avicenne" says he "was the first to bring to light the

(1). *Opus tertium*, cap. 23 (*Journal des Savants*—1848, p. 346—47.)

(2). *Opus Majus*, p. 26, 27.

Philosophy of Aristotle, but he suffered rude attacks on the part of those who followed him. Averroes, the greatest after him, contradicted him beyond measure. The philosophy of Averroes neglected for a long time, rejected and censured by the most celebrated doctors, obtains to-day the unanimous suffrage of sages; his doctrines, worthy enough of general esteem, though we might criticise them on several points, have been gradually appreciated." "After Avicenne" says he elsewhere "came Averroes, a man of solid doctrines, who corrected the sayings of his predecessors, and added much to them, though on some points he ought to be corrected also and in many others completed." Bacon expressly quotes the commentaries on the *Physics*, on the treatise on the *Soul*, on the treatise on *Heaven and Earth*. The translations of Hermann l'Allemand appear also to pre-occupy him much. Little initiated in theological disputes, and always indulgent towards anybody who can teach him anything, he does not perceive the venom of these works and reproaches his contemporaries for sticking to old writers without merit rather than profit by the new aids offered to philosophy.⁽⁶⁾

The subtlety, the confusion of the logical and the ontological order, and the strong bias to realise abstractions that characterise the Franciscan school established more than one bond of relationship between this school and the Arabian philosophy. The general chapter held in Assisi in 1295 saw itself forced to severely repress the taste of the youth of this order for subtleties and for *erotic* views. Although several Franciscan doctors, Guillaume de Lamarre and Duns Scot have opposed Averroism and have even rebuked Saint Thomas as having yielded to it by his theory of individuation, yet Realism forcibly attracted them towards the Averroistic theories. God, says, Saint Thomas, could not create matter without form. Duns Scot declares, on the contrary that matter *can* exist without form, and that the first act of every generation, is informable matter, that is to say, apt to receive all forms, but not informed. This unique and universal matter is the same in all beings, as Avicenne would have it. If Duns Scot is

(6) *Opus Majus*, p. 21.

far away from Averroes in certain points of detail, as for instance on the quiddity arising from the form and on the three dimensions essential to matter before its adjunction to form, these secondary details cannot make us deny the identity of the fundamental thesis, namely, the anteriority of the generic matter which all beings share in, in antithesis to the pure creation of Saint Thomas.⁽³⁾

Pierre Auriol drew on himself the anathemas of the Dominican school for a very similar doctrine.⁽⁴⁾ With regard to the thesis of a separate Intellect, Duns Scot finds it so absurd, that the author of it seems to him to deserve to be placed at the ban of the human species. That ought to have been the case. Duns Scot pushes to the extreme the doctrines of the plurality of souls, and of the multiplication of psychological entities. Little was wanting that, like Origen, he did not make the souls roar through space in search of their bodies. Duns Scot and Okkam, in admitting that Aristotle did not believe in immortality of the soul, and that this truth could not be proved except by Revelation, prepared, however, the way for dangerous audacities. We shall find in the 14th century, the most decisive Averroism coming out of the two directions traced by Duns Scot and Okkam. Even the mystical school which is related in so ways to the Franciscan school greatly utilises the psychology of the Arabs. The German mystics of the 14th century, particularly Master Eckhart, likes to make use of the hypothesis of the active and the passive Intellect in the demonstration of their theories of *Union with God*.⁽⁵⁾

In a treatise of this school, composed in Germany in the 14th century on the *Intellect active and possible*, Averroes and Aristotle are quoted as great authorities.

XII.

But it is chiefly at Garlande and in the street of Fouarre that we must, it appears to me, search for the Averroistic error so often condemned in the course of the century. Already

(3). Haureau, p. 327, 328 et suiv.

(4). Bayle, art *Aureolus*.

(5). Ritter, *Geschichte der Christ. Phil.* IV, part. p. 113-514.

1240, Guillaume d'Auvergne then bishop of Paris, brought under censure several propositions tinged with Arabism, and which seem to be extracts from the book, *De Causis*. In 1269, it is Averroism formally expressed which we shall presently find under the blow of anathema.⁽⁴⁾

Etienne Tempier, bishop of Paris, having assembled a Council of the leaders of theology, on Wednesday, before the feast of Saint Nicholas (6th December), condemned, in concert with them thirteen propositions which are nothing but the familiar axioms of Averroism: "Quod intellectus hominum est unus et idem numero. Quod mundus est aeternus. Quod nunquam, fuit primus homo. Quod anima, quae est farina hominis, secundum quod homo, corripitur corrupto corpore. Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia. Quod humani actus non reguntur providentia divina. Quod Deus non potest dare immortalitatem vel incorruptionem rei corruptibili vel mortali."

These are the audacious doctrines which were discussed in Paris in the middle of the 13th century; and in order, that no doubt might rest as to their origin, certain manuscripts present us with the criticisms of Etienne Tempier added to the works of Averroes, as the remedy side by side with the disease. Every condemnation in ecclesiastical history pre-supposes a professed error, in the same way as every measure of reform pre-supposes some back-sliding. We must, therefore, conclude, that about the middle of the 13th century, the faith of several people was shaken in the University of Paris, and that the scandalous propositions of Averroism found an echo with some of the Professors there. We could even affirm, that the opuscles of Albert and of Saint Thomas *contra Averroistas* were personally directed against the professors of the street of Fouarre, and ran parallel to the condemnations of 1269. No doubt is permitted in this respect, when we find, a preaching friar of Paris, called Gilles, probably Gilles de Lessines, address about this epoch, to old Albert, retired from

(4) Du Boulay, *Hist. Univ. Paris* t. III, p. 397. — Crevier, *Hist. de l'Université de Paris*, t. II, p. 79.

the fight, eleven Averroistic propositions professed by the masters of the University, and almost identical with those that had been condemned. Albert wrote against these propositions a special treatise, *Liber determinativus ad Parisienses* now lost, but which Pierre de Prusse, his biographer had in his hands and of which he gives the first words.⁽³⁾ We could equally not doubt, that the treatise of Saint Thomas *contra Averroistas*, was directed against the same adversaries. Guillaume de Toco, his biographer, expressly declares it: "Quem errorem" says he in speaking of the doctrine of the unity of souls, "quumessent scholares *Golardiae* imitantes qui Averrois erant communiter sectantes, poterat praedictus error plures inficere, quibus potuissent praedictum errorem sophisticis rationibus persuadere."

Quetif and Echard observe with reason, that we should in this text read *Garlandiae* in place of *Golardiae*. The same bibliographers inform us, that the opuscle of Saint Thomas bears sometimes this title: *Contra Averroistas Parisienses*. A list of books of the Convent of Saint Catharine, of Pisa, almost contemporary of Saint Thomas, attributes to the angelic Doctor a book, *Liber Contra Magistros Parisienses*. It is very possible, indeed, that this book was nothing but one of those writings of circumstance which Saint Thomas published during the fight of the Mendicants and the University; for example, *l'opus contra pestiferam doctrinam retrahentium homines a religioso ingressu*, directed against Guillaume de Saint Amour and which are found amongst the opuscles of Saint Thomas immediately after the *Contra Averroistas*. But even this *rapprochement*: Is it not significant? Is it not also very remarkable, that in the enumeration of the heretics vanquished by Saint Thomas, Guillaume de Toco places Guillaume de Saint Amour immediately after Averroes? Let us also observe, that Saint Thomas composed his treatise *Contra Averroistas* during the last years of his life, consequently about the epoch of the condemnation of Averroism under Tempier, about the epoch also when Albert composed his responses to friar Gilles against the Professors of Paris. Indeed, the last words of the

(3.) *Ibid.* 239--240, 293--*Histoire litt. de la France*, t. XIX, p. 350.

to be a challenge addressed to the resounding garrets of the street of Fouarre: "Si quis autem gloriabundus de falsi nominis scientia, velit contra haec quae scripsimus aliquid dicere, non loquatur in angulis nec coram pueris qui nesciunt de causis arduis iudicare, sed contra hoc scriptum scribat, si audet, et inveniet non solum me qui aliorum sum minimus, sed multos alios, qui veritatis sunt cultores, per quos ejus errori resistetur vel ignorantiae conculcetur." *L'opus contra pestiferam doctrinam* which was directed as nobody denies against the Professors of Paris, finishes almost with the very same words. The small number of celebrated works which the University of Paris has bequeathed to us in the 13th century do not permit us to determine who the Professors were to whom this haughty menace was addressed. That Siger *who syllogised important truths* and whom Dante, out of gratitude, no doubt, for the lessons he had received from him, places him in his *Paradise* side by side with Albert and with Saint Thomas, that Siger has remained obscure, because he did not possess the support of a religious order in order to arrive at fame, and whom one of his learned successors had to drag out of oblivion.⁽¹⁾ Was he not one of the Professors whom the opulence of the *Mediants* found it convenient to insult from their entrenchments? As a matter of fact, he frequently cites Averroes and Moses Maimonides, and in his treatise, *De Anima intellectiva*⁽²⁾ the Averroistic questions on the corruptibility of the soul and the multiplication of the thinking principle with the body are very neatly put. The gifts of books made to the University of Paris, in 1217, by Siger and Gerand d'Abbeville, bear testimony, on the other hand, to their strong bias for Arabism. The ground floor of Sarbonne which represents the current studies of the University of Paris in the 13th and the 14th centuries, contain nearly nine manuscripts of Averroes whereas the ground-floor of Saint-Victor and of Saint-Germain possess only one or two. Some of these manuscripts bear the marks of daily usage during tuition. The No. 942 contains lessons taken word by word from the great commentary; at the

⁽¹⁾ *Hist. litt. de la France*, t. XXI, p. 96 et suiv.

⁽²⁾ *Bibl. No. 963, p. 53* Vo. *Hist. litt. de la France*, I. c. p. 123.

end of the No. 943, we read this note of the owner: *mentaria ista constiterunt flarens XXX, pretio inastemabilia quoniam in eis veritas philosophiae naturalis et philosophiae prime continetur tota et perfecta.* But what proves more than all the rest how much the Averroistic doctrines obtained favour with the Professors of Paris, it is that after the numerous condemnations to which they were subjected, and after the notice given in 1217 to the rector of the University and to the procurator of the Faculty of Arts, not to permit the discussions of such questions that had already raised such storms,⁽¹⁾ we find them still in 1277 agitating once more the University and provoking a condemnation even more pronounced than the preceding ones. This sentence was even pronounced by Etienne Tempier after a very lively discussion which had taken place at the bishopric. Here are some of the condemned propositions:—"Quod Deus non potest facere plures animas in numero. Quod Deus nunquam plures creavit intelligentias quam modo creat. Si non esset sensus, forte intellectus non distingueret inter Socratem et Platonem, licet distingueret inter hominem et asinum. Quod intelligentia, animus vel anima separata nusquam est. Quia intelligentiae non habent materiam, Deus non posset plures ejusdem speciei facere. Quod intellectus est unus numero omnium, licet omnino separetur a corpore hoc, non tamen ab omni. Quod motus coeli sunt propter animam intellectivam. Anima separata non est alterabilis secundum philosophiam licet secundum fidem alteretur. Quod scientia magistri et discipuli est una numero. Quod intellectus agens non est forma corporis humani. Quod inconveniens est ponere aliquos intellectus nobiliores alios: quia quum illa diversitas non possit esse a parte corporum, oportet ut sit a parte intelligentiarum. Error, quod sic anima Christi non est nobilior anima Judae. Quod non est primus homo nec ultimus crit. Quod mundus est eternus. Quod impossibile est solvere rationes Philosophi de aeternitate mundi. Quod naturalis philosophus simpliciter debet negare mundi aeternitatem, quia nititur causis et rationibus naturalibus: *fidei autem*

(1) Du Boulay, t. III, p. 398.

potest negare mundi aeternitatem quia nititur causis supernaturalibus. Quod creatio non est possibilis, quamvis contrarium sit tenendum secundum fidem. Quod corpora coelestia moventur principio extrinseco, quod est anima. Quod non contingit corpus corruptum redire unum numero, nec idem numero resurget. Quod resurrectio futura non debet credi a philosopho quia impossibilis est investigari per rationem. Error, quia philosophus debet captivare intellectum in obsequium fidei."

But here are some propositions still more strange: "*Quod sermones theologi sunt fundati in fabulis. Quod nihil plus scitur propter scire theologiam. Quod fabulæ et falsa sunt in lege Christiana sicut ei in aliis. Quod lex christiana impedit addiscere. Quod sapientes mundi sunt philosophi tantum. Quod non est excellentior status quam vacare philosophiæ. Quod non est curandum de fide si dicatur esse aliquid hæreticum.*"

We see, that an immense step has been accomplished since 1259, and since Saint Thomas. It no longer concerns the interpretation, more or less hazardous, of the thought of the philosopher; it is the faith itself which is openly treated as a fable; the Christian religion is a religion like the other religions mixed with fables as the others. The great tactics of Paduan Averroism, the opposition between the philosophical and the theological systems are revealed with its false appearance of respect. "They pretend" says the synod, "that they are true things according to philosophy, although they are not so according to religion, as if there were two contrary verities, and as if in opposition to the truth of the Scriptures, truth could be found in the books of the damned heathens of whom it stands written: "I shall undo the wisdom of the sages." Jean XXI, by a bull addressed to Tempier orders him to find out and punish the partisans of such dangerous opinions. It appears, however, that the errors were far from being strangled out; since from 1310 to 1312, we have seen Raymond Lulle fencing at Paris against the Averroists and especially against the principle which served as a cover to all the other audacities. Petrarca, wishing to designate the places where Averroistic peripatetism was most in vogue, mentions in

the first line:—*Contentiosa Parsens ac strepidulus*. *Strepidulus* is a Latin word, but *Contentiosa* is not. No doubt, we cannot imagine, that doctrines so impious could be those of the whole University of Paris. Such propositions: *Quod nihil plus scitur propter scire theologiam; Quod lex Christiana impedit addiscere; Quod sapientes mundi sunt philosophi tantum*, evidently testify to a reaction of lay spirit against theologians. I am, therefore, inclined to believe, that the Averroists of Paris were drawn rather from amongst the Masters of Arts than from the Doctors of Divinity. The College de Sarbonne was generally Thomistic. Godfroi des Fontaines, one of the most considerable Doctors of the University of Paris expressly rejects the Averroistic theory of individuality and pushes further than Saint Thomas himself his opposition against the realism of the Franciscan school.¹¹ It is very difficult, in the midst of the quarrels which at this time were lacerating the philosophical world, to exactly seize the *nuances* of the different parties. Even this *nuance*: Was it properly insisted upon? Are there not days of chaos when our words lose their original sense, when friends do not know each other, and when enemies seem to shake hands? When in the course of some centuries, people shall write the history, the history of the quarrels of the 19th century, will it be easy to distribute the *roles* and to exactly delimit the diverse fractions of the diverse camps? The second half of the 13th century was for the University of Paris an analogous period. The *Mendicants*, strong in the support of Rome (in 6 or 7 years, they had obtained no less than 40 bulls from Alexander IV) and by the favour of a King whom their gratitude had lifted so high, these *Mendicants* demanded with loud cries the liberty to rule alone. Their perpetual efforts in this fight were directed to *prove* the University to be heterodox. It was at this moment nothing but a clashing of arms, so to say, of condemnations on the whole surface of the scholastic world. Averroism was a powerful weapon in this controversy.

"Between the people of Saint-Dominie: And those who are in for logic." It served as so many other plastic words, as the

(1) *Haureau, Phil. Scot. t. II, p. 290 et suiv.*

in the hands of calumny to render those suspicions whom people wanted to ruin. We have seen Guillaume de Tocco and Pierre de Prusse almost associate the brave Guillaume de Saint-Amour the *Mulieus Mendicantium*, with Averroes amongst the heretics crushed by Saint Thomas. Simon de Tournai did not less dearly expiate the crime of having defended the University. The *Mendians* satiated their hatred on this unfortunate man. According to Mathew Paris, he became dumb and idiotic, and it was only at the end of several years, that Divine wrath being appeased, he was able to learn from his son, still an infant to lisp the *Pater* and the *Credo*. The story of Thomas de Cantimpre is still more terrible. In full vigour, at the very moment when Simon began to pronounce the blasphemy of *The Three Imposters*, his eyes suddenly turned; he began to roar like a bull, and to roll in a fit of epilepsy; since then he forgot all his science, and lived like an animal, not knowing how to pronounce any other name except that of his concubine.⁽¹⁾ Look, how the *Mendians* took their revenge! Probably some natural accidents gave occasion to these terrible stories by which the priests frightened the imagination of their pupils. Geraud d'Abbeville died leprous and paralytic. Siger whom Dante saw in eternal light along with the most venerable doctors of theology, how is he remembered in the tradition of those days? As an infidel, a blasphemer and an impious man, converted by a vision of hell, who finished by putting on the priestly frock: another manner of revenge which the friars were exceedingly fond of. All their enemies either became converts to their order, or died with the precursory signs of eternal damnation.

XIII.

The condemnations of 1277 already showed us the Averroistic propositions associated with incredulity and this, incredulity is evidently traced by Etienne Tempier to the study of Arabian philosophy. We are nearing the period when Averroes, is, in the eyes of the majority, nothing but the author of a horrible

⁽¹⁾ Hist. litt. de la France, t. XXI, p. 112 et suiv.

blasphemy, and when a *resume* of all his works could be given in the words: *The three Imposters*. The reign of faith appears, at the first glance of the eye, so absolute in the Middle Ages, that we should be tempted to believe, that during the thousand years, since the disappearance of ancient rationalism, till the appearance of modern rationalism, no protest was ever raised against the established religion. But a more attentive study of the human mind during this strange epoch leads us to contract a good deal this period of absolute faith. No doubt, it is of importance to distinguish here the boldness of thinking which, accepting the revealed dogmas, tries its powers on the interpretation of those dogmas, or on attacks against the very revelation itself. Scot. Erigena, for instance, is evidently a speculator, very hardy and very orthodox. Could we, therefore, call him an infidel? No; certainly not. St. John, the evangelist, and St. Paul are for him *revealed* authorities. The thought, really sceptical *not* the rejection of this or that dogma, but of the very foundation of all dogmas, the belief that all religions are good in their own way, though all are impostures, is found well developed only in the 13th century. This is intelligible: The idea of *comparative* religion could grow only in a century in which people happened to possess some knowledge about the different religions of the world. But the first half of the Middle Ages had only very vague notions about religions foreign to Christianity and to Judaism. Everything was mixed up under the vague name of paganism. As long as *Mahom* was regarded as an idol worshipped in the company of Apollin and Tervagan, it was hardly possible to think, of comparing Christianity to such ridiculous superstitions. It was no longer the same case, however, when the works of Pierre de Venerable, and of Robert de Retines on the Koran, the Crusades, and the polemical books composed by the Dominicans had given a more exact idea of Islamism. Mahomet then appeared as a *Prophet*, the founder of a monotheistic cult, and people arrived at the conclusion, that *there were in the world three religions, founded on similar principles, and all of them mixed with fables.*⁽¹⁾ It was this idea which, was first

(1). Guillaume d' Auvergne (*De legibus*, c. 18, opp. t. I, p. 50; *De Univ.*, t. I, p. 682, 743, 849).

lated into proper language by the blasphemy of *The Three Impostors*. This was the sceptical idea, *par excellence*, the original idea of the 13th century. Like all new ideas, it corresponded to an increase of our knowledge of the universe and of the human race. For the virgin faith of unsophisticated ages, *there exists only one religion*. Either people don't know that there exists other religions as well, or if they know of their existence at all, those cults appear so perverse, that their adherents could hardly be counted as belonging to the human species. What a violent searching of consciences on the day when people came to know, that outside the religion which they profess, there are others that resemble it, and which are, after all, not entirely devoid of reason! The frankness with which the Church undertook the refutation of Judaism and of Islamism, did not contribute less vigorously to the progress of the spirit of discussion. *To refute is to know*. How many people must have been initiated in heterodoxy only by the *Solvuntur objecta* of the treatises on theology! Don't we find the Florentine traveller Ricoldo de Monte Croce, author of the *Cribratio Alcorani* publish a book, *De Varus religionibus*? Who did not hear of the refutation of the Koran by Pierre le Venerable, the *Prigis fidei*, and the *Capistrum Judaeorum* of Raymond Martini? The toleration, the common sense, and the spirit of criticism which the Dominican Brocard shows in his itinerary in the Holy Land shall always be an object of surprise.⁽³⁾ The crusades and the voyages hastened the same result. Had they not seen an infidel like Saladin, superior in good faith, in loyalty and in humanity to the crowd of adventurers who represented the Christian faith in the East?

In this manner the 13th century reached by all possible ways the idea of *comparative religions*, that is to say, of indifference and of naturalism. Here is something of which we find no trace in the centuries that preceded! We have already seen *Sectaries* re-asserting, in the theological discussion of dogmas, the share of liberty which the human spirit never entirely renounces. The heretics of Orleans, in 1022, had ventured to maintain,

(3) *Hist. litt. de la France*, t. XXI, p. 187.

that all the miracles which were related in the Old and New Testaments were nothing but fables, and they denied all the mysteries of Christianity.⁽²⁾ Berenger had even shown himself something more than a heretic; his debate had almost been an attack. Gaunilon, in his book, called, *Liber pro insipiente*, had ventured to make an apology for the fool who had said in his heart: *That there was no God*. Abelard had insisted with a sort of complacency on his terrible sophism of the *Sic* and of the *Non*. Orthodoxy itself took uncertain *nuances* from the epochs racked with doubts: Guillaume de Champeaux, Gilbert de la Porree, Pierre Lambard were suspected auxiliaries whom the people accepted only after having previously condemned them. Nothing of all that could, however, be properly called, *incredulity*. Those were the quarrels of theologians and the pure exercises of logic; very dangerous games, no doubt; because we can never irritate the delicate fibre of faith with impurity, and it is difficult afterwards to take seriously the dogma which we have in this manner handled with a sort of familiarity; but games which by the naive confidence that they seemed to betray in mere dialectics, proved in their own way, how much the faculty to believe was still complete. In the 13th century, it was even the very basis of faith that was disturbed. Works which in our days would reproduce the license and the contempt of holy things such as was affected by Rutebeuf and the romance of Renard would be hardly tolerated. Was it really a contemporary poet of Saint Louis whom we are supposed to listen to in the following verses:—

“Non dubito superos falsos adducere testis;
Nil audet magnum qui putat esse Deos?”⁽¹⁾

Who is the doctor who would venture to-day, in Sorbonne to agitate the *Impossibilia* of Siger, what should we think of a century, when we see a good and frank nature like that of Joinville

(2.) Rad. Glaber, I, III, c. 8. Labbe, Concil. t. XI col. 1115, 118; Dacheri Script. t. I, p. 604.

(1) *Geta de Vital de* (Blois Bibl. de l'Ecole des Chartes II, series, t. IV, p. 100).

most coming to make confessions to us of his temptations to infidelity? Italy shared like France in this great searching of consciences. Its proximity to heathen antiquity had left in it a dangerous leaven of revolt against Christianity. In the beginning of the 11th century people had seen a certain Vilgard, a schoolmaster of Ravenna declare, that all that the ancient poets had said was true and that's what people ought to believe in preference to the Christian mysteries. Since the year 1115 we find in Florence a faction of Epicureans, strong enough to provoke bloody disturbances. The Ghibellines generally passed for materialists and for people without religion. Arnold of Brescia had already translated into a political movement the religious and philosophical revolt of his days. Arnold of Villeneuve passed for the adept of a Pythagorean sect, spread throughout Italy. The poem on the *Descent of St. Paul into Hell* speaks with terror of a secret society which had sworn destruction to Christianity.⁽⁴⁾ The Epicureans, shut up alive in their coffins, occupy a special circle in the *Inferno* of Dante. Cavalcante des Cavalcanti, Farinata des Uberti, figure there with Frederic II with Cardinal Ubaldini and thousands of others. Guido Cavalcanti himself, passed for a logician, a physician, an Epicurian and an atheist. "When the good people" says Boccaccio, "saw him dreamy and absent-minded in the streets of Florence, they pretended, that he was searching for arguments to prove, that there was no God."⁽⁵⁾ The Middle Age in Europe, pre-occupied with its own notions of suffering, was strongly inclined to regard as unbelievers all people that were rich, worldly and leading a joyous life. Those who suffer naturally feel a greater need to believe in religion, and willingly suppose, that those who are happy in this world hardly care much after the other. The continually recurring heresies of Lombardy in the 13th century, those Albigenses who did not seem to be tired of being burnt to death, represented, on their side, we have no reason to doubt, a protest against the absolute despotism of the Church, and an aspiration towards the liberty of conscience.

⁽⁴⁾ Ozanam, *Dante*, p. 48.

⁽⁵⁾ Cesare Balbo, *Vita di Dante*, p. 92.

XIV.

But how did these heterodox tendencies which agitated Europe in the 13th century, come to ally themselves to Arabianism, and to hide themselves under the name of Averroes? For that, we must seek an explanation in the Court of Frederic II.

The predilection of Frederic II for the Arabs which was so bitterly thrown at him by his enemies had its origin in his views and in his character. The dominant idea of this great man was *civilisation* in the most modern sense of this term, I mean to say, the free and noble development of human nature, as opposed to that taste for abjection and ugliness which had led the Middle Age astray, the re-habilitation, in one word, of all that Christianity had too arbitrarily branded under the general name of *the world* and of worldly vanities. Superior even to Charlemagne by the elevation with which he grasped this ideal, he encountered an invisible obstacle in the religious institutions of his century. We shall never fully realise how much there was of rage and indignation in the heart of this man, when from his palace at Capua, surrounded by the wonderful things he had created, he saw all his work stopped by a bishop and by a number of begging monks at the distance of a few miles. But the Arabs whom Frederic counted in large numbers amongst the subjects of the *Two Sicilies*, answered very much better to his views and purposes. He could say as did Philip Augustus: "Happy Saladin who has no Pope!" He did not perceive the great flaw which Mahomedan civilisation carried in its bosom; his rage and certain bad instincts closed his eyes to the fatal arrest which ever since has doomed Mahomedan States to perish, in the absence of a counterpoise, under the hard pressure of a materialistic despotism. His insatiable curiosity, his analytical spirit, and his unquestionably superior knowledge combined to bring him nearer to this ingenious race who in those days represented to his eyes the liberty of thought and of rational science. He liked the Arabic towns of Lucera and of Foggia with their mosques, their schools, their bazaars and even their markets. It was assuredly a strange spectacle, this crusade, in which the

the most casual union reigning between the Emperor and the chief of the infidels, to the great vexation of their fanatical armies. The scandal reached its height, when Frederic visited Jerusalem. He appeared in this place, the holiest in Christendom, only to scoff openly at Christianity; the Imam of the Mosque of Omar who accompanied him relates many jests by which this strange pilgrim signalised his visits to the holy places. He chatted on mathematics and philosophy with the Mahomedan scholars, and addressed some very difficult problems on these different sciences. The Sultan, on his side, sent to the Emperor the gift of an artificial globe which represented the movements of the Heavens, and of the planets⁽¹⁾ How the times are changed! Here we see the temporal chief of Christendom and the chief of the infidels (Sultan) harmonising in the great community of the human spirit and spending their time in sending problems of geometry to each other, twenty years before Louis IX dreamt of a crusade during the very same century, already won by infidelity. The court of Frederic, and later on, of Manfred, became in this manner an active centre of Arabic culture and of religious indifference. The Emperor knew Arabic, and had learnt dialectics from a Mahomedan of Sicily. The Cardinal Ubaldini, friend of Frederic, openly professed materialism. The orthodoxy of Michel Scot and of Pierre des Vignes was greatly suspected. Men of evil nature abounded in his court. People saw there eunuchs, a harem, astrologers from Bagdad in long robes, and Jews richly pensioned by the Emperor for translating works on Arabic science. All this was transformed in the popular belief into criminal relations of Astharoth and Beelzebub:—

“Amisit astrologos et magos et vates,
Beelzebub et Astharoth proprios penates.
Tenebrarum consulens perguos potestates,
Speverat Ecclesiam et mundi magnates.”

—The Italian poet who celebrated the victory of Parma in 1248.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ See M. Reinand, p. 426, 431 et suiv. De Raumer, *Gen. Hist. de l'Europe*, p. 111, 7th Ed. Bach, &c., *Reinhold's Register*, p. 128.

One of the most curious memorials of Frederic's relations to Arab philosophers has been discovered by Monsieur Amari. Towards the year 1240, the Emperor sent to the scholars of different Mahomedan countries a series of philosophical questions about which, it appears, they were not able to satisfy him. He addressed, as a case of despair, to the Almohade Khalif Rashid to find out the whereabouts of Ibn-i-Sabin of Murcia, who was then the most celebrated philosopher of the West in Spain, and to make his programme of questions pass on to Ibn-i-Sabin. The Arabic text of Frederic's questions and the replies of Ibn-i-Sabin have been preserved for us, in an Oxford manuscript, under the title of *The Sicilian Questions*. The eternity of the world, the method that suits metaphysics as well as theology, the value and number of the categories, the nature of the soul: these are the points on which the Emperor asked for light from the infidels. The replies of Ibn-i-Sabin betray somewhat of embarrassment. He sent them to the Emperor through the intermediary of his government, and we feel at every line and sentence the precautions of incredulity, forced to dissimulate its true opinions. On delicate points, he asks for a personal interview with the Emperor, or he requests the favour of sending some one to whom he would give the replies in secret. Sometimes he even requests the Emperor to put the questions in a more obscure and in a more difficult manner of comprehension. "Because" says he "in this country, when it relates to such matters, the spirits are sharper than swords and scissors..... If our doctors knew for certain, that I had sent replies to certain portions of these questions, they would regard me with the same eyes as the questions themselves, and I do not know, if God, in His powers and mercy would help me or not to get out of their hands." Ibn-i-Sabin never saw Frederic, and to speak the truth the pedantic and impertinent tone which he saw himself obliged to assume towards him to flatter the prejudices of his own countrymen was not calculated to render his stay possible in the court of the jealous Emperor. Other questions of the same kind have been preserved for us by the Jew, Juda ben-Salomen-Cohen, author of a philosophical encyclopædia. The Jew replied to them in Arabic.

passed subsequently on to Italy, and there translated his encyclopaedia from Arabic into Hebrew, always supported by the patronage of Frederic. The name of another Arab physician, Takiuddin who was received in Sicily with distinction by the Emperor has also been preserved.

These relations, carried on with the Mahomedan *savants* were undoubtedly the source of the tradition which made the sons of Averroes stay in Frederic's court, a tradition which was repeated by Gilles de Rome. The passage of this author which we have quoted above (p. 254) has given rise to serious blunders. People have said, that Gilles de Rome *had seen* the two sons of Averroes in Frederic's court. Naude, Vossius, Bayle, and those who have copied these blunders, have even supposed, that they referred to Frederic Bascharossa.⁽¹⁾ But Gilles de Rome only reported a vague tradition, which he does not uphold by his own testimony, and this circumstance *qui diebus nostris obiit* evidently proves, that it relates to Frederic II. The hardly natural manner in which the passage in question has been brought in, would leave us to believe, that it is rather a marginal gloss, introduced into the text. Whatever that may be, this rumour too easily accepted is in manifest contradiction to what Ibn-Abi-Oceibia tells us about the sons of Averroes. The Arabian tastes of Frederic II, and his love of science, perverted by the hatred of the *Mendians* and by the natural suspicion which the common people cherish for all rational sciences, gave rise to the strangest of all rumours, and to the most extravagant of all calumnies in the world.

XV.

The heterodox movement of the Middle Age develops into two currents quite distinct of which the one, characterised by the *Eternal Gospel*, includes the mystical and the communistic tendencies which, starting from Joachim de Flore, and after having filled up the 12th and the 13th centuries with Jean de Parme, Gerard de San Dorino Ubertinde Casab, Pierre de Bruys Valdo Dolcino, the

(1.) Naude, *Apologie*, p. 354. Bayle, *Dict. crit. Art. Averroes-Jourdain*, p. 150.
De Gerando, *Historie comp.* t. IV., p. 462.

Brothers of the free Spirit, are continued in the 14th century by the German mystics, and the other resuming itself in the blasphemy of *The Three Imposters*, represents materialistic incredulity arising from the study of the Arabs and hiding itself behind the name of Averroes. It was neither a hazard, we must confess, nor a caprice of the popular imagination which established a close affinity between this incredulity and the Mahomedan philosophy. The position which Islamism assumed at first in the midst of religions more anciently established was a sort of appeal to comparison, and naturally provoking this thought, that each religion has only a relative truth and ought to be judged by the moral effects it produces. The parallel of *the three religions* was openly proposed in the schools of the Motecallemins of Bagdad.⁽¹⁾ A book like that of Scharistani, exposing with impartiality the condition of religious and philosophical sects which divide the world, while acknowledging the good points of each, was only possible in the Middle Ages in the bosom of Islam. It is an astonishing thing with what facility a comparison of different religions offers itself to the spirit of the Mahomedans. "The Christians" says Aboulola, wander here and there in their ways, and the Mahomedans are entirely out of the road; the Jews are nothing but mummies and the Magi of Persia are dreamers." "Jesus" says he elsewhere, "came to abolish the law of Moses; Mahomet followed him and established five prayers a day. Tell me now, do you enjoy, more or less, either of the sun or of the moon, since you have begun to live under any of these laws?"⁽²⁾ The Sufis profess the same indifference. "When there is nothing but *Me and Thee*, what does it matter whether it is the Kaaba, of the Moslems, or the synagogue of the Jews or the convent of the Christians?"⁽³⁾ Finally, the Arab historians speak without much astonishment of people who have no religion, or of men, like Batou or Tamerlane, who held themselves aloof from all established religions. The mixture of religions in Andalusia served to inspire similar ideas. Thence arose the Deism of Maimonides, and that strange book, *Khoz*

(1). Dozy, *Journal Asiatique* (1853).

(2). D'Herbelot, *Aboulola*.

(3). De Sacy, *Journal des Savants*, (1822).

where the author makes the theologians of the three religions, Jewish, Christian and Mahomedan, as well as a philosopher discuss against one another. Thence arose also according to all probability, the charming story of *The Three Rings* which has provided Boccaccio with one of his most piquant stories and has inspired Lassing with the idea of his *Nathan, the Wise*. We have found the bold phrase, *loquentes trium legum* frequently turning up under the pen of Averroes. We cannot doubt, that this phrase has greatly contributed to the reputation of incredulity which lay on him during the whole of the Middle Ages. "Averroes" says Gilles de Rome, in his *De Erroribus philosophorum*, renewed all the errors of philosophy, but he is much less excusable, inasmuch as he attacks much more directly our religious faith. Independently of the errors of philosophy, people reproached him as having condemned all religions as we see in the II and the XI books of the *Metaphysics*, where he blames both the Scriptures of the Christians as well as of the Saracens, because they both admit the doctrine of *Creation out of nothing*. He blames religion also in the commencement of the III book of the *Physics*; and what is far worse, he calls all of us, we and all, who hold by religion, as *prattlers* and *babblers* devoid of reason. In the VIII book of the *Physics*, he censures also religion, and calls the opinions of theologians as *phantasies*, as if they imagine them by caprice, and not by reason." Two pages further on, Gilles de Rome, resuming the heterodox views of Averroes, makes him say: *Quod nulla lex est vera licet possit esse utilis*. Nicolas Eymeric repeats the same charges and the same paradoxes.

We see here, that it was not without some reason, that public opinion charged Averroes with the phrase *The Three Imposters*. The parallel of the three religions was hardly dreamt of at this period, I mean, of the delicate, profound and the eminently religious signification of *The Three Rings*. It was by their pretended impostures, and not by their common celestial origin, that the different cults were brought near each other. This idea which, like a painful dream, followed the whole of the 13th century, was, no

doubt, the fruit of Arabian studies, and the result of the spirit of the court of the Hohenstauffen. It came to light anonymously without anybody's venturing to avow it; it is like temptation, like Satan, hidden at the bottom of the heart of the century. Adopted as a blasphemy and regarded by others as a calumny, the term of *the three Imposters* became, in the hands of the *Mendians* a terrible weapon always in reserve for ruining their enemies. Did they want to defame anybody, to make him a new Judas in public opinion, he was accused of having said, that there had been *Three Imposters*.....and the term remained as a *stigma*. What a lot of people know Voltaire only by the notorious phrase: *Mentons, Mentons toujours* (*Lie, let us lie always!*) which this great man said in a sense entirely different from what is attributed to him. All the enemies of the friars must have soon pronounced this blasphemy. The adversaries of Frederic could not imagine anything better to make this Prince the precursor of anti-Christ. "This pestilential King" wrote Gregory IX, "assures us, that the world has been deceived by *Three Imposters* (*tribus baratoribus*); that two of them died in glory, whereas Jesus was hanged on the cross. Moreover, he clearly maintains in loud voice, or rather he ventures to lie to such an extent as to say, that all those are fools who believe, that God, the Almighty Creator, was born of a virgin. He maintains the heresy, that no man can be born except by the union of man and woman. He adds, that we should absolutely believe nothing except that which is proved by the laws of things and by natural reason." In order to strike popular imagination with greater success, this phrase became *a book*. Averroes, Frederic, Pierro des Vignes, Arnould de Villeneuve, Boccacio, Pogge, Pierre Aretin, Machiavelli, Symphorin Champier, Pomponat, Carden Bernardin, Ochin, Servet Guillaume Postel, Campanella, Muret, Jordano Bruno, Spinoza, Hobbes and Vanini have been successively called as the authors of this mysterious book which nobody ever saw (I am in error; Marsonne saw it, but in Arabic!) and which has never existed! Often a century hardly dares confess to itself all its wicked thoughts, and likes to hide

them under a borrowed name on which it subsequently discharges all its maledictions for the relief of its conscience. When the King Philip le Bel wanted to cry down Boniface VIII, he imputed to him a series of blasphemies, drawn from the style of sceptical materialism that had served to defame Frederic II.⁽³⁾

It was the same process which led to the formation of the legend of Averroes, the infidel. There are three religions, this impious man had said, of which the one is *impossible*, that is Christianity; the other is a religion for children, that's Judaism; and the third is the religion of porc, that's Islamism. Then every one began to gloss in his own way, and made Averroes think and say what he did not venture to say in his own name. Why is the Christian religion an *impossible religion*? The great stone of scandal, the mystery before which even vanquished reason itself has always cried out: *Take this cup away from me*: the *Eucharist* seemed to have troubled the conscience. Averroes has called Christianity an *impossible religion on account of the Eucharist*.

One day, so it is said, this unbeliever entered a Christian church. He saw there the faithful who were feeding on their Lord. "Horror"! cried he "is there in the world a religious sect more stupid than these Christians, who eat the God whom they worship?" It was from this moment, that this unfortunate man ceased to believe in any religion and said, parading the words of Balaam: 'May I die the death of a philosopher'! Others made Averroes run through all the grades of incredulity. He had started by being a Christian, then he became a Jew, then a Mahomedan, and then he renounced every religion. It was then that he wrote the book, *The Three Imposters*. Every one made Averroes the interpreter of his own doubts and of his own incredulity. He did not believe in the *Eucharist*, said some; he did not believe in the Devil, said the other; he did not believe in Hell, said a third. Averroes became in this wise the scape-goat on whom every one discharged his incredulous thoughts, the mad dog which, pushed on by an execrable fury never ceased to bark at Christ and at the Catholic faith.

(3.) H. Martin, *Histoire de France*, t. IV, p. 485.

To what epoch are we to trace the formation of this legend? We find no well-marked traces of it either in Albert or in Saint Thomas. On the contrary, Gilles de Rome, Raymond Luke, Duns Scot, Nicolas Eymeric, the paintings of Orcagna, of Traini, of Gaddi, already represent Averroes as the chief of infidelity. Duns Scot incessantly calls him : *ille maledictus Averroes*, i. e., *that accursed Averroes*. The epithet, *impossible* which Averroes, according to the legends, applied to Christianity, is already found mentioned in Raymond Lulle as a blasphemy of the Averroists. It is, indeed, probable that the greater part of these stories had their origin about the year, 1300. In the poem called, "Le Tombel de Chartrose," composed between 1320 & 1330, we read the following verses :—

" Helas ! comment la prophécie
Voiez en noz temps accomplie
Qu'end plustost sunt les moizois,
Du maleest Averrois,
Qui fû de toute sa puissance
Aneemi de nostre creance,
Qui eslut vie et mort de beste ;
Quar nul ses oreilles ne preste
Aoir sarmons de la Bible. (1)

Petrarca had certainly in his mind the blasphemous maxims which people imputed to the Arab philosopher when he speaks of the intention he had of refuting him, *by collecting from all quarters his blasphemies*. Gerson designates him only with the words, *the accursed, the enraged barking dog, the bitterest enemy of the Christians*, and expressly imputes to him the blasphemy about *the three religions and the Eucharist*. Benvenuto d' Imola, commenting on the 4th canto of the *Inferno*, is surprised, that Dante should have placed in an honourable position and without any severe penalty an infidel like Averroes, who was the most arrogant of all the philosophers who hit all religions with equal scorn and regarded Christ as the least clever of all the imposters, because he had succeeded only in crucifying himself.

(1). Eugene de Beaurepaire dans les *Memoires de la Soc. des. Antiq. Normandes*, t. XX., p. 237 ; et Charma, l' *Athenoeum*, 1853, p. 47.

XVI.

It is chiefly in the Italian paintings of the Middle Ages, that the role of Averroes regarded as the arch-representative of incredulity appears in all its originality. The scholastic teachings of the Dominicans had penetrated all the intellectual culture of the period in such a manner, that even Art had borrowed from them its objects and personages. The chapter of *Santa Maria Novella*, is, in this respect, a unique remnant, a *Summa* of Saint Thomas in painting. Ambrogio Lorenzetti was the honour of the Siennese school and a scholastic *savant*. Scholasticism was everywhere. In the Campo Santo of Pisa, Buffalmac (others say Pietro d'Orvieto) draws the mystic circles of the earthly intelligences according to the system of Ptolemy, and of the Arcopagite. At Padua, it is the occult and the mysterious science of Pierre de Abano which inspires the alchemistic and archæological frescoes of the vast hall *dalla Ragione*, and those still more bizarre ones of Guariento *aux Ermites*. At Sienna, Taddeo Bartolo paints in the palace *della Signoria*, the great philosophers of antiquity, to wit, Aristotle, Cato of Utica, Curius Dentalus; philosophy found its place even in the celebrated mosaics in *clair-obseur* of the Cathedral: Hermes Trismegiste there presents his *Pimandre* to a Christian and a heathen who equally accept it; Virtue is seated on a steep rock which Socrates and Crates climb up with effort. The Perugian school followed the same traditions. It is also the philosophers of antiquity who figure on the walls of the admirable hall of the *Cambio* of Perugia, and even at the very moment when painting renounces all its peculiarities of the Middle Ages, it is Raphael who resumes all the philosophical ideas of his time in the school of Athens. The first painting in which figures Averroes is the *Hell* of Andre Orcagna in the Campo Santo of Pisa executed about the year 1335. The drama of the other life, the last Judgment, and the three states of the soul beyond the grave had become the picture frame of all the conceptions, religions, philosophical, poetical and satirical of Italy of the Middle Ages. Pisa, Florence, Assisi, Orvieto, Bologna, Ferrara, and Padua had each a *Hell* and its last judgment, full of local allusions and of personal

malice of the painter. In the *Hell* of *Campo Santo*, the reminiscences of Dante are incontestable. We cannot, however, maintain, that Orcagna had really intended, as he did later on at the *Santa Maria Novella* and at the *Santa Croce*, to reproduce all the Dantesque topography, taken as a geographical revelation of the country beyond the grave. If the division in pits (*bolge*) reminds us of the *Divine Comedy*, the details of the infernal categories are far from corresponding to those of *Alligheri*. Amongst these pits the two which occupy the higher compartments are destined for the proud, and the proud, *per excellence* are the heretics. Arius appears as the first, followed by his disciples; then come the Magi and the soothsayers, Erigene at their head; then the Simoniacs. But the pit on the right side seems to be reserved for more exquisite tortures, and the individuals who are being tortured there evidently belong to the class of the damned. It is, in the first place, Mahomet, torn to pieces by the devils who devour pieces of his limbs before his own eyes; then the Anti-Christ flayed alive; then a third individual, lying on the ground, coiled fast in the folds of a serpent and characterised by his turban and his long beard: *That's Averroes*.

In this manner, *Mahomet*, *Anti-Christ* and *Averroes*: these are the three names on whom Orcagna, an interpreter of the ideas of his time discharges all that is odious in unbelief. We must remember, that Dante regarded Mahomet only as the author of a schism, and Islamism only as an Arian heresy. Averroes evidently represents by the side of the false Prophet the sceptical blasphemer, who has ventured to embrace in a three-fold blasphemy the religion of Moses, of Christ and of Mahomet.

This rôle, as we know, is by no means in the traditions of Dante. Dante, with a remarkable tolerance had placed the Arab philosopher whom he had so energetically opposed in a region of peace and of melancholy repose amongst the great men:

“*spiriti magni,
Ohedi vederti in me stesso n'esalto.*”

Here, on the contrary, Averroes is only the companion of the tortures of the Anti-Christ. The same data would undoubtedly

be found in the other *Hells* of the same epoch. The church of the Saint Petrone of Bologna offers, in one of its chapels, a composition, attributed to Buffalmacco, and very similar to that of the Campo-Santo.

My curiosity was vividly excited when on examining this painting, I saw on one side Mahomet, and on the other a personage whose name offered only an initial and that initial was precisely that of the name of Averroes. But having brought a ladder to examine more closely the trace of the effaced letters, I recognised the word, *Apostala*. The rôle of Averroes is not less characterised in another order of compositions, inspired by the Dominicans, I mean, *the disputes of Saint Thomas*, in which the Commentator invariably figures amongst the heresiarchs prostrated at the feet of the master of scholastics. It is in the church of Saint-Catharine in Pisa, quite resplendent with Saint Thomas, close to the chair where the angelic Doctor is said to have taught, that we find the most curious monument of this theme, so dear to the schools of Pisa and of Florence. The painting of which we speak here and which must have been executed about the year 1340, had for its author Francesco Traini, one of the best painters of the 14th century. In the centre of the picture, in the midst of fascies of light, stands out in grand proportions the head of Saint Thomas, very conformable to the accepted type which was subsequently reproduced by Angelica de Fiesoli. Vasari even asserts, that the preaching friars of Pisa sent for the portrait of Saint Thomas from the abbey of Fosseneuve for Traini, where the saint had died in 1274. It is, indeed, *the good friar Thomas, the dumb ox of Sicily*, ruminating some article of his *Summa*. On the top of the picture, God, the source of all light, surrounded by seraphims, spreads His rays on Moses the Evangelists and Saint Paul, all suspended in the clouds. All these rays are reflected on the forehead of Saint Thomas who receives, besides, three rays direct from God. On both sides of the picture, a little below the resplendent head of the angelic Doctor appear Plato and Aristotle. Plato holds in his hands his

dialogue, *Timaeus*, while Aristotle his book on *Metaphysics*, and from each of these books, a small thread of gold mounts up to the face of Saint Thomas, and there mixes up with the flood of Divine light which descends from above. Saint Thomas, seated in his chair, holds in hand the volume of the Holy Scriptures, open at the words: *Veritatem meditabitur guttur meum et tabula mea detestabuntur impium* (Prov. XVIII, 7). On his knees are spread his various works, and just as the head of the Saint served as a point of reunion for all the luminous rays, going out from God, from Moses, from the Evangelists, from Saint Paul from Plato and Aristotle, his voluminous writings serve as a point of departure for another series of rays which go to spread on all the doctors of church grouped on two sides at his feet. One single ray seems to wander on an isolated individual in front of the picture, and prostrate at the feet of Saint Thomas. This individual and this *infidel* whom the lips of the Doctor detest is Averroes. He is there in an attitude of haughty meditation, painfully raising himself on his elbow indignant and swearing like a rebel that he is, fallen out with God and all mankind. His *Great Commentary* is by his side, open but turned upside down, and transferred by the ray that emanates from Saint Thomas. Such is the picture, arrived to us across five centuries which we could call the most original monument of the philosophical painting of the Middle Ages, if art, religion, science and pleasure had not combined to create *Santa Maria Novella*, that charming *resume* of Florentine life with its poetic, artistic, scientific and gallant *souvenirs*. Here also between Pampinea and Marsile Ficin, Genevra de' Benci and Savonarola, we find Averroes again, sacrificed at the triumph of Saint Thomas. Santa Maria Novella is a Dominican Church, and the most insignificant monument of the influence which the preaching friars exercised in Florence up to the day when they came to govern it by fra Girolamo and Dominico di Pescia. It is this victory of the order of Saint Dominic which Toddio Gaddi and Simon Memine undertook to represent in the capitulary hall adjoining the church, and known to-day under the name of the *Capellone degli Spagnuoli*. Around the

Church figured by Santo Maria del Fiore, Cimabue; Giotto, Arnolfo, Petrarca, Laura, la Fiametta, turned into symbols like Beatrice, represent the attributes of the Church militant. At the feet of the Pope, is the flock of the faithful; two dogs representing the order of Saint Dominic (*Domini Gani*) watch as his guards. Wolves (heretics) fall on the flock, but the dogs of the Saviour, marked in black and white (colours of the Dominicans) devour them with open jaws. Side by side with the pursuit of heretics is painted the more pacific work of preaching. Here the heretics conquered and submissive, throw themselves on their knees and tear their books with all the signs of repentance. Above the Church militant is the calm of the triumphant one. The soul, figured by a child which a woman drags by her hand, gradually mounts there by detachment from the world. Further beyond, is the glory and the joys of Heaven.

Memmi has represented in this admirable fresco the theological triumph of Saint Dominic, Gaddi has attempted to point *via-a-vis* the philosophical triumph of his order by the predominant mastership of Saint Thomas. The angelic Doctor occupies the centre of the picture; his chair dominates all the rest. On his sides, are seated a good and respectable company: these are ten personages from the Old and the New Testaments, Moses, Isaiah, Solomon, the King David, Job, the Evangelists, and Saint Paul. At his feet, on a kind of *proscenium*, as if unworthy to appear in such a noble choir are the heretics whom he has crushed, Arius, *Safellius* and *Averroes*, plunged in a sort of morose reverie, like people dissatisfied with Truth and whom no refutation can ever deprive of their pride. Averroes, as in the picture of Traini, is characterised by his turban, and supports himself on his *Great Commentary*. Below, Gaddi has represented in two different lines the seven profane and the seven sacred sciences with their chief representatives: Grammar and Priscien, Rhetoric and Cicero, Dialectics and Zenon, Music and Jubalcain, Astronomy and Atlas, Geometry and Euclid, Arithmetic and Abraham, holding a board for reckoning. Then come Civil Law and Justi-

nian, ecclesiastical law and Clement VI, practical Theology and Pierre Lombard, speculative Theology and Saint Denys the Areopagite, Boethius and demonstrative Theology, with his triangle (representing the three terms of a syllogism), Saint Jean Damasane and contemplative Theology, Saint Augustine and scholastic Theology, holding in his hand the bow of controversy.

Such is the grandiose composition in which with a marvelous art Gaddi has known how to group all the philosophical ideas of the century. Averroes keeps to his role in it. There as everywhere, he represents the heretic, the evil-thinking man, prostrate at the feet of the scholastic and orthodox severity of the Dominican school. Moreover, the data of the controversy of Saint Thomas were continued for a very long time in the school of Pisa. More than a century after Traini and Gaddi, at the moment when Pisa was raising herself from her disasters, we find the same theme under the pencil of the charming decorator of the Campo Santo, Benozzo Gozzoli. This picture which was formerly placed in the Cathedral of Pisa behind the see of the Bishop, is at present in the Louvre Museum. It is evident, that Gozzoli intended to reproduce trait by trait the plan of the picture by Traini. The order and the individuals are identical: Saint Thomas in the centre, his works on his knees, in his hand an open book with this terrible threat: *Labia mea detestabuntur impium*; above, Christ, the Evangelists, Moses and St. Paul; on both sides, Plato and Aristotle; below, the Pope and the doctors illuminated by Saint Thomas; at his feet, a personage lying on his whole length, and turning over the pages of a book on which we read: *El faciens causas infinitas in primum librum Aristotelis*.

A persistent tradition up to this time has recognised in this prostrate personage whom Saint Thomas seems to push outside the plan of the picture, Guillaume de Saint-Amour. In fact, we have already seen Guillaume play in the legends of Saint Thomas a rôle parallel to that of Averroes, and like him is sacrificed at the triumph of the Dominican doctor. It is, moreover, certain, that the painter had the intention to paint in the lower part of his picture the

Assembly of Anagni of 1256, presided over by Alexandre IV in which was condemned the doctrine of the University of Paris on monastic poverty. The personages who figure there beside the Angelic Doctor, are Saint Bonaventura, Jean des Ursins Hugues de Saint-Chair, Albert le Grand, and Humbert de Romans. Nevertheless, the *rapprochement* between the paintings of Pisa and of Florence of which I have spoken above, does not permit us, it appears to me, to doubt, that here also the accused is no other than Averroes. In the first place, the personage of Gozzoli, like Averroes of Traini, has a thick beard; he wears a turban and Cordovan boots: The big volume which he holds in his hands looks far more like the *Great Commentary* than the small books of Guillaume of Saint Amour. Moreover, it is evident, that Gozzoli, in his painting, yielded to no living inspiration, that he simply intended to reproduce with some variations the picture of Traini. How then can we suppose, that he has only modified a tradition whose original meaning he did not possess, and that he has introduced in his work an individual entirely foreign to the school of Pisa and whom probably he did not know himself? Finally, that which removes all doubt, is that Guillaume de Saint-Amour figures in the lower portion of the picture no longer in the costume of an Oriental Jew, but with the external appearance which suits a doctor of the University of Paris. What might be the origin of this theme conserved for such a long time by the schools of Pisa and of Florence? People have supposed, that Gaddi had only realised in his painting in *Santa Maria Novella* the ideas which fra Domenico Cavatco had communicated to him. At any rate, we cannot doubt when we find Averroes playing exactly the same *role* in the three paintings executed on the same theme and almost about the same years (from 1335 to 1340), that Orcagna, Traini and Gaddi had derived their inspiration from the same source. But this source can be determined with certainty: it is the legend of Guillaume de Tocco. We recollect, that Guillaume, enumerating the heretics vanquished by Saint Thomas places Averroes in the first rank. The painters received from the monks a *libretto* which sketched a plan of the composition with the personages who ought

to figure in it, and this written canvas was usually only the production of a legend then in vogue. The canonisation of Saint Thomas which took place in 1323 and in which Guillaume de Tocco took a prominent part had vividly drawn attention to this side. I have, therefore, no hesitation to see in the legend of Saint Thomas the origin of the role which Averroes plays in the disputes of Saint Thomas. As to his place in the Hell of Orcagna, perhaps Raymond Lulle who went to Pisa on two occasions and who in 1307 finished his *Arsbrevis* there, was not a stranger to this conception.

The personality of Averroes ceased to be familiar to the Italian painters of the 16th century. It was a mistake that people wanted to find him in the school of Athens of Raphael. The personage with a turban for his head-dress who bends to contemplate the table of Pythagoras, is indeed an Arab; but it seems, that Raphael wanted to signify by it, that the Arabs had borrowed their arithmetic or their philosophy from the Greeks. Raphael was too well-informed, to connect Averroes with Pythagoras rather than with Aristotle. In any case, the cycle of ideas which Raphael has represented in this admirable composition has no relation whatever, either with scholastic or Averroistic philosophy. It is the triumph of Greece and the development of the Grecian spirit which he had in view; Plato is for him the author of the *Timæus*. Aristotle that of *the Ethics*. If it was necessary to indicate the school from which this incomparable painter had borrowed the theme and the plan of his *fresco*, we should be most inclined to think of Marsile Ficin.

XVII.

In this way, in all scholastic philosophy, Averroes maintains a double personality. On the one hand, it is Averroes who has written the *Great Commentary*, the interpreter *par excellence* of the philosopher, Aristotle, respected even by those who opposed him, and on the other, it is Averroes of the Campo Santo, blasphemer of religions and the father of sceptics. It may be

seem strange, that during an epoch of absolute faith, these two roles do not exclude each other and that the same man could at the same time be the classical teacher of the catholic schools, and the precursor of the Anti-Christ. But as we have already remarked, the Middle Age found it quite natural to ask for lessons in philosophy from those whom religious faith was bound to condemn. The profound separation that was established between philosophy and revelation permitted the belief, that the heathens might have surpassed Christians in natural enlightenment. A historian should not, therefore, be more surprised to see bishops, perhaps even a Pope coming out of the school of Toledo than the archæologist, when he finds amongst the treasures of the Middle Ages, ecclesiastical ornaments, made of Arabian stuffs and covered with sentences from the Koran.

It is chiefly in the 14th century, that the *Commentary* becomes absolute and incontestable. In the 13th century, Averroes holds in public opinion a place lower than Avicenna. Humbert de Prulli, in 1291, enumerating the commentaries which he has utilised for his exposition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, places Averroes only in the fourth rank.⁽¹⁾ During the 14th and the 15th centuries Averroes, on the contrary, is the commentator *par excellence*, the only one who is copied and the only one who is quoted. Petrarca considers him as the first, the only perhaps who has commented on the complete works of an ancient author. Patrizzi regards him as the father of all scholasticism, and the only commentator when the Middle Ages have known.⁽²⁾

When Louis XI undertakes in 1473 to regulate philosophical instruction, the doctrine which he recommends is that of Aristotle, and of his commentator Averroes, acknowledged for a long time as sound and reliable. In a letter, dated from Haiti (October, 1498) Christopher Columbus mentions *Avenruyz*, according to a quotation from Pierra d' Ailly as one of the authors who have made him conjecture the existence of the New World.⁽³⁾

(1). *Hist. litt. de la France* t. XXI, p. 88 & 89.

(2). *Discuss. Peripat.* t. I, l. XIII, p. 108.

(3). Navarrete, *Collection de voyages y descubrimientos*, t. I, p. 261.—Humboldt, *Histoire de la découverte du Nouv. Cont.* t. I, p. 67, 78, 97, 98.

People might have noticed, that it was not without some difficulty that we have traced the Averroists of the 13th century. The refutations of the Dominican school and the insane fury of Raymond. Lulle have alone revealed their existence to us. It would be impossible to mention by name only one of the Professors who professed those views. This was no longer the case in the 14th century. We find in it a school which very decidedly bears on its flag the name of Averroes; this philosophical group which we should regard as the natural precursor of the Paduan school offers characteristics sufficiently defined; substitution of the commentary of Averroes as a text for lessons in place of Aristotle's treatises; innumerable questions on the soul and on the intellect; manner, abstract, pedantic and unintelligible.

The Carmelite Jean de Baconthorp (dead in 1346) is the most remarkable personage of this school. His name always appears, accompanied by the epithet of *the Prince of Averroists*.⁽²⁾ Baconthorp was the provincial head of the Carmelites in England, and became the doctor of his order, as Saint Thomas was that of the Dominicans, Duns Scot of the Franciscans, and Gilles de Rome of the Augustinians. Through him, Averroism became traditional in the Carmelite school. We see, indeed, that during the first years of the 18th century, a monk of this order, Joseph Zagaglia de Ferrare had the notion of reviving the method of Baconthorp and to apply it to theology. Baconthorp, moreover, tries less to maintain the heterodox doctrines of Averroism than to palliate its heterodoxy. He rejects the doctrine of the unity of Intellect, but after having showed previously how little the arguments of Saint Thomas and of Herve Nedellec are conclusive against the true meaning of Averroes. Averroes could not have pretended to establish as true and demonstrative a hypothesis which would be in contradiction to his own principle. It was only a fiction on his part; an exercise of logic and a thesis proposed for discussion and capable of bringing other truths to light. The Averroistic theories of the perception of separate substances, of celestial in-

(2). *Averroistarum princeps dictus* Bibliotheca Carmelitana, col. 743.—Du Roulay, *Hist. Univ. Paris*, t. IV, p. 995.—Naude *Apologie des grands hommes*, p. 390.

telligences, of the influence of Heavens on sublunary things and of the eternity of the world are generally explained away in a most qualified form. It is because of the great use he made of the works of Averroes and of the authority he accords to him rather than for his doctrines, that Baconthorp deserved to be considered as the representative of Averroism in the 14th century, and to be accepted as a classic in the Paduan school. We shall see later on the strange falsehood with which this reputation inspired Vanini.

Walter Barleigh ought to be ranged in the same philosophical group. Zimara frequently quotes him as an Averroist, and indeed he was very much copied at Venice and at Padua during the 15th century. Pierre Auriol and all the fastidious scholasticism of the 14th and the 15th centuries Pierre de Tarentaise, Nicolas Bonnet, Gabriel Beal; the Occamistic school in particular, Buridan, Marsile d'Inghen belong to the same type. The ideas had no longer enough of originality to establish a classification amongst the teachers, sufficiently near one another by their dull and pale physiognomy.

Averroism is in one sense only the name of that scholasticism from the *Quaestiones* and the *Quodlibeta*, which drags itself along even when dying painfully of old age and inanity till the appearance of modern philosophy. The only reaction tried outside Italy against Averroistic pedantism, was that of John Wessel, of Gainsford, a cultured mind and a philologist, an isolated reflexion of Petrarca, Marsile Ficin, Politien and of Bembo in the midst of barbarous Europe. John Wessel, as all the humanists hated Averroes. He tried to oppose Plato to the routine of Arabian peripatetism and to the theory of unique Intellect, the doctrine of Saint Augustine:—

Unas est magister Deus

In lumine tuo videbimus lumen.⁽¹⁾

(1). Brucker, t. III, p. 859, sqq. t. VI, p. 611.

CHAPTER III.

Averroism in the school of Padua.

I.

The University of Padua deserves a place in the history of philosophy, less for having initiated an original doctrine than for having continued much longer than any other school the ways and habits of the Middle Ages. The philosophy of Padua is indeed, nothing but scholasticism surviving itself and prolonging on an isolated point its slow description somewhat like the Empire of Rome reduced in Constantinople or the Mahomedan domination in Spain contracted within the walls of Granada. Arab peripatetism, personified in Granada takes shelter in the North-East of Italy, and there drags its existence on right into the 17th century. Cremonini, dead in 1631, is properly speaking the last scholastic. How was it, that this insipid philosophy could be so active, in spite of the railleries of Petrarca and the attacks of the humanists in the country which was the first to embrace modern culture? To this question, the answer, it seems to me, is this, that the *Renaissance* was a literary and not a philosophical movement. Barbarous Europe had found in her own bosom the impetus of scientific curiosity, but not the sentiment of the beauty of forms. She now began to do her rhetoric in the school of the ancients. The representatives of the *Renaissance* never duly got hold of philosophy. The philosophical instruction remained thus in the same old grooves: the coarse and pedantic traditions of the Middle Ages perpetrated there; refined spirits held themselves aloof from that house of disputes and bad taste where people spoke a barbarous jargon or where *charlatans* put on the ways of masters: Truth in everything being delicate and fugitive, it is not reserved for dialectics alone to reach it. In geometry and in algebra, where the principles are extremely simple and true in an absolute manner, we can abandon ourselves to the play of formulas and to in-

definitely combine them without feeling uneasy about the realities which they represent. In moral and political sciences, on the contrary, where the principles by their inadequate and always partial expression rest half on the true and half on the false, the results of reasoning are legitimate only under the condition of being controlled at every step by common sense and by experience. A syllogism excludes every *nuance*, and as truth dwells entirely in *nuances*, so syllogism is an useless instrument to find truth in moral sciences. Sagacity, suppleness, and a manifold culture of the mind : *there lies the true logic*. In philosophy the form is at least as important as the main point ; the turn given to the thought is the only possible demonstration ; and in a certain sense, it is correct to say, that the humanists of the *Renaissance*, though to all outward appearance almost exclusively busy how to say things well, were yet more truly philosophers than the Averroists of Padua.

It is true, that the school of Padua alone is not guilty of this strange anachronism. It is not quite accurate to regard scholasticism as finishing in the 15th and the 16th, nor even in the 17th century. Did we not find a famous religious order make the most active opposition to Descartes, in the name of Aristotle, I mean ; the Aristotle of the Schools, or in other words, against the note books which had been transmitted from hand to hand by generations of Professors ? It would be easy to show, that scholasticism has been continued even in our own days, in more than one course of instruction. Nothing equals the strange contrasts which are presented in this respect by the *rotule* or the programmes of the 16th and the 17th centuries which are still preserved in the University of Padua. Side by side with real science represented by Fallop, Fabrice d' Acquapendente, we find Theology taught by a Dominican, *Secundum viam S. Thomae* and by a Franciscan, *Secundum viam Scoti*. Cremonini announces to his auditors, that he will explain the treatise *on Generation and Corruption* and the treatise *on Heaven and Earth* for a remuneration of 2,000 florins, whereas Gallilei with a much lower salary

shall explain the Elements of Euclid.⁽¹⁾ The School of Padua is a school of Professors. Nothing but its class-lessons remain for us, and its class-lessons at this period did not know how to take the shape of books. In this manner, this school has left nothing that deserves study, or could be of some value in the actual state of the human mind. A school of Professors might render great service to science but not represent in all its complexity the ensemble of human nature. The philosophy of Padua, it is Padua itself. Compared to the cities of Tuscany, this city is mediocre and without genius. All the beautiful things, the *Arena*, the *Baptistry*, the *Ragione* and the *Santo* were made there by strangers. What is Saint Anthony, the flower of Padua and a true Paduan creation, compared to Francis d'Assisi or to Catherine de Sienne? Its miracles are of the poorest invention; all its legends are of the worst style. The intellectual movements of Bologna, of Ferrara and of Venice are entirely derived from that of Padua. The Universities of Bologna and of Padua really make only one, at least for medical and philosophical instructions. It is the same Professors who, almost every year, emigrate from the one to the other to get an increase of salary. Padua, on this side, is the *Quartier Latin* of Venice; everything that was taught in Padua was printed in Venice. It is, therefore, well-understood, that under the name of the school of Padua, we include here all the philosophical development of the North-Eastern Italy.

II.

It was chiefly the study of medicine that contributed to found at Padua the reign of the Arabs—Pierre d'Abano deserves in this respect to be considered as the founder of Paduan Averroism. The *Consiliator differentiarum philosophorum et medicorum* is already a prelude to the essays of Zimara and of Tomitanus, trying to put Aristotle and Averroes in harmony. A strange thing, though! Pierre d'Abano knows neither the *Colliget* nor

(1) The story is still told in the University of Padua that after the discovery of the satellites of Jupiter, Cremonini, judging that such a thing was against Aristotle, obstinately refused ever since to look through the telescope!

the medical works of Averroes: all the quotations he made in this author are borrowed from his philosophical works. Under a different title, I mean, by his doubtful reputation and his ambiguous orthodoxy, Pierre d'Abano deserved a good deal more the name of an Averroist. The blasphemous idea of a horoscope of religion subsequently adopted by Pomponat, Pie de la Mirandole, Cardan, and Vanini is announced for the first time, it appears to me, in his writings with a surprising audacity:—"Ex conjunctione Saturni et Jovis in principio Arietis, quod quidem circa finem 960 contingit annum.....totus mundus inferior commutatur ita quod non solum regna, sed et leges et prophetae consurgunt in mundo.....sicut apparuit, in adventu Nebuchod-mosor, Moysi, Alexandri Magni, Nozerei, Machometi."

This was written in 1303. Pierre d'Abano died while his process was going on; the Inquisition, however, took its revenge by having his bones burnt, and his name remained in popular memory, charged with infernal machinations and surrounded by mysterious terrors. The whole medical Faculty of Padua was ever since devoted to Averroism. The medical man formed at that epoch in the North of Italy a rich and independent class, ill-thought of by the clergy and who appeared to have had rather liberal opinions about religion. Medicine, Arabism, Averroism, Astrology and Incredulity became almost synonymous terms. Cecco d'Ascoli was condemned in 1324 by the Inquisition of Bologna to get rid of all his books on Astrology and to attend every Sunday the sermon in the Church because he had spoken against religion; later on, he was burnt, and Orcagna placed him in one of his hells.

The turn of the positive spirit inclined to materialism which dominated in Northern Italy manifested itself; hard spirits began to multiply, and here as everywhere else, tried to hide themselves under the name of Averroes. But the slightly rude forms of peripatetism and the barbarism of the Arabian school hurled the Averroists into a pedantic *morgue* which could not but disgust the more cultivated spirits of Tuscany. The debased

Petrarca seized this *nuance* with an admirable tact : antipathy to medical Averroism is one of the essential traits of his life, and one of the most agreeable caprices of this charming spirit.

III.

Petrarca deserves to be called the first *modern* man, in this sense that he was the first to initiate amongst the Latins the delicate sentiment of ancient culture, the source of all our modern civilisation. The Middle Ages, on several occasions had tried hard to reunite the broken thread and to re-attach itself to classical traditions. But the Middle Ages, notwithstanding its admiration for the classical antiquity never really grasped what was living and fruitful in it. Petrarca, on the contrary, was really an ancient of the classical period. He was the first to re-discover the secret of that noble, generous and liberal way of looking at life which had disappeared from the world since the triumph of barbarism. Petrarca must, consequently have detested the Middle Ages, and all that belonged to it. And the Arab science appeared to him as a relic of the pedantry of that epoch. While the original sources of ancient science were sealed for the Occident, the Arabs had rendered incontestable services. But in the presence of the antiquity itself, these infidel interpreters were nothing but an embarrassment. The ridiculous infatuation of their disciples provoked in the refined and irritable nature of Petrarca a violent access of humour.

This aversion is found at every page of his writings. Petrarca would not be cured even by the prescriptions of Arabic medical science nor even by the remedies which bore Arabic names. " I ask you as a favour " says he to his friend Dondi, " as far as I am concerned, not to take any notice of the Arabs, as if they did not exist, at all. I hate the whole race. I know, that Greece has produced men learned and eloquent ; philosophers, poets, orators, mathematicians all come from there ; there also were born the fathers of medicine ; but the Arab physicians..... I know what they are. For myself, I know their poets, and it

is impossible to imagine anything more public, more enervating and more obscence.....It would be difficult for any one to make me believe, that anything good might come out of the Arabs. And nevertheless, you, learned, men, by what weakness I don't know you overwhelm them with undeserved praises, to such an extent, that I have once heard a physician say, with the evident assent of his colleagues, that if he found a modern physician equal to Hippocrates, he might probably allow him to write, if the Arabs had not already written before him : words which I won't say burnt my heart as a nettle, but transferred it like a stiletto, and would have sufficed to make me throw into fire all my books.....What ! Cicero could be an orator after Demosthenes, Virgil a poet after Homer; Titus Livy and Sallust historians after Heradotus and Thucydides; and after the Arabs, it wouldn't be permitted to write ! We are reputed to have often equalled and sometimes even surpassed the Greeks, and consequently all the other nations, except, say you, only the Arabs ! O, folly ! O, madness ! O, the genius of Italy, slumbering or extinct" ! The hatred of Petrarca for astrologers and medical men came from the fact, that they both represented in his eyes the Arab spirit, and the fatalistic and incredulous materialism. It seems, moreover, that at every age medicine had the privilege to stir up against herself the humanists and a certain class of honest people. The hatred of Petrarca against medical men became almost a fixed idea with Petrarca in his last years. He had had some discussions at Avignon with the physicians of the Pope, who affected to despise poets as useless people and without any profession. It is in this connection that he composed his four books *of invectives against a physician*, a voluminous declamation in which he had collected against the art of healing all the charges imaginable, with a view to reach the conclusion that there is not a single physician in the world in whom we could trust. In a letter to Boccacio, he runs down with malice the charlatanism and the vanity of the medical men of his days who never appeared in public except superbly dressed, riding on magnificent horses, with golden spurs and an air of authority, the fingers resplendent with rings and precious stones. "Little is wanting", says he, "to

they do not arrogate to themselves the honours of a triumph; and, indeed, they *do* deserve a triumph; since there is not a single one amongst them who had not got killed at least 5,000 men; the number exacted for claiming the right to such honours." In another letter, addressed to Pandolfo Malatesta, he relates or probably invents in support of his thesis the gayest of anecdotes. It appears, moreover, that the cultured men of Padua were grateful to him for this campaign against the pedantism of medical men, because long time after, we find a Paduan propose to erect at his own expense a statue to Petrarca on the *Parato della Valle*, on condition of his being permitted to engrave on it :—

Francisco Petrarchae Medicorum hosti infensissimo.

Petrarca's antipathy to everything that smelt of charlatanism made him forget the service which medical schools, in spite of his ridicule, have rendered to the human mind by founding secular and rational science. Every time, that Italy has desired to react against popular superstition, she has fallen into a sort of materialism, harsh, rude and exclusive; Averroes and the Arabs were at this epoch for the free-thinkers of the North of Italy only a pass-word. Nobody could aspire to the title of a clever philosopher unless he was prepared to swear by Averroes. Petrarca himself relates on this subject strange adventures. He received, one day in his library at Venice the visit of one of those Averroists who according to the custom of *modern philosophers*, believe to have done nothing unless they bark against Christ and His supernatural doctrines. Petrarca, having ventured in the course of the conversation to quote some words of Saint Paul, this man raised his eye-brows with disdain "Keep for yourself" said he "doctors of that sort for myself. I have my master and I know in whom I trust." Petrarca tried to defend the Apostle. The Averroist began to laugh. "All right" said he, "remain a good Christian; as for myself, I don't believe a word of all those fables. Your Paul, your Augustine and all those fellows whom you so highly think of, were nothing but babblers. Ah! if you could only read Averroes, you would have seen how far superior he was to all those scamps." Petrarca could hardly restrain his anger;

he took the Averroist by his mantle, bagging him, not to go any more. Another time, Petrarca having quoted Saint Augustine to one of these hardy spirits: "What a pity," said the latter, "that such a great genius should have been taken in by such childish fables. But I have better hopes, and one day you shall, no doubt be one of ours."

It appears, indeed, that for a certain time, Petrarca was exposed to the obsessions of Averroists. His treatise, *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia* is nothing but the report of conversations which he had at Venice with four of his Averroistic friends who kept no stone unturned to bring him over to their party. Petrarca relates at first the efforts they had made for his sake, either individually or collectively and the disgust they showed when they found him taking his own religion seriously and quoting Moses, and Saint Paul as his authorities. Finally, they held council to find out, if it were not a mere waste of time to try to convert him and the resume of their consultation was that *Petrarca was good sort of a man but without literature: Breven diffinitivam hanc tutere sententiam scilicet, me sine litteris virum bonum.* A manuscript of the library of S. S. Jean and Paul has furnished us with the names of these four Averroists. They were, it is said, Leonard Dandolo, Thomas Talento, Zachari Contarini, all three from Venice, and master Guido da Bagnolo of Reggio. Averroism had become fashionable in the high Venetian society. But under this name, there was hidden the most decisive infidelity. "If they did not apprehend the tortures of men much more than those of God, they would venture" says Petrarca "to attack not only the creation of the world according to the *Timæus* of Plato, but also the Genesis of Moses, the Catholic faith and the sacred dogmas of Christ. When this apprehension does not hold them back, and they can speak without any restraint, they directly oppose the Truth; in their secret conventicles, they pretend to know nothing about Christ, but adore Aristotle whom they don't understand. When they dispute publicly, they protest that they speak of faith in the abstract, that is to say, they seek the truth by rejecting truth."

the light by turning their backs towards the sun. But in secret they only blaspheme, and they only start sophisms, jests and sarcasms to the great applause of their hearers. And why should they not treat us as illiterate folks when they call our master Christ an idiot? For themselves, they go about swollen with their sophistries, satisfied with themselves, and engage themselves into disputes without ever having learnt anything." Petrarca then exposes the subtle questions which such people discuss on the Problems of Aristotle and the difficulties they raise on the problems of creation, the eternity of the world, the Almightyness of God and the supreme felicity of man. "Immortal gods"! said he, "in the eyes of these people, one does not deserve to be called a cultured man unless he is a heretic, a spiteful critic and a fool and unless he goes about the streets and the public places disputing on beasts and showing that he is a beast himself. The more a man attacks the Christian religion with fury, the more he is learned and ingenious in their eyes. If anybody ventures to defend it he is nothing but a weak spirit and fool who hides his ignorance under the veil of faith. For myself adds Petrarca, the more I hear people running down the religion of Christ, and the more confirmed I get in His doctrines. It happens to me as to a son whose filial tenderness might have cooled down, but who, on hearing the honour of his father assailed feels his filial love flaming up again in his own heart, which seemed extinct. I testify in the name of Christ, that frequently the blasphemies of Christian heretics have made me very Christian."

Petrarca did not content himself with these edifying protestations. He had undertaken a formal refutation of the Averroistic errors but he was not able to finish it. Consequently he began to redouble his insistence on one of his friends, Luigi Marsigli, an Augustinian monk, in order to engage him to undertake this work. "I ask of you a last favour," he wrote to him, "it is to be so good, as soon as you have a little leisure, to turn yourself against that rabid dog, Averroes, who, carried away by a blind fury, never cease to bark, at Christ and the Catholic religion. As you know, began to collect from this and that side all

his blasphemies ; but occupations more numerous than ever, and a lack of time such as of knowledge have turned me away from it. Apply all the energy of your mind to this work, which has been so shamefully neglected till now, and dedicate your little work to me, whether I am alive or dead."

We should totally misread the character of Petrarca, if we thought, that this opposition to Averroism had its origin in a narrow-minded bigotry. He who, the precursor of the most vivid aspirations of our modern times, exclaimed two centuries before Luther :—

Dell 'empia Babilonia ond 'efuggita
Ogni vergona, ond 'ogni bene e fori,
Albergo di dolor madre d' errori,
Son fuggit is per allungar la vita,

he who addressed to the Roman people the letter, *De capesenda libertate*, and exclaimed in his enthusiasm for Cola de Rienzi: *Roma mia sera ancor bella!* was not the man to be alarmed at the emancipation of the human mind. But Petrarca bore a grudge against the disdainful haughtiness of the Averroists. This Tuscan, full of tact and *finesse*, could not endure the harsh and pedantic tone of Venetian materialism. Many a refined spirit would rather like to be a believer than to be an unbeliever of bad taste.

IV.

It was the destiny of Averroes to be the chief leader of two roles in history : the one in classical instruction and the other amongst the free-thinkers and other men of the world. These two roles were, however, not without connection with each other. The misuse which people made of the name of Averroes was encouraged by the magisterial authority which he had obtained in the Universities. The usages of a degenerate scholasticism had in a certain way naturalised the Great Commentary in upper Italy. In the first half of the 14th century, Gregory of Rimini, Jerome Perrari, Jean de Jandun and fra Urbano de Bologna present us with those perfectly characteristic teachings which are to

be continued in Padua until the middle of the 17th century. Few authors have been more quoted and subsequently more forgotten than Jean de Jandun. It concerns, however, one of those teachers to whom the prestige of the Universities had awarded the title of *the king of philosophy* and *the prince of philosophers*. Though born in France, and though he had worked with *ecclit* as a Professor in the University of Paris, Jean de Jandun really belonged to the school of Padua. It is there, that his name has remained celebrated; it is there that he came to know Marsile of Padua and perhaps also Pierre d' Albano with whom he entertained constant correspondence from Paris, and who kept him abreast of all Averroistic productions. He like Marsile, took the part of Louis of Bavaria in the quarrel of this Emperor with Jean XXII, co-operated in the famous work, *Defensor pacis*, and saw himself condemned by the Pope in 1328.⁽¹⁾ His *Questions* and his *Commentaries* on Aristotle and Averroes and particularly on *De Substantia orbis* have been printed several times at Venice in 1488, 1496 and 1501. The Imperial Library of Paris (anc. fonds 6452) possesses from him a voluminous commentary of Pierre d' Abano on the Problems of Aristotle. It was through the intermediary of Marsile that Jean de Jandun made the first acquaintance at Paris with the work of Pirra d' Abano. Zimara and the Coimbrois place Jean de Jandun in the list of Aversionists. Averroes was in his eyes *perfectus et gloriosissimus physicus, veritatis amicus et defensor intrepidus*, i. e., a perfect and most glorious physicist and a friend and intrepid defender of Truth. As regards doctrines, Jean de Jandun has none very characteristic. In his commentary, on the *De Substantia orbis*, he defends the thesis of the necessity and the incorruptibility of celestial matter, and refutes the moderns who pretend, that the Heavens, being composed of the same matter as the sublunary world, holds its necessity only from an external cause. In his *Questions* on the treatise on the Soul, he is content to offer with much subtlety the *pros* and *cons* of the Averroistic

(1). Martene, *Thesaurus novus Anecd.* II col. 704 et suiv. J. Wolf, *Lect. Memorab. Centenaire XVI.* t., I, p. 914. Bandini, *Bibl. Leopoldina Laurent* t., III. col. 103. De Boulay, *Hist. Univ. Par.* t., IV, p. 163, &c. Bolliot, *Biographie ardonnaise*, t., II, p. 56.

questions on Intellect: Does the active intellect exist by itself? Does the active intellect form a portion of the human soul? Does the potential intellect comprehend the active intellect with the same intellection? On the chief question: Is the active intellect unique in all men? He has some difficulty in deciding between opposing reasons. Yes, because if there were several intellects the Reason of one man would not be that of another; yes, because by this hypothesis, intellect would be individualised by the body, but it is absurd that a substance that exists before being united to the body should be individualised by that body. No, because the same reason, would prove that intelligence is identical in all, which is absurd. No, because intellect being the first perfection of man my eyes would be constituted as an individual by that which constitutes also the essence of another.⁽¹⁾ No; because it would follow thence, that the same subject is capable of undergoing contrary modifications. No, the intellect being eternal, and the human species being eternal, intellect would be already perfect and full of intelligible species. "For myself" says he, "although the opinion of the Commentator as well as that of Aristotle is well known, I am of opinion, that intellect is not unique, and *that there are as many intellects as there are human bodies*. Jean de Jandun rejects with much more decision an opinion which he distinguishes from that of the Commentator and according to which one eternal soul is said to individualise in everybody by a sort of metempsychosis. He affirms without any hesitation and conformably to theological dogmas, that the soul is formed by a direct creative act of God at the moment of conception. On a great number of other questions concerning intellect and the intelligibles, Jean de Jandun holds equally aloof from the opinions of the Commentator.

The Servite fra Urbano of Bologna is another example of those monks who like Baconthorp proclaimed without fear the name of an Averroist. Mazzuchelli and Mansi believe that he has taught theology at Paris, at Bologna and at Padua. But Tiraboschi observes, that the ancient documents which the father Giantonio

(1). *Ego essem per esse tui, et tu per esse me.*

use of, the analist of the Servite order, speak only of the school of philosophy which fra Urbano held in Bologna. The chief of these works is dated 1334, and he tells us himself, that he was already advanced in age. This work which made him deserve the surname of *the father of philosophy* is a voluminous commentary of the commentary of Averroes on the *Physics of Aristotle*. Antoine Alabanti general of the Servites, had it printed in Venice in 1492, under the title: *Urbanus Averroista philosophus summus ex almfico servorum B. M. V. ordine commentorum omnium Averoy super librum Aristotelis de Physico auditu expositor clarissimus* with a preface by Nicoletti Verinas. The author announces in a prologue his intention of composing a similar commentary on the commentary of the treatise on *Heaven and Earth*. Averroes, as we see, has already replaced Aristotle; it is his text that people comment on in the place of that of the philosopher. Fra Urbano, according to Tiraboschi who had seen a copy of his commentary in the library of Este at Modena, did not hold any of the reprehensible views of Averroes. Moreover, it does not appear, that he had exercised any great influence; because, we do not find any manuscripts of his works in the libraries of Venice and of Lombardy.

About the same epoch, Zacharia Professor of Rhetoric (*eloquentiæ latinæ didusculus*) at Perma, wrote a thesis, *De tempore et motu contra Averoy* which is found in the No. 1749, of the *fonds de Sorbonne*. The work is of meagre value; but it bears testimony, how much the Averroistic questions were in vogue at the time in the schools of the North of Italy in the beginning of the 14th century.

Paul de Venice (dead in 1429), one of the most authoritative doctors of his days, as the great number of the editions and the manuscript copies of his works testify, Paul de Venice, surnamed by general consent as *excellentissimus philosophorum monarcha* i. e., as *the most excellent monarch of philosophers*, admits with a frankness of which we have reason to be surprised in an Augustinian monk, the last consequences of Averroistic theories:—"The

moderns" says he, assert that the intellectual soul multiplies according to the multiplication of individuals, that it is generated, but not subject to corruption; and they maintain, that such is also the opinion of Aristotle. But the true opinion of Aristotle is, that there is only one unique intellect for all men, conformable to the interpretation of the Commentator, and according to the principle, that Nature never abounds in superfluous excess, as she is never lacking also in that which is necessary. This, however, does not mean, that the same soul is happy and unhappy, learned and ignorant both at the same time, all the qualities in the soul being only accidents. The human intellect is uncreated, impassible and incorruptible; it has neither a beginning nor an end; it is not calculated after the number of individuals. As a matter of fact, all that is susceptible of numerical individuality, participates in matter. But the intellectual soul is exempt from every material concretion. The intellectual soul is the last of the wordly intelligences; it is specific of the human species, whereas the *spiritistic* soul by which man is an animal is of the same species as the soul of other animals: this animal spirit is produced and is corruptible."

Paul de Venice is thus to be reckoned in the number of the most decided Averroists. He maintained at Bologna before the general chapter of the Augustinians, composed of more than 800 monks, and with a great air of solemnity, Averroistic theories against Nicolas Fava. His skill in dialectics did not, however, save him from a defeat. The Sienese Ugo Benzi, a personal enemy of Fava who was present at this controversy could not help exclaiming, "Fava is right and thou, Paul, art defeated"! "Good God!" replied Paul de Venice, "see how Herod and Pilate become friends!" At these words, there burst out a general laughter which put an end to the assembly. Paul de Venice is represented to us by his contemporaries as an insolent and presumptuous scholastic; Fava, on the contrary, a friend of Philadelph's, already belonged to the Hellenist school which a century later on was destined to dethrone Averroes. Paul de Pergola, Onofrio de Salmona, *Henricus ab Alemania*, Jean de Lendinara,

Nicolas de Foligno, *Magister Strodus*, Hugues de Sienne, Marsile de Saint-sophie Jacques de Forli, Thomas de Catlaogne, Adam Bouchermefort were all masters famous in their days and zealous partisans of Averroistic scholasticism. No doubt, it is difficult to comprehend the fascination which this philosophy could have exercised on the studious youths who crowded at Bologna and at Padua. A man, devoted to intellectual pursuits feels a great sadness coming over him, when going through the archives of these long centuries of study, he finds buried in oblivion those heaps of superannuated writings of which nothing remains but a few names which nobody now cares to remember. But he consoles himself with the thought, that the cultivation of Reason has an absolute and independent value *per se*, and that each one of those manuscripts of Jean de Jandun and of Paul de Venice, so carefully bearing the name of its owner and of the studies for which it was once utilised, has partially entered into the traditions of science and might have contributed to that great education of the human mind where nothing is ever lost. The abecedary in which Goethe first learnt to read was certainly not a useless book.

V.

Gaetano de Tiene (1387-1465) is usually regarded as the founder of Paduan Averroism. This is surely not correct, because the authority of Averroes was already established at Padua for more than a century when this Professor began to teach in 1436. Nevertheless, Gaetano by his wealth, his social position, his teaching and his writings powerfully contributed to augment the authority of the Great Commentary. Child of an illustrious family of Venice, Gaetano became one of the most important personages of the University of Padua and died as the canon of the Cathedral of that town. His library passed with his own writings to the abbey of San Giovanni in Verdara, one of the principal centres of Averroism, and from thence to Saint Marc where it is still a picture of the studies of that period. The extraordinary number of the copies of Gaetano's lectures which

is found in the libraries of Northern Italy, the luxury of calligraphy which is occasionally manifested in them and the numerous editions which he obtained in the first years of the Printing Art, bear testimony to the vogue which he enjoyed, during the second half of the 15th century in the schools of Italy and even of the whole of Europe.

We should not ask for any original doctrine from Gaetano. Less bold than Paul de Venice, he rejects all the heterodox consequences of peripatetism. In his commentary of the treatise *on the Soul*, finished in 1448, Averroistic questions are pursued in their most subtle distinctions. Gaetano tries to conciliate immortality with the Aristotelian theory of perception—he succeeded in it only by the most extravagant hypotheses. In a psychological thesis, maintained at Padua, Gaetano discusses a problem which seems to have very much occupied the schools of his epoch; namely, if it be necessary to assume a *sensus agens* (a corporeal agent) to explain sensibility in the same way that we assume an *intellectus agens* (an intellectual agent) to explain intelligence. Some people, says Gaetano, pretend that the active intellect produces sensible species which become the elements of sensation, and they attribute, but wrongly, this opinion to Averroes. Others with Jean de Jandun imagine in the sensitive soul as well as in the intellectual soul two kinds of forces, the one passive and the other active. Others, however; and these are nearer the truth do not admit at all the existence of a sensuous or corporeal agent and think, that the sensible objects on one side suffice to produce the species, and that the species on the other side suffice to explain sensation without the intervention of a special agent. In another thesis in which Gaetano discusses the question of the perpetuity of intellect, he resumes himself in the following manner:—The intellectual soul is produced by an immediate creation and then infused into matter. Intellect regarded in an isolated manner is, therefore, produced and corruptible. But the human soul, regarded in the *ensemble* of its faculties is immortal. All this, as we see is indecisive and without character. Averroes is since then the chief of

those who know. Michael Savonarola in his book, *De laudibus Patien*, composed in 1440 calls him: *ille ingenio divinus homo Averroes philosophus, Aristotelis operum omnium commentator i. e.*, that ingenious, divine and philosopher Averroes, commentator of all the works of Aristotle. The Library of Jean de Marcanuova bequeathed by him to the abbey of Saint Jean in Verdara in 1467, and at present at Saint Marc of Venice is almost exclusively composed of Averroistic writings. To enumerate all the Paduans or Bolonese who in the 15th century have commented on Averroes would be to dress up the list of all the Professors of Padua and of Bologna. Claude Betti and Tibere Bazilieri of Bologna, Laurent Molino of Rovigo, Apollinari Offredi, Bartholomo Spina and Jerome Sabionetta saw their lectures adopted as an easy interpretation of the Great Commentator. The celebrated Thomas de Vis Cajetan himself taught after the method of Averroes, and if we are to believe Gui Patin, so well posted in all the rumours which ran through Padua, it was from his teachings that Pomponat drew all his venom. In 1480, the learned Cassandra Fedele of Venice maintained Averroistic thesis at Padua and obtained laurels in philosophy. There was hardly any opposition. The thesis of the minor friar Antoine Trombetta against the Averroists took off nothing of their audacity. The last years of the 15th century are the years of the absolute reign of Averroes in Padua.

To the number of the most determined Averroists of this epoch we must reckon the Theatine Nicoletti Vernias who taught in Padua from 1471 to 1499. Much bolder than Gaetano, Vernias maintained without any qualifications the theory of the unity of intellect to such a degree, that he was accused of having infected all Italy with this pernicious error. It was in his school that Niphus learnt Averroism.⁽²⁾ Vernias subsequently renounced those dangerous views, and wrote in favour of the immortality and the plurality of souls a book which appeared in 1499.⁽³⁾ This work was dedicated to Dominic Girmani, the patriarch of Aquilia,

(2) Naude, I. C.—Niceron, t. XVIII, p. 54.

(3) Facciolati, I. C. p. 89.—Tommasini, *Elogia*, t. II, p. 343 sqq.

to whom Vernias confessed that he was ready to exchange the title of a philosopher for that of a Canon, *sperans se non super philosophi sed canonici titulo aliquando usurum*. This change was due to the friendly exhortations of the Doge Augustino Barberigo and of Pierre Barozzi, Bishop of Padua who later on saved Niphus from the Inquisition and at the same time induced him to correct his errors. Already the debate began to increase in volume and to quit the narrow circle of logical questions in order to enter into the region of moral and religious philosophy. We are at the threshold of the glorious epoch of the school of Padua, that of Niphus, of Achillini and of Pomponat.

VI.

In 1495, old Vernias who by a unique privilege had been able to teach without an antagonist, became negligent; his pupils began to grumble; people put Pierre Pomponat in opposition to rouse him. With Pomponat, there opens a new era for the school of Padua. Up till now, the Paduan philosophy had held itself within the terms of a very inoffensive metaphysics. Paul de Venice, fra Urbano, Gaetano de Tiene, and Vernias himself are nothing but commentators. No life and no thought circulate under this hard crust. Boldness is only in words; the philosophical language, twenty times subtilised had reached so far as to conceal nothing. The psychology is nothing more than a sharp clashing of sonorous words and realised abstractions. Pomponat, on the contrary, represents really the living thought of his century. It is the personality of the human soul, it is immortality, it is Providence and all the truths of natural religion which are placed on trial, and become in the North of Italy objects of the most animated discussions. While duly explaining Aristotle and Averroes according to the usual rule, Pomponat knew how to interest his youthful auditors and to teach them how to philosophise in reality. Paul Jove speaks with admiration of the variety of tone which he knew to employ in his lectures. It is no longer a schoolman but a modern man that we have before us.

In order to open this new tendency, a new name is required. It is that of Alexandre d'Aphrodisias. Averroes shall no more reign alone. Reduced to divide the school, he shall have no more than a few names for himself, and these names shall not always be the most illustrious ones. Such is the origin of the two philosophical factions, known under the names of Alexandrists and of Averroists. We must not, however, attribute a too great importance to this distinction. M. Ritter has gone so far as to call into doubt the very existence of these two parties.⁽²⁾ It is at least certain that the demarcation between these two parties has not that strictness which we might be tempted to expect, and that there were very few teachers in the 16th century whom we could definitively classify as Averroists and Alexandrists. The real division of the peripateticians of the *Renaissance* is that of Arab peripateticians and of Hellenic peripateticians. But this division by no means coincides with that of Alexandrists and of Averroists. The Hellenists, like Leonicus Thomaeus, placed themselves beyond all scholastic disputes. It is therefore, quite erroneously, that certain historians of philosophy, Tennemann for instance⁽¹⁾ have attached a too great importance to this division which is hardly based on a passage of Marsile Ficin's and to which we should never be led by a study of the original sources.

Immortality of the soul is usually regarded as the point of difference between the Alexandrists and the Averroists. Immortality, indeed, was about the year 500 the problem around which the philosophical spirit of Italy was exercising itself, and when the scholars of a University wanted to find out from the very first lecture the doctrines of a Professor, they were in the habit of crying out: "Speak to us about the soul!" The great shock which the moral conscience had received from the political doctrines of the 16th century had turned the anxiety of the spirits towards this side. The Averroists saved appearances by maintaining, that after death the intellect returns to God and there

⁽¹⁾ *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, I. part p. 367 and *suiv.*

⁽²⁾ *Geschichte der Philosophie*, T. IX, p. 63.

loses its individuality. Pomponat embraced the opinion of Alexandre who purely and simply denied immortality. In his book, *De immortalitate animae*, assuming the respectful tone of orthodoxy, he fought Averroism as a monstrous error, justly censured by Saint Thomas and very remote from the thought of Aristotle. The unity of souls appears to him to be an absurd fiction and a nonsense (*figmentum maximum et intelligibile monstrum ab Averroee oxco gelatum*). The Neopolitan Simon Porta, pupil of Pomponat, who wrote after the example of his master against immortality, vigorously attacked, also like his master, the Averroists, reproaching them for reducing knowledge into reminiscence and for supposing the intelligence of a child to be as perfect as that of a grown up man, exactly what the school of Locke found fault with in the innate ideas of Descartes.⁽²⁾ Indeed, we shall presently find the task of refuting Pomponat entrusted by Leon X to the Averroistic Niphus. By a strange turning upside-down of roles, the Averroists who up till now have represented the negation of human personality, become thus for a moment against Pomponat, the defenders of immortality and the props of orthodoxy. Compared to the absolute materialism of the Alexandrists, Averroism represented undoubtedly a certain amount of spiritualism. The theory of active intellect, by maintaining the higher origin and the objective reality of knowledge set aside sensualistic hypotheses. Consequently we find in the middle of the 16th century a partisan of the *tabula rasa* theory Vito Piza, in his book, *De divinis et humane Intellectu* (Padua, 1555) energetically opposing Averroism in the name of empiricism.⁽¹⁾

It is, therefore, by mistake, that people have ranged Pierre Pomponat and Simeon Porta amongst the Averroists and that people have imputed their doctrine of immortality to Averroes; because, on the contrary, Pomponat appeared to the authority of Alexandre only to tear the Averroists to pieces. Notwithstanding, this confusion which Bayle and Brucker have justly noticed

(2). Poli, *Supplimenti*, p. 551 et suiv.

(1). Poli, *Supplim*, p. 561.

was not without some foundation. Italian philosophy, disengaging himself from the abstract discussions of the Middle Ages, had arrived at the point of resuming itself in some questions of a simple materialism: that, the immortality of the soul had been invented by law-givers to keep people under control; that the first man was formed by natural causes; that miraculous effects were nothing but impostures or illusions; that prayer, invocation of saints and the cult of relics were of no efficacy and that religion was made only for simple minds. That's what people called Averroism,—that's what clever and cultivated men maintained in courts and in literary circles, pretending to place the representative of such doctrines above the Evangelists and the Apostles and to make his writings their favourite study. This Averroism of the men of the world was certainly that of Pomponat. Very little was wanting to revive the blasphemy of "The Three Impostors."⁽³⁾ The appearance of religions and their decadence were the effects of the influence of stars. Christianity was already without any life; it had no longer any power to produce miracles. What can we say about this dilemma against Providence in which he regails himself with an evident malice? "If the three religions are false, the whole world has been deceived; if, of the three, there is only one true, then there must be two that are false and consequently the majority have always been deceived." Was this not evidently of the period when people were discussing the question to find out which of the three law-givers had succeeded best and had won the greatest number of followers?⁽²⁾ Even the very expressions *legis* and *legislatores* which the Italian philosophers used to designate *religions* and *their founders* were borrowed from the translations of Averroes where the word *lex* always represents the Arabic word *scharîe* (law, religion). The passage of the *Destruction of the Destruction* in which Averroes has insisted with the greatest boldness on the parallel of religions is called in the Italian editions: *sermo de legibus* and brought forward by the annotator with an evident purpose.⁽³⁾

(3). De immort. animae, cap. XIV.

(2). *Menagiana*, t. IV, p. 286 et suiv.

(3). Opp. t. X, p. 35 (edit. 1560).

The opposition between the order of faith and the order of philosophy which, during the entire Middle Ages we have found as a distinctive trait of the Averroists is also the basis of the system of Pomponat. Pomponat the philosopher does not believe in immortality, but Pomponat, the Christian does believe in it. Certain things are true theologically which are, however, not true philosophically. Theologically, we must believe that the invocation of saints and the application of relics have great efficacy in diseases, but philosophically, we must admit that the bones of a dead dog would have as much of it, if people invoked them with equal faith. During 4 centuries, free-thinkers did not find any better subterfuge to excuse their audacities in the eyes of theologians. Repression always produces subtlety; conscience protests, and revenges itself by an ironical respect for the obstacles that have been imposed.

If then we apply the name of Averroists to the family of thinkers, restless and exasperated by repression so numerous in Italy at the *Renaissance*, and who hid themselves behind the name of the Commentator, Pomponat ought to be placed in the first rank of the Averroists, and Vanini could say with truth *Petrus Pomponatius, philosophus acutissimus, in cujus corpus animum Averrois commigrasse Pythagoras judicasset.*⁽²⁾ But if we understand by the term Averroist a partisan of the doctrine of the unity of intellect, this name suits Pomponat so little, that all his life was nothing but a perpetual combat against Achillini, the champion of Averroism. Averroes, moreover, is treated in his writings with extreme severity; he finds his views so extravagant and so devoid of sense, that he doubts if they had ever been taken seriously by anybody, and if Averroes himself had ever understood them.

Pomponat being presented as the founder of Alexandrism, although we do not notice, properly speaking, in him any systematic adherence to Alexander, symmetry required that Achillini should become the head of the Averroists. This classi-

(2) *Amphit. Exerc. VI, p. 36.*

fication would be entirely artificial, if it be imagined, that Achillini had really maintained the unity of souls and collective immortality. Though fully admitting, that on these two points, the doctrine of Averroes was conformable to that of Aristotle, Achillini expressly rejects these theories as opposed to religious faith.⁽²⁾ But from a different stand-point, Achillini deserves the name of an Averroist, I mean to say, by the importance which he accords to the Great Commentary, and by his scholastic and pedantic method. The school of Padua had nothing more famous than the quarrels of Pomponat and of Achillini. Achillini had the best of it in solemn thesis, but the public agreed with Pomponat by repairing in crowds to his lectures.⁽³⁾ The League of Cambray forced both of them in 1509 to transfer their field of battle to Bologna. There the fight was continued until the death of the two combatants, about 1520.

Achillini is properly speaking only a controversialist, a continuator of the old Paduan school where the most necessary qualifications were skill in public debates, audacity to press on an adversary and self-confidence in the replies. Like all Averroists, he tried to appear orthodox by invoking incessantly on the distinction between the theological and the philosophical methods. He shows himself much more free in his views in the haughty epitaph at San Martino Maggiore of Bologna:—

Hopes, Achillinum lumulo qui quaëris in isto,
 Falleris; *ille suo junctus Aristoteli*,
 Elysium colit, et quas rerum hic discere causas,
 Vix potuit, plenis nunc videt ille oculis
 Tu modo, per campos dum nobilis umbra beatos,
 Errat, dic longum *perpetrumoque* vale.

VII.

In this manner, these doctrines which we have seen in the time of Petrarca forced to hide themselves and conspire in the

(2) Ritter, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie* Part I, p. 383, &c.

(3) Niceron, t. XXX, init.,—Tiraboschi, t. VI, p. 492.—Papadopoli, *Hist gym.* Patav, t. II, p. 298.

dark, had in the beginning of the 16th century become almost the official philosophy of all Italy. Discussions on the immortality of the soul were fashionable in the Court of Leon X. Bembo did not conceal his predilections for Pomponat. It was he who saved the philosopher from the flames, and in order to pacify the Inquisition took the responsibility to correct his book, called *De Immortalitate animae*. It was also under his patronage, that Pomponat published a *Defensorium* against Niphus. All the old dictions of sceptical Averroism such as that the hell is an invention of princes, that all the religions contain fables, and that prayers and sacrifices are the inventions of priests were repeated by people who were most well situated in the Court. The sceptic of the *Messe de Bolsene* was an Averroist. The Middle Ages gave horns to the unbeliever who ventured to doubt before the blood of Christ. See the difference! Raphael has made a galant personage out of him, leering pleasantly at the miracle as a clever man who knows the reason of things and who has read his Averroes.

It was not, however, that people did not show themselves to be severe at times, in order to save appearances. People publicly condemned Pomponat, but secretly supported him. People paid Niphus to refute him at the same time that they encouraged Pomponat to reply to Niphus. How could people take seriously a bull countersigned by *Bembo* and ordering people to believe in Immortality? The *nuance* which in this matter separated the Alexandrists and the Averroists was, moreover, almost unseizable. The former frankly admitted the consequences of their doctrines from which the latter escaped only by subtle lies. In both, the method, the spirit and the irreligious tendencies were the same. Marsile Ticin, J. A. Marta, Gaspard Contarini, and later on Antoine Sirmond opposed them with the same arguments, and the Council of Latran covered them with the same condemnation.

The Council of Latran was nothing but an impotent effort to stop Italy in the path in which she was already engaged and from which only the great reaction provoked by the shock of the refor-

mation could draw her. No doubt, considering only the terms of the bull, we should be inclined to believe, that it concerned the zeal of the purest orthodoxy. All the subterfuges of the school of Padua were anticipated there. The Council condemned those who assert that the soul is not immortal, and those who hold, that these opinions, though contrary to religious faith are true philosophically. It enjoins, amongst other things, on professors of philosophy to refute heterodox views, after having exposed them, and commands them to pursue as heretics and infidels, the fabricators of such detestable doctrines. Finally, it forbids all clergymen to devote more than five years to the study of poetry and philosophy, if they do not add to it also the study of theology and of ecclesiastical canon. This bull is dated the 19th of December, 1512. But it was precisely during the years that followed that the controversy excited by Pomponat attained the highest degree of liveliness and of audacity. The book, *De Immortalitate animæ* appeared in Bologna in 1516. The decree of Latran had, therefore, no great efficacy. Certain voices were timidly raised even in the Council in favour of the condemned doctrines. Cortelori mentions, it is true, an order dated the 13th June 1518, by which it is enjoined to pursue Pomponat as disloyal to the Council of Latran; but it does not appear, that this order had any effect. This decree was taken far more seriously in Spain. The author of a life of Raymond Lulle who lived about this time bears testimony, that every year, this decree was solemnly read at the University of Palma,⁽¹⁾ and that he himself, in order to testify his joy at this happy event, composed a piece of poetry in which Leon X was compared to Ferdinand the Catholic of Spain for his zeal against heresy :—

Ille reos fidei flammis ultricibus arcet,
 Tuque peregrinum dogma vagumaque premis.
 Vos duo sufficitis gestis et voce Leones
 Omnia sub Christi mittere regna jugo.

That excellent Pope certainly did not deserve this eulogy. He took far too much interest in the debate to think of burning

(1). *Acta S. S. Junii*, t. V. p. 678.

the combatants, and it was much less for the finish than for the pleasure of seeing it continue that he ordered a reputation of Pomponat to his confidential theologian Augustine Niphus.

VIII.

Niphus had begun by being a decided Averroist. When leaving the school of Vernias, he wrote his treatise, *De Intellectu et daemonibus* which created a great scandal. In this treatise, he maintained the view of his master on the unity of intellect, and attempted to prove, that there are no other separate intelligences except those that preside at the movements of celestial bodies. The arguments of Saint Thomas and of Albert against Averroes were treated in it with so little respect, that the protection of the pious and tolerant Barozzi, bishop of Padua was necessary to pull him out of the fury of the Thomists. Barozzi persuaded him, with a view to pacify the commotion to suppress some passages of his book, and it was with these corrections that the work was published in 1492. This mishap made him wiser. He rallied himself to orthodoxy and became a zealous Catholic. Padua, Salerno, Rome, Naples and Pisa saw him successively under the names of Suessanus, Eutychius, and Philotheus, teach a modified Averroism. His commentaries on *De Substantia Orbis*, on *De Animæ beatitudine* and especially on *the Destruction of the Destruction* took their places in all the editions side by side with the texts of Averroes, not to speak of a crowd of minor works which he allowed to follow year after year. He himself, became the editor of Averroes, and between the years 1495-97, there appeared under his auspices a complete edition of Averroes' works, since often reproduced. Since that epoch, the libraries liked to add to ancient books some illustrious recommendation amongst the contemporaries. The name of Niphus thus became inseparable from that of Averroes. *Averroes alone has understood Aristotle; Niphus alone has understood Averroes:—*

“Solus Aristotelis nodosa volumina vovit,
Corduba, et obscurcis exprimit illa nodis,
Gloria Parthenopes, Niphus bene novit utrumque,
Et nitidum media plus facit esse die.”

Moreover, Niphus took great care not to get into hot waters with the theologians. In his commentary on *the Destruction of the Destruction*, he pretends incessantly to make use of these expressions:—*At nos christicolae.....at nos Catholice.....*. His marginal notes are often lively ironies: *Non potest intelligere Averroes quod Deus sit in omnibus: O quam rudis!—Male intelligis, bone vir, sententiam Christianorum.* He had a good deal of success in Rome. Leon X made him a Count Palatine and permitted him to adopt the arms of the Medicis. His book, *De Immortalitate animae*, a refutation of that of Pomponat's appeared in Venice in 1518. Niphus seems to have been one of those literary *Chevaliers d'industrie* so common in Italy in the 16th century. He knew, like an Italian parasite, how to amuse his masters by his bragging of debauchery, accept the *role* of a clown and pay his way by his *bons mots*. His moral and political treatises became fashionable. Charles V. accorded to him his good graces, and he had the honour of making himself agreeable to certain princesses of his days.

This frivolity of character does not permit us to take seriously the philosophical tenets of Niphus. His psychology is at bottom, Thomistic psychology which he had at first opposed. The intellect which is the form of the body is susceptible of numerical plurality; it is created at the very moment when it is united to sperm and survives the body. Neither Aristotle nor Averroes knew creation; nevertheless, he does not reject the principle of peripatetism, that God produces something new, if not by a variation of Himself but at least by a variation of the objective cause. That which Aristotle absolutely rejects, that is an act of creation in time, but nothing prevents us to suppose an eternal creation by according to nothing a conceptual priority. Niphus very much changed on this point. In his book, *De Immortalitate Animae* and in the last editions of his commentaries, he went so far as to maintain, that the principles of Aristotle did not reject creation in time, and that that philosopher had regarded the intellect as created.

Niphus has been generally considered as one of the chiefs of the Averroistic school. M. Ritter has made the remark, that on a number of points, he opposes the views of the Commentator, and that in his commentary on the XII book of the Metaphysics, he treats him with an affected scorn: "Averroes in praesenti commento fere dicit tot errata quot verba.....Magno miraturum dignum est quonam pacto vir iste (Averroes) tantam fidem lucratus sit apud Latinos in exponendis verbis Aristotelis, quum vix unum verbum recte exposuerit."⁽¹⁾ He calls his commentaries, *potius confusiones quam expositiones*, and he declares, that he has adopted this author only because he is so celebrated, and because his pupils don't care to hear of any other master. It is true, that he otherwise accords to him the highest praises and shows himself merciless towards his detractors. It would be lost labour to try to conciliate all these differences, and Niphus would undoubtedly have been the first to smile at the attempt.

IX.

The inoffensive Averroism of Niphus was during the whole of the 16th century the official instruction of Padua. The word, Averroism no longer represented a doctrine, but the confidence accorded to the Grand Commentator in the interpretation of Aristotle. And the theologians were far from being contrary to such instructions. There was in this fidelity to texts a respect for authority which rather pleased them. It was the innovators in philosophy and in literature who called it routine and barbarism. The most Catholic persons liked to be called Averroists, in the sense which we have just explained. I have seen in Rome in the convent of the *Chiese Nuova*, in an armoury containing books which once belonged to Saint Phillip of Neri, and which are preserved there as relics, a good manuscript copy of Averroes. The Church highly approved of the study of Aristotle; the cardinal Pallavicini went even so far as to say, that, without Aristotle the Church would have lacked in some of its dogmas. And Averroes was, by general consent, the best interpreter of Aristotle.

(1) Ritter, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, Part I, p. 381 et suiv.
Cf. Comment in *Destr. Destr.* f. 60, 64, 177 V^o, 211 (1560).

disciples of Pythagoras, said a contemporary, has nothing that should astonish us, because in these days, we find everything that Averroes says pass as axioms in the eyes of those who philosophise. The most splendid titles were lavished on him: *Solertissimus peripateticæ disciplinæ interfres. Altividus Aristotelicorum vestigator penetratium. Magnus Averroes, philosophus consummatissimus. Primarius rerum aristotelicarum commentator*. Finally, the word *Averroist*, implying no longer any nuance of opinion but designating only a man who has intensely studied the Great Commentary, became synonymous with a philosopher as *Galenist* was that of a physician.

Marc-Antoine Zimara, of San Pietro, in the kingdom of Naples, acquired a great reputation in the schools by the care with which he surrounded the texts of Averroes. His *Solutions des contradictions d' Aristotele et d' Averroes*, his *Indices*, his concordances, his marginal annotations, his analyses, became, like the works, integral portions of the editions of Averroes. Averroes underwent in the school of Padua the fate of all classical masters. To the original texts of his works, people began to give preference to modern abstracts, more handy and more common.

Subtlety and dryness are the common defects of all Averroists. But nobody, we must say, has carried them so far as Zimara. This barbarism began to be tedious even in Padua. We have already seen public favour abandon the pedantic Achillini and take to Pomponat. Zimara underwent the same disgrace. He became ridiculous, intolerable to his pupils and was able to teach only three years.⁽¹⁾ Bembo, in a letter dated 6th October, 1525,⁽²⁾ expresses with tact the humour with which this antiquated method inspired him. "Il quale Otranto" wrote he to Ramusio, "e gia da ora tanto in odio, di questi scolari tutti dall, un capo all' altro che se ne ridono con isdegno. Perciocche dicono che ha dottrina, tulla barbara et confusa, ed e semplice Averroista. . . . E. Castui pare che sia tutto barbaro e pieno di quella feccia di dottrina, che ora si fugge, comme la mala ventura. Siate

⁽¹⁾ Raccolati, III page, page 274.

⁽²⁾ Opera, t. III, p. 118. Venezia, 1720.

sicuro che questo povero studio quest' anno quanto alle arti, sarà quattro scolari e sarà l' ultimo di tutti gli studj. *Non mi interess* ; se non in quanto essendo io di cotesta patria, mi duole di veder le cose che sono d' alcun momento all' onor pubblico andare per questa via lontano da quello che si dee desiderare e procacciare."

The *Solutiones contradictionum Aristotelis et Averrois*, composed to a great extent after Zimara, and put together by the Juntas, are, however, not without interest, because of the numerous quotations that are found there from the masters who were in favour at Padua. It is curious to see file off on each of their debatable points men like Gilles de Rome, Walter Burleigh, Baconthorpe, Jean de Jandun, Gregoire de Rimini, Paul de Venise, Jacques de Forli, Gaetano de Tienc, Pomponat, Achillini, and Niphus. What is still more curious are the anecdotes, concerning the debates of the university of Padua which are reported there and which in this may enable us to assist, as it were, in the discussions of that celebrated school.⁽¹⁾ The doctrine of the unity of intellect is adopted in the sense of the unity of common principles of the human mind,⁽²⁾ but openly rejected in the sense, that there was only one substantial principle of human reason. Zimara enters into subtle distinctions of the diverse *nuances* which this theory had taken in the Padua school, and of the efforts made to reconcile it with faith. But always respectful towards the commentator, he aspires less to refute him than to prove, that the errors which are attributed to him are really not imputable. The first intelligence gives being to the first motor and by it to the universe. The first motor is the form of beings as the master is the form of his slave. The active intellect is neither God Himself, as Alexandre would have it, nor a simple faculty of the soul, but a substance 'superior to the soul separable and incorruptible. The form is the principle of individuation ; the form, indeed, pre-supposes matter, whereas the reciprocal proposition is not true. The intellectual soul is separable

(1). Par example F. 62 Vo., 134 Vo., 140, 212 Vo.

(2). F. 177 Vo.

immortal. Truth reaches us by two paths, the prophets and philosophers. In cases of doubt, the prophets ought to be believed in preference.

A multitude of laborious Professors competed with Niphus and Zimara in the elucidation of the works of Averroes. Antoine Posi de Monselice published even a still more considerable index than that of Zimara (1560, 1572). Julius Palamedes gave a third table of the same kind (Venice, 1571). Bernardin Tomitanus de Filtre composed *Solutiones contradictionum in dicta Aristotelelis et Averrois*, analogous to those of Zimara, as well as arguments for the questions of Averroes. Phillip Boni composed another concordance of the same kind. A great number of usual books, under the titles of *Methodus legendi Averroem*, *concordantia in Averroem*, &c., were evidently researches by scholars. Marc-Antoine Passeri, Vincent Madio, Chrysostom Javello, Jean-Francois Burana, Jean-Baptiste Bagolini, Jeromi Stefaneli, pupil of Zimara, the two Trapolini, Victor Trincavelli, by their teachings and writings continued the traditions of the same instruction during the first half of the 16th century.

X.

This extraordinary vogue led to a general rehandling of the translations of Averroes. Since the first edition (Padua, 1472), people were contented to reproduce the ancient versions made from the Arabic of the 13th century, almost such as are found in the manuscripts. Niphus and Zimara had well tried to correct them and to make them intelligible, but had only partially succeeded. Since the beginning of the 16th century, people began to make new translations in Latin on the basis of Hebrew translations. We should remember, that the Arab manuscripts of Averroes were then as now excessively rare, and that Arabic scholars were hardly less so, whereas Jewish translators were abundant. Avicenne had the same fate. Translated at first from the Arabic by Gerard de Cremone, he was subsequently translated from the Hebrew by Manitino Andre Alpago de Belvedere, Jean Cinq-Arbres, etc. We must, however, confess, that the

object which they had in view was not achieved, and the translations made from Hebrew are still more barbarous and obscure than those of the 13th century.⁽¹⁾

These new versions were circulating for a long time in manuscripts, when the Juntos formed the plan of a grand complete edition of Averroes, which was entrusted to the care of Jean-Baptiste Bagolini of Verona, known in Padua as a philosopher⁽²⁾ and in Venice as a physician. A very large portion of this edition was made out of new translations; the old versions were kept for certain treatises, particularly for the commentaries on the *Physics*, on the treatise on the *Heavens*, the *Metaphysics*, and the *Morals of Nicomache*. Sometimes as for certain important portions of the treatise on the *Soul*, the two translations were printed in two columns in a parallel manner. Frequently the ancient texts and the new versions were corrected by one another. Certain paraphrases which till then had remained unpublished were the marginal notes of Zimara were kept; a better classification was made; the paraphrases and the medium commentaries were divided and placed after the texts. Bagolini manifested a great zeal in this work and really deserved from his contemporaries this supreme eulogium:—

Tantum est Aristoteles Bagolini et Corduba debent,
Quantum humus agricolæ debet operta rubis.⁽³⁾

He died of fatigue before the completion of his work. Marc Oddo presided at the publication which took place in the years 1552—1553.

The Jew Jacob Mantino, born in Tortose in Spain and physician to Paul III⁽²⁾ was the most laborious of the translators who undertook, in the 16th century, to reform the text of Averroes after the Hebrew translations. He for himself alone revised all the commentaries. Bagolini took in his translations all that he considered suitable and neglected the remainder. We see, indeed,

(1). Cf. Possevin, *Bibl. select.* t. II, l. XII, cap. 16 et 18. Richard Simon, *suppl.* a Léon de Médène, p. 121 (Paris, 1710).

(2). Cf. Facciolati, III, pars p. 302. Maffei, Verona, *illustr.* parte II, fol. 100 (Verona, 1752).

(3). *Elit.* 1553, l. II, V6.

the words of these new interpreters often gave double work, and that the same work was found translated from several sources at the same time.

Abraham de Balmes, born at Lecce, in the Kingdom of Naples and physician at Padua, sufficiently known amongst the Jews as a grammarian attached himself especially to the logical works of Averroes and to the *Rhetorique* and to the *Patique*. Bagolini made use of his versions to correct those of Mantino, and gave preference to them for the *Topics*, the *Sophistical Arguments*, the *Rhetorique* and the *De Substantia Orbis*.

Jean Francois Buranade Verone, Professor at Padua, was the only Christian who figures in this list of translators. It is infinitely probable, that Burana, appropriated to himself the work of some Jew. Since we could hardly suppose, that a Christian of that epoch could know Rabbinical Hebrew well enough to be able to translate, even in a mediocre way, such difficult texts as those are. Besides, why should anybody give himself so much trouble when there were all around Jews quite ready to do the needful *per ulcuni danari*? It seems, that people attributed to Burana also a knowledge of Arabic. It follows, at any rate, from some unpublished documents which Maffei had in his hands, that Burana had translated several Greek authors. Whatever that may be, Burana figures in the edition of the Juntas, for the great commentaries of the *Analytics* of which before him there were only medium commentaries. His works had already been printed in 1553. Marc Oddo vividly complains of the defects of this translation which he was obliged to correct by that of Mantino.

Paul l'Israelite gave the paraphrase of the treatise on the *Heavens*, and the prologue to the XII book of the *Metaphysics*; Vital Nissus, the paraphrase of the treatise on *Generation*; Calo Calonymus, physician of Naples figures as a translator of the *Destruction of the Destruction*, of the letter on the *Union of the Separate intellect*. His version is more complete than that which was made from the Arabic in 1328 by Calonymus, son of Calonymus, of Meir and which was printed in 1497 with the commentary

of Niphus. For all that, this work does him little honour. I do not know if there exists another text less intelligible, and Pococke said with reason, it deserves in a double sense its title of *Destruction*, (*non versio sed destructio*). Wolf attributes also to Calo a translation of the *Questions Physiques* of Averroes with the commentary of the Moses of Narbonne. ⁽⁵⁾

A manuscript in the Imperial Library of Paris (ancien fonds, 6507) contains a Latin version of the middle commentary on the *Physics* made on the Hebrew text of Zerachia, son of Isaac, never published and finished on the 7th June, 1500 by Vitalis Dactilometos, master of Arts and Doctor of medicine by the order of the Cardinal Dominique Grimani, patriarch of Aquilia. This translator, is, moreover, entirely unknown. Elic del Medigo is also reckoned amongst the Jews who tried to give to the school of Padua a more intelligible text of Averroes. He translated, it is said, *De substantia Orbis*, the commentary on the *Meteors*, the questions on the *Premiers Analytiques*, printed at Venice by Alde (1477), and the medium commentary on the first seven books of the *Metaphysics*, printed for the first time in the edition of 1560. Death prevented him to bring the last work to completion. It is also probable, that people have regarded as translations several of the commentaries which he composed on Averroistic treatises.

The medical works of Averroes underwent the same fate as his philosophical works. In the middle of the 16th century people felt the necessity to translate them over again, to complete them and to correct them. Jean-Baptiste Bruyerin Champier, nephew of Symphorien Champier, physician to Henri II, translated, or rather had translated from the Hebrew, the books II, VI, VII of the *Colliget* which he reunited under the name *Collectanea medica*. Mantino re-translated equally some Chapters of the book V. Andre Alpago de Bellune revised the commentary on the poem of Avicenne. The treatise on the

(5). Bibl. heb. I, p. 19. Steinschneider, Catal (inédit) of Oxford, nos. 27 & 28.

Theriacus was published after the manuscripts of Andre della Groce, surgeon of Venice.

The Juntas, in their subsequent editions, did nothing but reproduce that of 1553. Their prefaces testify, that the books were in great demand. Each edition ran out in two or three years, like the most popular classics.

XI.

A reign so absolute could not but provoke a violent reaction. Arab Aristotelism, personified in Averroes was one of the great obstacles which those people encountered who were then so actively working to establish modern culture on the ruins of the Middle Ages. In Italy, the revolutionary spirit has never known moderation. Aristotle soon became *a poisoner, an obscurantist, the hangman of the human race who has ruined the world by his pen as Alexander had ruined it by his sword.* The majesty of Averroes was also violated in its turn. This Arab and this barbarian became the target of the Sarcasms of all the cultivated spirits. Proud of having refound authentic Greece, the philologists and the Hellenists, the Platonicians and the Hippocratists became supremely scornful of that falsified and pedantical Greece which people had got from the Arabs. This bristling scholasticism, these meagre categories and this savage jargon must have seemed more than ever intolerable to those spirits brought back by classical culture to beautiful form and to a sound method of thinking. Even Petrarca found Aristotle little agreeable for study. The humanists of the 15th century declared all with one voice, that Averroes was unintelligible, void of meaning and unworthy of engaging the attention of a cultivated mind. His obscurity became proverbial and his followers passed for people who wanted to find some where there was none.

Scholasticism, continually getting further and further away from the text of Aristotle, putting the commentator in the place of the philosopher, and the note books of the Professors in the

place of the commentary had made for itself an Aristotelian convention, who resembled the real Aristotle almost as much as *l'Histoire scholastique* of Pierre Comestor resembles the Hebrew text of the Bible. The inadequacy of translations, the inaccuracy of manuscripts and the first editions of the 15th century had rendered a systematic study of the text of Aristotle very nearly impossible. People were content to approximate those phrases that offered some sense, and some of those principles which they had agreed to attribute to Aristotle, in order to be able to build with it a system of their own. The publication of the Greek text of Aristotle was veritably the discovery of a new text, and all the cultivated men began to declare at once, that there now remained only one thing to do, and that was, to leave in their own dust all the translations and commentaries of the Middle Ages, in order that they might find out genuine peripateticism only from the general texts. But conventionalism is never entirely overcome. The old translations and the old commentaries of the Middle Ages still counted their numerous partisans, when Theodore Gaza, Georges of Trebisonde, Argyropule, and Ermola Barbaro had once more revived the ancient Lyceum. Hence the dispute so bitter between Arab Aristotelism, seeking Aristotle in his original text and in the Greek commentators like Alexandre d'Approdisias, Themistius, &c.

On the 4th of April, 1497, Nicolas Leonicus Thomaeus ascended the academical chair of Padua in order to teach Aristotle in Greek. Bembo celebrated this great event in verse, which seemed to open a new era in philosophical instruction. Leonicus, by the liveliness of his polemics against scholasticism, by his medical instructions entirely Hippocratic, by the beauty of his style and his Ciceronian manner deserves to be regarded as the founder of critical and Hellenistic peripateticism. The sweetness of his temper kept him from indulging in abuse. He had even the courtesy to find in Averroes a distinguished interpreter: *Averroes equitabilis Aristotelis interpres* (*Graccos semper excipio*). Even more than this he props himself on the psychology of Averroes.

reconcile Aristotle and Plato, and to establish the pre-existence and the immortality of the soul.⁽²⁾

All the distinguished spirits of the 16th century thus preached a crusade against the barbarians in philosophy, and in medical science. Young students, abandoning scholastic quibbles dreamt only of learning Greek in order to be able to read Aristotle ; and consequently the pedantic Zimara could hardly find any hearers for his Averroes. *As quale autore* says, Bembo in his letter to Rannusio already quoted, *a questi di si lascia a parte dai buoni dottori, ed attendesi, alle sposizioni de' commenti greci a far progresso ne' testi*. The same revolution took place in medicine. Hippocrates and Galen were no longer infallible except in Greek. "Our ancestors" said Thomas Giunta in the preface to his edition of Averroes, "found nothing clever either in philosophy or in medicine which did not come from the Moors. Our age, on the contrary, trampling under their feet the science of the Arabs, admires and accepts only that which has been drawn from the treasures of Greece ; it adores only the Greeks ; it does not want any but the Greeks as their masters in medicine, in philosophy, and in dialectics ; he who does not know Greek, knows nothing. Hence those fights and those quarrels between the philosophers and the physicians, so lively, indeed, that the patients, not knowing to what sect to hold on, die more frequently of hesitation than of disease."⁽²⁾ Jean Bruyerin Champier, in the preface to his *Collectanea* of Averroes, written in 1537, equally informs us, that the young students of his day detested the Arab physicians, and did not care to hear them quoted.

XII.

The renaissance of Hellenism which was announced in Padua, Venice and in Northern Italy by a return to the true text of Aristotle becomes manifest in Florence by a return to Plato. Florence and Padua are the two poles of philosophy as well as of art in Italy. Florence and Tuscany represent the ideal in art and spiritualism

(2). H. Ritter, *Geschichte der neuen Philosophie*, I. part. p. 377.

(3). Edit. 1552, f. 2-3.

in philosophy ; Venice, Padua, Bologna and Lombardy represent analysis rationalism and the exact and the positive spirit. Plato alone suits the conversations of Careggi and of the Rucellai Gardens ; Aristotle suits the institutions of Venice, based on prudence and calculation. At the first glance of our eyes, we may be astonished, that a heavy and pedantic school whose history we have been trying to sketch here was the official school of a city which the imagination is pleased to surround with such a halo of poetry. But looking at it more closely, we find that this school is in perfect harmony with the Venetian character, and that it is exactly in philosophy that, which Titian and Tintoretto are in painting. Philosophy and poetry have really their source in the same principle ; philosophy is only a species of poetry as any other ; poetical countries are also philosophical countries. But the essential trait of the Venetian character is neither art nor poetry. What is Saint-Marc compared to the cathedral of Pisa ? Who could contemplate one of the Madonnas of Venice after having seen those of Sienna and Perousa ? Study those strong heads of the Venetian ceremonies by Gentile Bellini or by Paris Bordone. Is there any thought or any ideal that breathes in them ? No ; it is firmness, it is action. Instead of that flower of youth which eternally flourishes on the banks of the Arno, here it is the maturity of the full grown man, the steady and accurate perception of the things of this world. No doubt, on the score of the liberty of thought, Florence had nothing to envy Venice. No where were license of opinion and irreverence towards holy things carried so far as not even to believe in the miracles of Saint Catherine of Sienna, attested by all the Siennese ! The blasphemous thought of the parallel of religions : was it ever so insolently expressed as it was in the third story of the Decameron ? But the reply of the Jew Melchisedech to Saladin, a reply found so wise by Boccaccio and which in the rest of Europe would have lighted flaming piles excited only a graceful smile in Florence. Instead of the pedantic toga with which Venetian incredulity shrouded itself, Florentine incredulity smiling and frivolous, gave itself up to the intoxication of a perfumed life of youth and gaiety. Venice arrived at philosophy by those habits of rigour and exactitude which the practical

spirit and the handling of wordly affairs give us. Florence arrived at philosophy by the serenity of a conscience where all the elements of the Ideal are permeated in harmony and by that air of freshness and of joy which we breathe at the foot of the hillocks of Fiesole. Marsile Ficini informs us himself, that it was by a reaction against Averroistic peripatetism of Venice, that he undertook to revive the Platonic traditions. Incredulity seem to him to be so deep-rooted, that he found only two means to combat it, either miracles or a religious philosophy. When he translates Plato or Plotin, all that he expects is, that in their capacity of philosophers, they might find a better reception with the public than Saints or the Prophets. Averroes, the representative of heterodox peripatetism is treated with the most profound contempt. He never knew Greek, and he has never understood anything of Aristotle. The XV book of his *Latonic Theology* is entirely devoted to the refutation of the *Averroistic monster*, the unity of Intellect. The arguments of Ficini lack neither in neatness nor in subtlety. In the Averroistic hypothesis, the perception, says he, would belong to no particular individual; free action and free will would be inexplicable. Even astrology furnished him with arguments: the souls are not identical; they are either Saturnian or Martial, Jovial or Mercurial.⁽¹⁾ The Averroistic theory of Providence is also refuted with great vivacity. God sees everything in His own essence; being incessantly attentive to make the most general good predominate, He has no need to turn aside from the great things to look after the small ones.⁽²⁾

Gemiste Plethon and Bessarion before Marsile Ficini had showed the same antipathy, and he rejected the Averroistic theories in the name of Platonism.⁽³⁾ Patrizzi is still more severe. Imagining, according to an oft-repeated error, that the scholastics knew Aristotle only through Averroes, Averroes in his eyes is responsible

(1). *Theol. plat.* f. 359.

(2). *Ibid.* l. II, f. 104.

(3) *Theol. plat. opp.* t. I, p. 327.

for all the defects of scholasticism and of all that chaos of subtle questions which had invaded the field of philosophy,"

XIII.

In order to comprehend the aversion with which Averroistic peripatetism inspired the cultured spirits of the *Renaissance*, it is necessary to have known from experience that style bristling with savage words, those subtle discussions, and that intolerable prolixity which are the characteristics of the Averroistic school. "Formerly" said Louis Vives, "nothing was more charming than a contemplation of the garden of this universe; but these (Averroists) instead of flowers and trees, have set up crosses in there, to torture human spirits." Let us imagine what impression such phrases as follow were likely to produce on the Vallas, the Barbaroes and the Bemboes. "Quælibet anima intelligit primum et se, hoc est suum esse, quod Dehaath appellatur; de secundis vero intelligit Zobar quod dedit sibi suum esse." That's a case where we have to say with pic de la Mirandole: "Age, damus hoc vobis, ut non sit vestrum ornate loqui, sed vestrum est certe, quod nec præstatis, latine saltem, ut, si non floridis, suis tamen verbis rem explicetis. Non exigo a vobis orationem comptam, sed nolo sordidam; nolo unguentatam, sed nec hircasam; non sit lecta, sed nec neglecta; non quærimus ut delectat, sed querimus quod offendat."⁽¹⁾ The thesis of Nizolius, in his *Antibarbarus*, the extreme insistence with which cultivated spirits maintained, that philosophy should make use of ordinary language and give up technical style, which was called the style of Paris, was certainly not a childish proposition then nor a simple scruple of a rhetorician. There was not a more urgent reform than that of language. The first condition of progress was to disengage thought from the intolerable shackles of the scholastic style which interdicted all delicacy.

The man of the century, in whom this combat of different sentiments is best seen is Pic de la Mirandole. Pic was at first

(4) *Discuss peripat.*, l. XIII, p. 106.

(1) *Epist. ad Herm. Barbarum*, inter opp. Politiani, Paris. 1512 vol. I. f. l. v.

not free from Arabism. He had for his teacher Elie del Medigo, the Averroist, and he never quite entirely got rid of the bad leaven. Amongst the 900 questions which he proposed for his great philosophical tournament, barbarous scholasticism and Averroes in particular hold a prominent place. "Est a pud Arabas," says he in his *Apologia*, "in Averroee firmum et inconcussum; in Alpharabio grave et meditatum; in Avicenna divinum atque Platicum." Elsewhere he calls Averroes "celebrem in Aristotelis familia philosophum et rerum naturalium gravem aestimatorem," and he proposes to himself to reconcile him with Avicenne, as well as, Aristotle with Plato. The Coimbrians therefore reckon him amongst the Averroists. Pic felt however, better influences. A letter which he addressed to Ermolao Barbaro contains the expression of his new sympathies and of his regrets as a new convert. "Hac proxima tua ad me epistola, in qua dum barbaros hos philosophus insectaris, quos dicis haberi vulgo sordidos, rudes, incultos quos nec vixisse viventes, nedum extincti vivant, etsi si nunc et vivant vivere in fuenam et contumeliam, ita Hercules sum commotus, ita me puduit piguitque studiorum meorum (jamenim sexennium apud illos versor,) ut nihil minus me fecisse velimquam in tam nihili facienda re tam laboriose contendisse. Perdiderim ego, inquam, apud Thomam, Joannem Scotum, apud Albertum, apud Averroem meliores annos, tantas vigilas, quibus potuerim in bonis litteris fortasse non nihil. Cogitabam mecum ut me consolarer, si qui ex illis nunc reviviscant, habituri-ne quidquam sint, quo suam causam, argumentosi aliqui homines, ratione aliquatwantur." Pic de la Mirandole knew, however, to maintain himself within a wise eclecticism; the exaggerations of the humanistic party almost led him to find something of good in Arab scholasticism. "Quamvis, dicam quod sentio, movent mihi stomachum grammatae quidam, qui quum duas tenuerint vocabulorum origines, ita se ostentat, ita se venditant, ita circumferunt jactabundi, ut prae se ipsis pro nihilo habendos philosophos arbitrentur. Nolumus, inquiunt hasce vestras philosophias, Et quid mirum? Nec Falernum canes." It appears, moreover, that this apology little satisfied the Averroists but on the contrary made the

Hellenists triumph who called it *the Apology of the Scythians and the Teutons*. "Ab amicis quos habeo Patavii," wrote to his Ermolao, "certior factus sum apologiam tuam quæ Seytharum et Teutonum est inscribi coepta, quasi Typhonis et Eumenidum laudatio, molestissimum accidisse majori eorum parti quos defendis."

All the declamations of the bitterest of the Humanists pale however, beside the energetic dithyrambe of Louis Vives. This is apostrophe, the most rude, without contradiction that Averroes has ever been exposed to, occupies no less than four pages in folio in his treatise *De Causis corruptarum artium*. "Nomen est Commentator is" wrote he "homo qui in Aristotele enarrando nihil minus explicat, quem eum ipsum quem suscepit declarandum. Sed nec potuisset explicare, etiamsi divino fuisset ingenio, quum esset humano, et quidem infra mediocritatem. Nam quid tandem adferebat quo in Aristotele enarrando posset esse probe instructus? Non cognitionem veteris memoriæ, non scientiam placitorum priscae disciplinæ et intelligentiam sectarum, quibus Aristoteles passim scateat. Itaque vides eum pessime philosophes omnes antiquos citare, ut qui nullum unquam legerit, ignarus græcitates ac latinitatis. Pro Polo Ptolomæum ponit, pro Protagora Pythagoram, pro Cratylo Democritum; libros Platonis titulis ridiculis inscribit, et ita de us loquitur, ut vel cæco perspicuum sit litteram eum in illis legisse nullum. At quam confidenter audet pronuntiare hoc aut illud ab eis dici, et quod impudentius est, non dici, quum solas viderit Alexandrum, Themistoclem, Nicolaum Damascenum, et hos, ut apparet versos in arabicum perversissime ac corruptissime! Citat enim eos nonnunquam et contradicit, et cum eis rixatur, ut nec ipse quidem qui scripsit intelligat. Aristotelem vero quomodo legit? Non in sua origine purum et integrum, non in lacunam latinam derivatum (non enim potuit linguarum experts), sed de latino in arabicum transvasatum; in qua transfusione ex Græcis bona facta sunt latina non bona; ex latinis vero malis arabica pessima." Vives cites after this passage which justifies only too much his sarcasms, but whose responsibility, properly speaking, ought to fall much more on the

Arab translator than on the commentator. "Aristoteles si revivisceret intelligeret haec" cried he, "out posset vel conjecturis castigare? O; homines valentissimus stomachis qui haec devorare potuerunt it concoquere, et in haec tam ab Aristotelis sententia ac mente abhorrentia auscultare quae Aven Rois commentator comminisciture: favete linguis viro tanti nominis et alteri Aristoteli." The unfortunate sect of the *Herculeans* furnished him with an occasion for inexhaustible pleasantries. "Haec sunt tua, an Herculeorum uttu vocas? Tua sunt, qui adeo est impius ut impietates inserere vel tuo vel alieno nomine semper gaudeas. Atqui hiest Aben Rois quem aliquorum dementia Aristotele parem fecit, superiorem divo Thomae Rogo te, Aben Rois, quid habebas quo caperes hominum mentes seu verius dementares? Coperunt nonnulli multos sermonis gratia et orationis lenocinio; te nihil est horridus, incultius, obscaenius, infantius. Alitenuerunt quosdam cognitione veteris memoriae tu nec quo tempore vixeris, nec qua aetate natus sis noviste, non magis praetorum consultus, quam in silvis et solitudine natus et educatus! Admiratione atque omnium laude digni sunt habiti qui praecepta tradiderunt bene vivendi: te nihil est sceleratius aut irreligiosius: impius fiat, necesse est et" *aeos* quisquis tuis monumentis vehementer sit deditus. Jam dic ipse, quare quibusdam placuisti? Audio, tenco, non tua culpa est, sed nostra non tu adferebas quo placeres, sed nos adferebamur quo non displiceret. Suavia erant abscuris abscura, inanibus inania, et quibusdam pulchra sunt visa quae non ipsi intelligerent. Multi te non legerant alienum iudicium sunt secuti: aliquibus propter impietatem faisti gratus nam et Aben Rois doctrina et Metaphysica Avicennae, denique omnia illa arabica videntur mihi resipere deliramenta Alcorani et blasphemias Mahumetis insanias nihil fieri potest illis indoctius, insulsius frigidus."

I have found it necessary to quote this long declamation in order to make people understand to what pitch rose sometimes the anger of the enemies of Averroes. Coclius Rhodiginus is hardly less severe. Bernard Navagero, who cultivated literature

and had some regard for Averroes is represented as a literary phenomenon of his century.⁽¹⁾

Finally, the moderate spirits who, frightened by the boldness of Italian peripatetism, attached themselves to the principles of reformed Christianity (protestantism) such as Melancthon Nicolas Taurel, also showed themselves very antipathetic to Averroistic teachings. Erasmus was convinced of the deep impiety of Averroes. Ambrogio Leone, Professor at the university of Naples, wrote to him that he had just finished the printing of his work in 46 volumes against the Commentator. Erasmus congratulates him. "Utinam" cried he "prodisset ingens illud opus adversus Averroem impium."

In general, the Humanists of the *Renaissance* showed less temerity of spirit than the scholastic peripateticians. Apart from a few pagan customs, innocent enough, they remained at bottom attached to orthodoxy, Catholic or Protestant. Petrarca himself offers a curious example of this doubt tendency. The ingenious Society of the Jesuits took *vis-a-vis* Averroes the same position. The *Ratio Studiorum*⁽⁵⁾ enjoins on Professors of philosophy to remember incessantly the decree of the Council of Latran, to quote only with great precaution the interpreters of Aristotle *who have demerited the Christian religion*; to take care that the scholars do not attach themselves to those interpreters, and what concerns Averroes in particular, not to explain his digressions; and when one is obliged to quote his commentaries to do so without any great praise, and if possible after showing that all the good things he says were borrowed from others; moreover, to attach purely and simply to Aristotle, to attack equally the Alexandrists and the Averroists, and to contest the authority of Alexandre and Averroes. *Who is wrong and who is right*, that's something which preoccupies very little the authors of the *Ratio*. Science and philosophy are tactics; he who does not serve the views of the Society shall not be commended, and

(1) Praef. Junt. (1855), f. 20 Vo.

(5) P. 68 et suiv. (Rome 1616).

if he happened to be right once in a way, it must undoubtedly be the result of some plagiarism.

XIV.

(Page 400—433).

Strange tenacity of routine! All this barbarous teaching, unintelligible and become ridiculous, is prolonged for a century more in the midst of a cultured Italy and of modern spirit already triumphant all round! Averroes, it is true, no longer reigns in an equally exclusive manner; the hermeneutical means began to spread and the authority of the Greeks to counterbalance more and more that of the Arabs. But the Averroistic problems always agitated the Schools, and served as a programme of Instruction. From 1564 to 1589, Jacque Zabarella continued the traditions of the academic chair of Padua. Averroes is his guide in the interpretation of difficult passages; he quotes him with the profoundest respect, although on several points, he seems to approach the Alexandrists. He thinks with Averroes et Achillini against Avicinna, that the necessity of an absolute being does not prove the existence of a God, that the Heavens could be this first Principle, and that there is only one decisive proof of the existence of God, *i. e.*, the movement of the Heavens. Zabarella distinguishes, besides, between the opinion of Averroes and that of his partisans. In psychology, he actively opposes the Averroistic hypotheses. According to the system of the unity of souls, said he, the intellect in man would only be what the pilot is to a ship. But intellect is the informing principle in man, for which man is what he actually is. Intellect, however, multiplies itself after the number of bodies. Notwithstanding, Zabarella conformably to the doctrine of Saint Thomas Aquinas, establishes a difference between the real activity of the spirit and the active Intellect properly speaking which is the Intelligible or God as a universal motor. If it be objected to Zabarella, that he in this manner destroys the personality of the intellect, the personality which he desired to establish against the Averroists, he replies by making

a distinction between the primitive and the ulterior perceptions. In the former, there is nothing personal; illumination comes from outside. Later on, on the contrary, the intellect is *acquired*; it becomes our own in this sense, that God spreading His light incessantly is always at our disposal whenever we begin to think. By its nature, the individual intellect would be perishable; but rendered perfect by Divine illumination, it becomes immortal⁽¹⁾. The thought of Zabarella on this point appears, moreover, very little decided. He thinks like the whole school of Padua, that the immortality of the soul does not exist in the principles of the peripatetic physiology. In so far, he was an Alexandrist, and this is the judgment which his contemporaries have passed about it; *deterrimam alexandriorum sententiam palam professus*. The disputes of Zabarella and of Piccolomini remind at Padua, during the second half of the 16th century, the feats of Achillini and of Pomponat; Piccolomini had been the pupil of Zimara and appears to have approached the Averroists to whom the scholastic forms of his instruction, moreover, bound him.⁽²⁾ Frederic Pendasio of Mantua a very distinguished Professor of his day, approaches very much the method of Zabarella. The library of the University of Padua possesses the manuscript text of his lectures, yet unpublished, on the treatise *on the Soul*. There are few books so suitable to make us understand the method and the habits of teaching in Padua. The text of Averroes is distinguished in it line by line with the minutest care. Nevertheless, though accepting Averroes as the basis of his lectures, Pendasio attaches himself on the question of the intellect to the doctrine of Alexandre. The intellect multiplies itself according to the number of individuals. No doubt, the principles of reason are common to several; but the images which are necessary for all intellectual acts are various and manifold. Reason is unique and eternal, considered in the human species which eternally shares in it; it is transient, regarded in such and such an individual. The Averroists maintain, that numerical plurality belongs only to matter, and that if the intellect were manifold, it would be material. Not at all, re-

(1) Rister, *Geschichte der Neun*—Philos I, p. 718.

(2) Brucker, t. IV, p. 203—Tomasini, t. I, p. 208.

plies Pendasio, the intellect is made to unite with the body, but it does not depend on the body, "in the same way, as the shoe is made to adapt itself to the foot, and yet it does not depend on the foot." Pendasio is thus a pronounced Alexandrist. Cremonini, Loinus Alberti, and his disciples were also reckoned amongst the most decided defenders of Alexandrism. In general, all the Professors of Padua of the 16th century whose names have been preserved in the history of philosophy, belong to this *nuance*; and though making Averroes the text of their lectures, they severely condemn the unity of intellect. It would be difficult to name a single one, who, since the Council of Latran had frankly defended the views of the commentator on this point. Notwithstanding, considering the emphasis which Pendasio incessantly lays on refuting the *Averroists*, we are bound to suppose, that those views still rallied round themselves a certain number of partisans in Padua. The extreme rarity of the purely Averroistic texts have given a certain importance to an unpublished commentary on the 12 books of the *Metaphysics*, which the library of Saint Antony of Padua possesses (No. 424). This commentary is attributed to a certain Magister *Calaber*, otherwise unknown. The Father Minciotte, author of the catalogue of manuscripts of Saint-Antony, thinks that this could very well be Onofrio Calaber to whom Gaetano de Tiene dedicated his book *on the Soul*. This conjecture is inadmissible because Magister Calaber quotes Achillini, Niphus, Zimara, and Simon Portius, posterior to Gaetano by a century. Whatever that may be, the doctrine explained in this book is the purest Averroism. The first matter is one and common. The first cause acts necessarily, and acts as much as it can, since it cannot refrain from communicating its goodness. Nothing ever comes out of the absolute non-existence. Saint Thomas and the Latin philosophers have upset all the principles of the Aristotelian philosophy, by supposing the intellect to be manifold and immortal in its multiplicity. The intellect is eternal, because it is unique and because it is not entangled in the corruptibility of the individual. The whole theory of Averroes on the Heavens is adopted as the last word on cosmology.

At Bologna, at Naples, at Ferrars, as well as at Padua, people commented on Averroes. Nicolus Rissus, Nicolas Viti-gozzi, Franciscus Longus, Scipion Florillus published their lectures on *De Substantia Orbis*, and on the other portions of the Grand Commentary. The libraries of the Northern Italy contain an immense quantity of manuscripts belonging to this cycle of studies; since very often the note books of the school never reached the printing Press and circulated in manuscript copies. Even the court of Este was not a stranger to the Averroistic philosophy. Antoine Montecatino whom the Duke Alphonso II named as his philosopher with a remuneration of 24 *lives* every month, commented Aristotle and Averroes. ⁽¹⁾ The library of Ferrare (No. 304) possesses an autograph manuscript of the unpublished commentaries of the physician Antoine Brasavola on Averroes, dedicated to Hercules d'Este and to Rence de France.

Some verses in praise of the author, placed at the head of the book, according to the Italian custom, are a homage to Averroes:—*Corduba Tergemino felixjam sacret honorem, Commentatoris dogmata doctasui, etc., etc.* In his commentary on the *De Substantia Orbis*, dedicated to Francois de Gonzague, the Duke of Mantua, Brasavola shows himself equally very well versed in the writings of the Averroistic school which he divides into ancient and modern. He discusses turn by turn on every phrase of Averroes, the opinions of Baconthorp, Jeande Jandun, Gregory of Rimini, Trombetta, Gaetano de Tiene, Niphus, Zimara etc. Brasavola appears, however, to incline towards Alexandrism and censures sometimes with severity the opinions of Averroes. People will probably be more surprised to learn, that the poet Tasso was an Alexandrist and that one of the books which he asked Alde le Jeune to send him in his prison was the commentary of Alexandre on the Metaphysics.

XV.

The last representative of Averroistic scholasticism was Caesar Cremonini, successor of Zabarella at Padua. Cremonini has

(1) Brucker, tom IV, P. 231.

hitherto been appreciated in a very insufficient manner by the historians of Philosophy. People have judged him only by his printed works which are only dissertations of little importance, and cannot in any way help us to comprehend the colossal reputation which he attained. Cremonini was nothing but a Professor: his lectures were his real philosophy. Consequently, while his printed works were very badly sold, the redactions of his lectures were spread all over Italy and even beyond the Alps. It is well known, that the students frequently preferred the note (books which they had collected from the lips of their Professor to printed texts. Condemned, moreover, like Vico, like almost all the distinguished Italians of the 17th and the 18th centuries to live by his Rhetoric, Cremonini found editors for his sonnets and occasional pieces: *Clorindae Valliero*, *It ritorna di Dimone*, but could not find any for his more serious works. Generally, it is much more in the note) books than in the printed sources that we should study the school of Padua. For Cremonini, this task is easy enough, because the copies of his lectures are numberless in the North of Italy. The most complete copy without any contradiction is that of the library of Saint-Marco of Venice. It consists of 22 big volumes (classis VII, codd. 176—198), written by the same hand and containing year after year the lectures of Cremonini on all the portions of peripatetic philosophy. These manuscripts come from the *Council of Ten* to whom Cremonini had, in fact, dedicated his works as is proved by a letter found in the Mont—Cassin and which shall presently be spoken of. Cremonini, properly speaking, is neither an Alexandrist, nor an Averroist, although he inclines very much towards Alexandrism. Averroes and Jean de Jandun are the authors whom he utilises most, and who furnish him with the texts of his lectures the other masters of the Averroistic school appear turn by turn in these fastidious discussions. Cremonini appears to decide amongst them all by a superficial eclecticism. Like Cesalpin and Zabarella, he attached himself to an opinion which was then generally attributed to Averroes, namely, that the existence of God can be proved only by the physical hypothesis of the movement of the

Heavens. He admits without any important restrictions the theories of Averroes on celestial intelligences and on Providence. All the sublunary things are governed by the Heavens; there is an universal agent to whom belongs all the efficient cause of the Universe. God perceives nothing beyond Himself. Crimonini criticises with greater severity the Averroistic psychology. The principle of Averroes: *Recipiens debet esse denudatum a natura recepti*, appears to him false in a every respect. No more does he accept the theory of the unity of intellect, although he acknowledges that immortality ought to be found in the species and not in the individual. The active Intellect is God Himself, as Alexandre has put it. It is necessarily distinguished from the faculties of the soul, simple and existing by itself; since the active Intellect is in reality all the intelligibles, and that alone is intelligible which is simple, separate, subsisting by itself. Everything in a way is full of the soul: God is the very life of the universe, permeating everything in his quality of the active Intellect. The world is an eternal *fieri*; it never is; it is born and it dies incessantly. These are the doctrines which Cremonini taught for 17 years at Ferrara and for 40 years at Padua. They do not lack, as we see, in audacity, and it was only owing to his protestations of orthodoxy that Cremonini succeeded in avoiding persecution. The preface to his commentary on the treatise of the soul is in this respect a *chef d'oeuvre* of ingenuity. "Know" said he to his auditors, "that I do not pretend to teach you what we should believe about the soul, but only what Aristotle has said about it. But all that which in Aristotle is against religious faith the theologians and particularly, Saint Thomas have already sufficiently replied to. Let me tell you this once for all, in order that if you ever hear in my lectures any evil sounding proposition, you should know where to find the reply. Since if I ever dissembled any of Aristotle's views I should be totally wanting in the duties that I have to discharge." At every dangerous proposition he always hastened to add: "Please observe, that I do not give you here my own opinion (my own opinion can be only that of our mother the Holy Church), but that of Aristotle".

The tactics by which the philosophers of the day tried to revindicate some independence, were to explain the compromising doctrines under the name of somebody else, disavowing and even refuting them ; but taking good care that the refutation should be a feeble one and should sufficiently betray the real thoughts of the person who spoke. It follows from an interesting correspondence which I have found in the library of the Mount—Cassin that this manœuvre did not always suffice to shield Cremonini. On the 3rd of July, 1619, the grand inquisitor of Padua wrote to Cremonini to remind him of the decree of the Council of Latran, which orders all Professors to seriously refute the errors which they expose, and he demands a retraction from him, while quoting the example of the docility of Pendasio. In a letter of remarkable firmness, Cremonini replied to the inquisitor, that it did not rest with him to change his writings which had already received the approval of the Senate, and that being paid for explaining Aristotle, he should feel himself bound to return his fees, if he taught anything else but that which he believed to be really the thoughts of Aristotle. Let some one be entrusted to write against him as Niphus was entrusted to write against Pomponat, and he agreed not to reply: That's all that he could promise and that's all that people could obtain from his condescension. In this manner were prolonged until right into the heart of our modern times and in one of the most brilliant scientific centres of Europe, the teachings and controversies of the Middle Ages. In 1628, Gabriel Nande found Averroism still dominating at Padua. The death of Cremonini (1631) may be considered as the limit of the reign of this philosophy. Scholastic peripatetism shall hereafter no more count any partisan of value. Fortunico Licito (dead in 1656) saves its *débris* only by penetrating into it the spirit of modern philosophy. Berigard, more hardy than he, tried to replace peripatetism by Ionian physics. In 1700, Fardella taught Cartesianism at Padua without any opposition. Averroism had resisted for nearly three centuries the attacks of Platonism, of the Humanists, the theologians, of the Council of Latran, of Trent, and of the Inquisition ; it died on the day in which appeared the great, the serious and

the scientific school which was opened by the genius of Leonardo da Vinci, was continued by the Aconzios, the Erizzos, the Giordano Brunos, the Paul Sarpies, the Telsios, the Campanellas and was consummated by the genius of Gallileo. The great school of scholarship the real crown of Italy and which justly claims a portion of the glory somewhat exaggerated by Bacon, that truly modern school, and entirely free from the barbarism of the Middle Ages could alone put an end to this decrepit Aristotelism. The true philosophy of our modern times is the positive and experimental science of things. Positive science alone has had the power to sweep away that heap of sophisms, of childish questions void of sense which scholasticism had accumulated. Positive science alone could cure the human mind of that strange malady, and lead it back to the right path, to the contemplation of things as they are, and to the vivid sentiment of reality. The extinction of Averroism can, however, be regarded from a different stand point. If it was on one side victory of the rational and scientific method, it was on the other side a victory of religious orthodoxy. Paduan Averroism, insignificant as philosophy, acquires a truly historical interest when we regard it as having served as a pretext for the liberty of thought. This apparent contradiction has nothing to surprise us. Have'nt we seen Jansenism, the strictest of all the sectaries represent in its own way the cause of liberty? Venice was in a certain way the Holland of Italy; liberty of thought was utilised there as a branch of very productive trade; all the Protestant books came from there. The Morosini society, formed chiefly of the partisans of Cremonini was the home of bold speculations. Even the miracles of Saint Anthony were such as suited a centre of such incredulity. It is the heretic *Alerdin* (note this Arab name) converted by the prodigy of a glass of water; it is a blasphemer of the Eucharist convinced by an ass; it is the fishes which are more docile than the heretics to the word of God. The people and the monks found it pleasant to give lessons in this manner to those great doctors who treated their beliefs with a disdain scarcely dissembled. But this libertinism of opinion which lend such an original physiognomy to the North East of Italy during the 16th century, disappears with Arab peripateticism.

in the first-half of the 17th century. All intellectual activity goes out at the same time. Venice which once covered the world with her books, Venice has no longer a single publisher of books, and the Aldes have been reduced, in order to avoid being bankrupts to print breviaries! In general, the effects of an intellectual reaction become perceptible only at the end of a generation. The Catholic revival that followed the abortion of reform in Italy, was the stroke of death given to the Italian movement; and yet this movement went on for more than half-a-century. Italy in 1600 still had something of the life of the epoch of Leo X, so free, so full and so flourishing. Then coldness, drawing nearer and nearer, reached to the very heart. Art produces nothing more than the affectations of Bernin and the extravagances of Barromini; human thought serves no other purpose than to make *sonnets*, and *ciculates* for the academies; everything sleeps as under a charm. In 1650, Italy has no other anxiety than the station for prayer and the *Ave-Maria*, her oratories and her religious fraternities.

XVI.

It is because of not keeping in mind this double conception of the name of Averroes, that people have reckoned amongst Averroists individuals quite strange besides to the family of the peripateticians of Padua, such as Cesalpin Cardan, Vanini and Berigard. Cesalpin is a mind too original to be mixed up in a school whose character is to lack originality. By certain points of doctrine, he, it is true, approaches Averroes; but by his spirit and his method he holds nothing in common with Paduan Averroism. Nicolas Jaurel, his adversary, finds his doctrine more absurd and more impious than that of Averroes. Cesalpin is, in fact, a veritable predecessor of Spinoza. There is only one sole life which is the life of God or of the universal soul. God is not the efficient but the constituent cause of all things. Divine intelligence is unique; but the human intelligence multiplies itself according to the number of individuals; since human intelligence is not in an actual but a potential state. In this manner, while conserving

the dogma which forms the basis of Averroism, Cesalpin avoids the confusion which has produced in this school such a long series of errors. The object is identical, but the subject is manifold and we might be allowed to say, that the object multiplies itself by individual consciousness according to the number of subjects. Cesalpin lived through the period of the severest Inquisition without being molested. He was even physician to the Pope, Professor at the Sapienza and saw Giordano Bruno burnt at the Champ de Flore. He used a fairly unique trick to escape censure: "I know well" said he "that all these doctrines are full of errors against our faith, and I repudiate these errors; but it is not my business to refute them; I leave that work to theologians more profound than myself." The doctrine of Cardan is not without analogy to that of Cesalpin. All individual souls are virtually contained in the universal soul as the worm in the plant by which it lives. In his treatise, *De Uno*, one of the first he composed Cardan admits without any restrictions the Averroistic hypothesis of the unity of intellect. Later on, in his *De Consolatione*, he retracted his first opinion, and openly admitted, that there could exist no unique intelligence either for all animate beings, or for all men. He maintains in it, that intelligence is as personal to us as sensibility, and that the souls are distinct here below, as they shall be in the other life. Finally, in a third treatise, *the Theonoston* or the immortality of the soul, Cardan tries to conciliate these two contradictory opinions. Intelligence is unique, but can be regarded from two different points of view, either in its relation to eternal and absolute existence, or in its apparitions in time. Unique in its source, it is manifold in its manifestations. An excellent solution to which we must always revert for an explanation of the fact of intelligence.

In spite of this variation of doctrine, admitted by himself Cardan is not treated less of an Averroist in the diatribes of his antagonist Jules-Cæsar Scaliger. By the method of his philosophising and by the form of his writings, Cardan by no means belongs to the family of the Professors of Padua. But by his attitude towards theology he is, indeed, one of the most pronounced

representatives of that which in a different sense was called Averroism. The passage in his book, *De Subtititate* (I-XI.) where he makes the partisans of the Christian, Jewish, Mussalman and heathen religions argue against one another and which brusquely finishes without conclusion with the formula: *Igitur his arbitrio victoriæ relictis*.....has made him to be reckoned amongst the authors of the book of *The Three Imposters*. One of the familiar demons which used to appear before his father boasted of being an Averroist: *Ille vero palam averroistam se profitebatur*, an idea which appeared very impertinent to Gabriel Naude, because Averroes did not believe in demons at all. (³)

It is also by mistake that people have ranged Claudy Berigard amongst the Averroists. Brucker has completely absolved him from this reproach. Berigard, on the contrary should be counted amongst the adversaries of peripatetism in general and of Averroism in particular. He admits the infusion of the individual soul at the moment of birth and consequently a plurality of souls. Notwithstanding, we can imagine, that his decided naturalism and his bold negations have given him a place amongst the Averroists in the larger acceptation which public opinion gave to that word. But the most original type of Averroism, understood in this sense is without contradiction, the unfortunate Vanini. He himself assures us, that he had for his teacher a Carmelite, Jean Bacon, called *the Prince of Averroists* who did nothing but make his pupil swear by the name of Averroes. We catch Vanini here in the very act of buffoonery; the personage whom he would speak of is without contradiction Jean Baconthorpe who died in 1346 two hundred and forty years before his birth! It appears, besides, that Vanini had taken into his head to mystify the public about the name of his teachers. He constantly gives himself out as the pupil of Pomponat and yet Pomponat died in 1525 and Vanini was born in 1585. Vanini does not seem to have read with much attention even the books of his *divine preceptor* as he calls him; since far from concluding that Averroes by virtue of metempsychosis must have passed into the body of Pomponat, he

(3) *Apologie des grands hommes*, p. 232—Bayle, art *Averroes*, note, F.

would have found at every page of Pomponat's works a refutation of Averroes. Vanini did not, however, look so closely into the matter. This eccentric spirit took to anything that could serve his bragging of impiety. In the thirtieth of his dialogues, he relates, that one day preaching on the question : *Why was Man created by God ?* he solved it *by that famous scale of Averroes* according to which there is a sort of gradation of spirits from the most humble to the most highly elevated *which is God or primitive matter*. In Genoa, Vanini wanted to teach according to these tenets, but says his biographer, people there were by no means biased in favour of Averroes, and he was obliged to go away. His favourite authors, he said, were Aristotle, *Averroes*, Cardan, Pomponat ; and after the example of his reputed teacher, Jean Bacon, he placed into the hands of his pupil no other book except that of Averroes. Evidently, the Averroes who is spoken of here is not the Great Commentator, but an imaginary author to whom people attributed blasphemous books which were easy to read. Vanini knew, however, the great Commentary. He refutes with an affected severity the Averroistic theories about the eternity of the world, the intelligences, Providence and of the unity of souls. But Vanini ought not to be taken seriously in his views ; the opinion he refutes is almost always the one he wants to inculcate. Whatever weakness we might feel in spite of ourselves for this flexible spirit and particularly for those piquant philosophical sketches which he has called his *Dialogues*, we cannot deny, that this enthusiasm, this delicacy and this acuteness of mind did not hide the most immoral scepticism and the most unblushing materialism in the world. Instead of the gay and *spiritual* frankness which characterises the French incredulity of the 18th century, the Averroistic incredulity of the 16th century is gloomy, scornful, hypocritical and without dignity. People wrote books in defence of dogmas which they really wanted to attack. All the objections were given in their full force while treating those who made them as fools and wretches ; then some reply was given, in a derisive manner, although it was admitted that it was impossible to give any suitable reply by the method of reasoning. What hold could

the Inquisition have on a man who made an apology for the Council of Trent, deserved the approbation of the Sorbonne, called a book: *Amphitheatre de l'eternelle Providence, divino-magique, christiano-physique, astrologico-catholique, contre les anciens philosophes, les Athees, les Epicuriens, les Peripateticiens, les Stoiciens, &c.* and finished his most notoriously blasphemous tirades with the words. *Ceterum sacrosanctoe Romanae ecclesiae me subijcio ?*

Probably the 16th century also like the 13th purposely exaggerated the malice of the Averroists, and took pleasure to accumulate on certain representative types of impiety all the wicked thoughts that were running about in the air and of which every body found himself, more or less, guilty. The first time that an incredulous thought arises in the mind of a believer, he gets frightened about it and likes to relegate his own temptations on to the shoulders of other people. *The Three Imposters* returned like a nightmare to intimidate the conscience. "The joke that the world has been seduced from the right path by three sharpers" said La Monnoie "and constantly reiterated by the free-thinkers would give an occasion to somebody amongst them to say, that there was in it quite enough to exercise his mind, and that it would be a nice subject for a book." Then all the different sects, Catholic, Protestant, &c. cast it away as an insult. Bodin, while making the partisans of the different religions argue against one another give preference to none; the evil-disposed even seemed to believe, that the Christians had almost always the worst of it in his book and that the replies were never so forcible as the objections. Postel pretended, that a perfect religion should consist in equal proportions of Christianity, of Judaism and of Mahometanism. As for Vanini, *that wicked scoundrel, that seeker after open filth, that rabid and the most damnable villain that has ever existed* (Gorasse) it was he who had brought out, so people said, a new edition of that execrable book. The words which all the eye-witnesses attribute to him as he was going to his final torture, *that he was dying as a philosopher* seem to be a reminiscence of Averroes:—*Moriatur anima mea morte philosophorum: May my soul die the death of a philosopher!*

XVII.

In general, Averroism properly so-called, that is to say, the study of the Great Commentary spread very little beyond Italy. Patrizzi gives as a characteristic trait of the schools of France and of Spain that there the pure text of Aristotle is explained without commentaries. Nomadic Italians, Francois Vimercati for example, only brought some noise about it on this side of the mountains. Jean Bruyerin Champier (in 1537) bears witness to the transient vogue which the foreign teachers obtained with their new book: *Postquam ex Italia terra in Gallias nostras philosophi quidam convolarunt, magna cum laude pariter et frequenti auditorio commentaria Averrhoë in Aristotelis volumina interpretantes.* Averroes, however, never made a brilliant fortune in France. The copies in our libraries bear no trace of reading; its edges are intact, and I have always found the pages uncut which had escaped the cutting of the binder. Lyons, however, offers some traces of Averroism. There were published in Lyons several editions of the medical and philosophical works of Averroes, "which books and treatises" says the privileged authority of the very Christian King Henri II "are full and adorned with beautiful and singular authority of philosophy for the good and the benefit of the public weal of our kingdom; and for the utility and instruction of those who care to see and read them." This royal recommendation was not much heeded. Averroes in the 16th century went definitively out of the French schools, and we must believe, that Ruckermann expressed an entirely personal wish when he demanded with insistence, that the Medicean typography which had published the Arabic text of Avicenne, should equally bring out an edition of Averroes. Spain and Portugal where scholasticism has continued up to our own days saw also the authority of Averroes continue for a long time. Antonio has put together all the eulogiums which had been offered to him, by a great number of Spanish and Portuguese physicians. Averroes is, however, judged in a very severe style by the Jesuits of Coimbra. Relegated, moreover, amongst "the books of scholasticism which serve no longer either to fold reeds of musical instru-

ments or to make cartoons," Averroes was strongly disfigured in public opinion. These heavy commentaries which people could consult with so much facility were represented as libels full of blasphemies. A surprising thing! Neither Bayle, nor Brucker who devotes lengthy articles to Averroes in which they have collected the most hazardous anecdotes that were current about him, has ever thought of opening his books. We might say, that it related to rare or unpublished works of which we are obliged, to speak with confidence. Naude who ought to have known him far better during his journey to Padua, represents him as a *frank atheist* and applies to him the phrase of Tertullian's: *Sub pallio philosophorum patriarcha hæreticorum*. In the judgment of Duplessis-Morney, Aristotle is very little religious, but Averroes his interpreter is of the greatest impiety. Duplessis has even taken the trouble to refute formally the theory of an universal intellect. Campanella and after him Berigard, regard Averroes as the first author of the blasphemous book, called *The Three Imposters*. I don't exactly remember what honest English theologian has called him *a human monster and the secretary of Hell*. The celebrated phrase: *moriatur anima mea morte philosophorum* was enough for Vossius to make a frank libertine of him and for La Monnoie to set him up as a fanatical contempter of all the religions. Gui Patin seems to be much less scandalised about it, and ranges him simply amongst the deists. Another believes himself to be authorised by a passage of Grasse's to attribute to Averroes such strange political views as follow ⁽¹⁾ :—

"For mankind (it is the opinions of Vanini which are being explained) it would be necessary to do what the wood-cutters do every year in the great forests. They enter there to see the trees and to find out the dead or the green wood and to eliminate the forests, cutting down all that is useless and superfluous or injurious, in order to retain only the good trees or the young pollards of promise. In the same way, said this wicked atheist, it would be necessary to pay a rigorous visit to all the inhabitants of big and populous towns, and to put to death all those that are useless

(1) Grasse, *Doctrine curieane*, p. 615.

and prevent the remiander to live as are those persons who have no useful profession for the public, the decayed old men, the vagabonds and the sluggards ; it would be necessary to eliminate nature, lighten the towns, and put to death every year a million of persons who are like the thorns and thistles for others preventing them to grow." "These," cries one of the biographers of Vanini, after having quoted this passage, "these are the fruits of the school of Averroes." (4)

Finally, in the 17th century, some Jesuits had also the idea of refuting Averroes. Antoine Sirmond in his book against Pomponat (Paris, 1625, exactly 100 years after the death of Pomponat) fought vigorously against the unity of Intellect. This hypothesis would make God responsible for the errors of men ; it supposes, moreover, that the same subject is susceptible of opposing modifications. If Averroes had ever heard of the action of God on intelligence spoken of as the first cause, Sirmond would have nothing to find fault with ; but he cares very little to know, whether that was really his thought or not. Posseven, his colleague, is much more severe. Averroes is in his eyes the choregus of impiety, the edition of the Juntas and of Bagolini the work of the Devil. He transcribes in all its length the long diatribe of Vives and cannot imagine, that a Christian could ever dream of asking for instruction from an impious man as he who in the midst of the floods of light of Christianity, eleven hundred years after Jesus Christ had pushed his voluntary perversity so far as to remain for ever in infidelity. Moeri, d'Herbelot Bayle and Rapin have only accepted the common tradition on the impiety of Averroes. The 17th and the 18th centuries repeated in confidence the same fables. Leibnitz regards him as a pernicious author who has done the greatest possible harm to the Christian world, and Vieo regards him as the representative of the basis of all impiety inherent in peripatetism. By a strange hazard, the phrase which is attributed to Averroes about the Eucharist became a weapon in the Protestant controversy. Duplessis Mornay, Daille, Drelin-

(4) David Durand, *La vie and les sentiments de Lucilis Vanini*, p. 52-54.

Court make use of it to prove the great wrong which this Catholic dogma did to the Christian religion in the eyes of the heathens. It was thus the destiny of Averroes to serve as a plank for the most diverse hatreds in the struggles of the human mind and to cover with his name several doctrines which certainly he thought the least of.

The history of Averroism, properly speaking, is only the history of a grand paradox. A very free interpreter of peripatetic doctrines, Averroes saw himself interpreted in his own turn in a manner still more free. From alteration to alteration, the philosophy of the Lyceum was reduced to the following:—*Negation of the supernatural, of miracles, of angels, of demons, of Divine intervention, explanation of religions and of moral beliefs by imposture.* Certainly, neither Aristotle nor Averroes hardly ever thought that their doctrines should some day be brought down to that. But in the case of men elevated to the dignity of symbols we must always distinguish between the personal life and the life beyond the tomb,—that which they really were and that which posthumous opinion made of them. For the philologist, a text has only one sense; but for the human spirit which has put into this text its own life and all its affections—for the human spirit which, at every hour, suffers from new wants, this scrupulous interpretation of philology is not sufficient. It is necessary, that the text it has accepted should resolve all its doubts and satisfy all its desires. Thence a kind of necessity for a paradox in the religious and philosophical development of humanity. This paradox, in the periods of authority, is a sort of revenge which the human spirit takes against the infallibility of the official text. Man abdicates his liberty on one point only to recover it on some other. It knows how to find thousand subterfuges and thousand subtleties for escaping from the chains it has imposed on itself. We distinguish, we comment, we add, we explain; and it is thus that under the weight of the two greatest authorities that have ever ruled over human thought, *i. e.* the Bible and Aristotle, that the human spirit has still remained free; it is thus that there is no pro-

position so rash which could not be held by some theologian, pretending, of course, not to go beyond the boundaries of orthodoxy, that there is no doctrine so mystical which could not be put forward under the cover of an interpretation of Aristotle. What could have become of our humanity, if since the last eighteen centuries, it had understood the Bible with the lexicons of Gesenius and of Bretschneider? We can create nothing out of a text which we understand too accurately. The really fruitful interpretation which within an authority accepted once for all knows how to find a reply to the ever recurring exigencies of our human nature is far more the work of human conscience than that of philology.

THE END.

N. B.—This is the real end of Renan's "Averroes et l'Averroisme" bringing it down to the page 433 of the original volume. Then follows an Appendix of II unpublished pieces in Arabic, Latin and Italian for reference, covering the pages between 435 to 480 of the book. After this, there is an *Alphabetical order* of the principal names and headings which I translate and transcribe below

HYDERABAD (DECCAN),

6th September 1908.

NISHIKANTA CHATTOPADHYAYA.

Notice to the third edition of "Averroes and Averroism"

BY

ERNST RENAN.

This essay which was published for the first time in 1852 has in the present edition undergone a good deal of re-handling. The biography of Ibn-Rushd, the history of Averroism amongst the Jews and even two or three points in the history of Averroism in the Middle Ages have been made more complete, thanks to the study of some new sources and to the recent works of Messieurs Munk, Joseph Muller, Steinschneider, Dozy and Gosche. Deferring to the wishes of certain persons, I have given in an appendix the unpublished Arabic texts according to which the biography and the bibliography of Ibn-Rushd have been set up. Monsieur Munk had already prepared the printing of the three of these texts, namely, the pieces of Ibn-el-Abbar, of El-Ansari and of Dhehebi; and it is after his copies that these have been published here. The very difficult piece of El-Ansari which my learned colleague, considering his state of blindness, could not revise has been the object of a new critical study for which the assistance of Messieurs de Slane, Dozy and Derenbourg have been infinitely useful to me. I believe that this singular fragment shall be read with interest by Arabic scholars on account of its beautifully rhymed style, and particularly for the curious circular of Ibn-Ayyasch which the author has inserted in it. The piece of Dhehebi is in part only a repetition of others; I have, however, thought it my duty to put it in as it furnishes certain *variantes* of readings. For the piece of Ibn-Abi-Oceibia, I have been able to profit by a collation of the two Oxford manuscripts which Monsieur Dozy has kindly communicated to me. As regards the document published in the appendix under No. V, I have had only a very defective copy to make a text out of it. The Imperial

printing press with its accustomed generosity has kindly placed at the disposal of the editor the composition of the different pieces, executed with all the perfection which it knows how to put into its oriental works. I have weighed with an extreme care the observations which some critics of high authority and particularly Monsieur Henri Ritter have kindly addressed to me at the time of the first edition. I have, however, not been able to modify my stand-point with regard to what concerns the origin and the character of the Arabian philosophy in general. I still persist in thinking that no great dogmatic sect has presided at the creation of this philosophy. The Arabs did nothing but adopt the *ensemble* of the Greek encyclopædia such as the whole world had accepted in the 7th and 8th centuries. Greek science played at this epoch with the Syrians, the Nabateans, the Harraneans and the Sassanide Persians a *role* very analogous to what European science has been playing in the East since half-a-century. When the Arabs first got initiated into the order of these studies, they received Aristotle as a master of high authority, but they did not choose him, just as such and such a school of Cairo where geometry and chemistry are taught on modern lines is not guided in the preference it accords to certain authors by any theoretical considerations. It is very true, on the other hand, that in developing itself on a traditional basis, Arabian philosophy arrived, particularly in the 11th and 12th centuries, at a true originality. Here I am quite prepared to make certain concessions. When I put myself again to follow after an interval of ten years, the traces of this interesting movement of studies, I found that the position which I had given to it was rather lower and not higher than what it really deserved. Ibn-Rushd, in particular, has rather increased than diminished in my eyes. Altogether the intellectual development represented by the Arab scholars was till the end of the 12th century superior to that of the Christian world. But it was not able to pass into the institutions of the people. Theology opposed in this respect an insurmountable barrier. The Mahomedan philosopher remained always either an *amateur* or a court functionary. The day fanaticism gave a fright to sovereigns, philosophy disappeared; its manuscripts were destroyed by royal

ordinance, and it was the Christians alone who remembered later on, that Islamism had had scholars and thinkers.

There, according to my view is the curious lesson we derive from all this history. The Arab philosophy offers an example almost unique of a very high culture, almost instantly suppressed without leaving any traces behind, and nearly forgotten by the very people who created it. Islamism showed in this case that which is irremediably narrow in its genius. Christianity also has not been particularly favourable to the development of positive science; it has succeeded in arresting positive Science in Spain and in hindering it a good deal in Italy, but it has never quite stifled it, and the most advanced branches of the Christian family have even finished by effecting a reconciliation with it. Incapable of transforming itself and of admitting any element of civil and profane life, Islamism tore away from its bosom every germ of rational culture. The last tendency was opposed, as long as the hegemony of Islam remained in the hands of the Arabs, race so witty and subtle, or of the Persians, a race very much inclined to speculation; but it has reigned without any counter weight ever since the barbarians (Turks, Berbers, &c.,) have taken the guidance of Islam. The Mahomedan world has since then entered into that period of ignorant brutality whence it came out only to fall into the dull agony in which it is now struggling before our eyes.

After revising, on the contrary, the sentence that I passed on the school of Padua, I have not been able to discover that I had been too severe. Apart from some distinguished individualities, the philosophical school of Padua is nothing but the prolongation of a degenerate scholasticism into the very heart of our modern times. Far from serving the progress of science, it has done injury to it by maintaining beyond measure the reign of old authors behind time. Paduan Averroism is altogether a philosophy of the indolent. We could not cite a more striking proof of the danger which the teaching of philosophy as a distinct science brings with it in a scientific establishment. Such a teaching always finishes by falling a victim to routine and by becoming injurious to the progress of positive science. Is it not, indeed, re-

markable, that it was not from the learned Padua but from the poetic and frivolous Florence, that the great scientific movement that of Galileo had gone out? Truly speaking, all scholasticism according to the expression of Nizolius, is the capital enemy of truth. A logic and an abstract system of metaphysics, imagining themselves to be able to do without science become fatal obstacles to the progress of the human mind, particularly when a corporation recruiting within itself, finds in them its *raison d'être* and sets them up as its traditional teachings.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

If we had to search in the history of philosophy only for positive results and immediately applicable to the needs of our own times we should have to reproach ourselves with regard to these, researches as being nearly sterile. I am the first to admit, that we have nothing or almost nothing to learn either from Averroes or from the Arabs, or from the Middle Ages. Although the problems which engage the human mind to-day are at bottom identical with those which people have always tried to solve, the form under which these problems appear in our days is so peculiar to our century, that very few of the ancient solutions are still capable of being applied to them. We must not demand from the past except the past itself. Political history has ennobled itself ever since people have ceased to seek in it for lessons of cleverness or of morals. In the same way, the interest of philosophical history is to be found less perhaps in the positive information we derive from it than from the picture of the successive evolutions of the human mind.

The characteristic trait of the 19th century is to have substituted the historical method for the dogmatic one, in all studies relating to the human mind. Literary critique is no more than an exposition of the diverse forms of the beauty, that is, of the different ways in which the different families and nations

different ages of humanity have solved the æsthetic problem. Philosophy is only a picture of the proposed solutions to solve the philosophical problem. Theology is nothing but a history of the spontaneous efforts made to solve the divine problem. History is, in fact, the necessary form of the science of all that is subject to the laws of changeable and successive life. The science of languages, it is the history of languages; the science of literatures and of philosophies, it is the history of literatures and of philosophies; the science of the human mind, it is also the history of the human mind, and not merely an analysis of the wheel-work of the human soul. Psychology regards only the individual, but regards the individual in a manner abstract and absolute as a permanent subject and always identical with itself; in the eyes of the critique, consciousness develops in humanity as it does in the individual; it has its own history. The great progress of the critique has been to substitute the category of the *becoming* to the category of the *being*, the conception of the relative to a conception of the absolute of movement to that of immobility. Formerly, every thing was considered as *being*; people spoke of philosophy, of law, of politics, of art and of poetry in an absolute manner; now-a-days everything is considered as in a process of *becoming*. Not that progress and development were formerly not a general law as it is now: the earth was revolving before Copernicus though people were not conscious about it. Substantial hypotheses always precede phenomenal hypotheses; the Egyptian statue, immoveable and the hands fastened to the knees is the necessary antecedent to the Greek statue which lives and which moves.

From this point of view of the critical science, what we seek in the history of philosophy, is much less philosophy properly so-called than history. The Arab philosophy is certainly a very important fact in the annals of the human mind, and a century so curious to know as ours could not pass away without having constituted all its proper worth to this ring of tradition. We must, however, renounce this in advance. Almost no result shall be gained from this study which our contemporary philosophy could

assimilate with advantage, unless it be the historical result itself. It is not from the semitic race that we should seek for lessons in philosophy. By a strange destiny, this race which has known to imprint on its religious creations such a high character of power has not produced the smallest essay on philosophy which might be called its own. Philosophy amongst the Semites has never been except a purely external loan, and without great fecundity, an imitation, in fact, of Grecian philosophy. We must say also the same about the philosophy of the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages, so profound, so original and so poetical in its religious enthusiasm, is with regard to its intellectual culture only a long grouping after a return to the great school of noble thoughts that is to say, of antiquity. The Renaissance, far from being, as it has been said, a wandering away of the modern spirit, led astray by a strange ideal, is only a return to the true traditions of civilised humanity. Why should we blame the Renaissance and our modern times for doing with knowledge and discernment that which the Middle Ages did without criticism? Was it really better to study Aristotle from detestable translations than to study him in the original text? Was it really better to know Plato from some bad commentary of the *Timæus* or from second-hand quotations than from the *ensemble* of his works? Was it better to know Homer from Dictys and Dares than to read *Iliah* and *Odessey*?

All that the Semitic Orient and all that the Middle Ages have had of philosophy properly so-called, they owe to Greece. If, however, it was a question of choosing in the past for a philosophical authority, Greece alone would have the right to give us lessons; not the Greece of Egypt and of Syria, altered by a mixture of barbarous elements, but the Greece, original and sincere, in her expression, pure and classical. On the contrary, if, instead of asking for doctrines from the past, we ask only for facts, the periods of decadence and of syncretism, the periods of transmission and of slow alteration shall have more interest for us than the periods of perfection in which original sallies of genius seem sometimes to efface themselves under the perfection of form and the exact measure of thought.

These observations seem to me to be necessary to anticipate the reproach of having devoted so much care to doctrines which have nothing more to do with us. But the moment it is admitted, that the history of the human mind is the greatest reality open to our investigations, every research to enlighten a corner of the past has a worth and a significance of its own. It is, in a certain sense, more important to know what the human spirit has thought about a problem than to have an opinion about that problem; since even when the problem is insoluble, the effort of the human mind to solve it constitutes an experimental fact which is always interesting; and even supposing, that philosophy was doomed for ever only to be an eternal but useless effort to define the Infinite, we could not at least deny, that there was in this very effort for curious spirits a spectacle worthy of the highest regard.

I have, in general, abstained from expressing my own opinion about the problems which the subject of my book has led me to touch; or at least I have done so as soberly as possible, only trying to represent with accuracy the individuality of the characters and the physiognomy of the schools. Schools are in philosophy what parties are in politics; the personal system of the historian who relates the struggles of the schools and of the parties serves most frequently only to falsify his judgment and to spoil the effect of his picture. The critical judgment excludes the dogmatic judgment. Who knows if the true *finesse* of mind does not consist in refraining from coming to a definite conclusion? It is, observe it well, neither in difference nor scepticism, it is the critique. A man is a true historian only on the condition of knowing how to reproduce at will in himself the different types of the life of the past, in order to understand their originality and to find them turn by turn legitimate or defective, beautiful or ugly, worthy of hatred or of love.

I should take away from the present work its most honourable recommendation, if I forgot to mention that it was undertaken according to the instructions of M. M. Victor Cousin and of Victor Le Clerc. However unworthy it might appear to be of the benevolence with which these eminent men have encouraged

this work, people will find in it, I hope, a feeble result of the movement which those gentlemen have impressed on the studies of literary and philosophical history. I should also be lacking in my most cherished *souvenirs*, if I did not mention here those persons whose complaisance has permitted me to enrich with certain unpublished documents the history of Paduan Averroism: Monsieur l'abbé Valentinelli, librarian of Saint Marc, in Venice; M. Baldassare Poli, Professor of philosophy at the University of Padua; the learned M. Samuel Luzzatto; a good many more who have made me vividly appreciate Italian hospitality. Finally I must express my gratitude to M. M. Thomas Munoz and J de Alava, members of the Academy of Madrid, who have helped me to obtain from the Escorial, the copy of an Arabic document very important for the subject which has occupied me.

I have taken the trouble to show in my notes what I owe to the excellent works which have already appeared amongst us on Aristotelian philosophy. People will notice particularly of what use have been to me the researches of M. Haureau on scholastic philosophy, and those of M. Munk on the Arabian and Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages. Independently of the very substantial article which he has inserted on Ibn-Rushd in the *Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques*, M. Munk has collected on the Commentator and his family some interesting documents which he would have already published, had it not been for the fatal accident which has interrupted his learned occupations. Undertaken from a different stand-point, my work far from rendering his useless will only serve to create a desire for it, if, as we hope, science has not been deprived for good of the results which it had a right to expect from a spirit so sagacious and an erudition so cultivated as his. ⁽¹⁾

(1) M. Munk has since fulfilled a part of his promises by reproducing, with considerable additions, his article on *Ibn-Rushd* in his *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, (Paris, 1859.)

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